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Terms used in this report are defined as: 
Farm firm: the decision making unit in agricultural production; a 
unit v/ithin which, factors are combined and production decisions are made, 
whether the resources are owned by one resource owner or are split between 
a landlord and a tenant. 
Resource: Any factor of input in the firm; a factor is a vinit of 
resource. 
Renter: a tenant or a part-owner. 
Tenant: an operator who rents farm land from a landlord. 
Type of renter: a classification of tenants; full tenants, one land­
lord rent all the land they operate from one landlord; full tenants, two 
or more landlords rent two or more tracts from different landlords; part-
owners, one landlord rent one tract and own some land; part-owners, two or 
more landlords rent two or more tracts from different landlords and own 
some land. 
Landlord: an individual owning or controlling a tract of land 
operated by a tenant. 
Lease: or leasing arrangement; or rental agreement; a written or oral 
contract betv/een a landlord and a tenant concerning use of resources for a 
given period and a specified payment. 
Gash lease: a rental agreement in which the payment is a specified 
amount of money. 
Orop-shar© lease: a rental agreement in v;hich the payment is a share 
of the crop or crops. 
V 
Crop-share-cash lease: a rontal agreement in which the payment is 
a share of the crop or crops and a specified amount of money. 
Livestock-share lease: a rental agreement in which the payment is 
a share of the income from livestock and crops, and livestock are the 
major source of income. 
Labor-share lease: a rental agreement in which the payment is a 
share of the crops or livestock income, but the tenant's contribution is 
primarily his own labor. 
Special or other lease: a rental agreement in which the payment 
cannot be classified clearly into one of the above types. 
Statistically significant: or significant difference; a difference 
or variation too large to be explained by chance or by sampling; the 
5 percent level of significance is used for all tests in this study. 
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PURPOSES AND METHODS OF TEES STUDY 
Introduction 
In October, 1950, the Landlord-Tenant Relations Subcommittee was 
assigned the task of preparing an outline for a study of leasing practices 
for consideration as a regional research project to be sponsored by the 
North Central Land Tenure Research Q-ommittee. The basic purpose in this 
study was to develop a set of principles to be applied in dealing with the 
questions and problems raised by landlords and tenants concerning content 
of leases and effective leasing arrangements. The proposal for a regional 
study grew out of a joint meeting with the North Central Farm Management 
Extension Committee in April, 1950, in which research needs in land tenure 
were discussed. Between October, 1950, and March, 1951, the SubcoErimittee 
prepared a project proposal for a regional study to be conducted by use of 
a mail questionnaire. In March, 1951, the North Central Land Tenure 
Research Committee authorized the Landlord-Tenant Relations Subc^nmittee 
to initiate the study in all states able to participate. Seven states 
joined in the study, in cooperation with the Farm Foundation and the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics. 
A sampling procedure was developed in collaboration with the Statis­
tical Laboratory, Iowa State College, to obtain a random sample of names 
of persons operating one or more tracts of farm land under a lease. 
Economic areas as defined by the Census of Agriculture were used s^s the 
unit for sampling and analysis. In two states, two or more economic 
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areas were oombinjed, giving a total of 46 areas or oombinations of areas, 
as shown in Figure 1. These 46 areas are oalled economic areas in all 
following discussion. 
The source of names of tenants was the records in the county offices 
of the Production and J/3iarketlng Administration. Within each area used in 
the study a sampling rate was calculated to give a total of 900 jiames of 
tenants, distributed amiong and within coxmties in such manner that each 
lease in effect; in 1951, whether for a whole farm or a tract of land, had 
equal chance of falling within the sample. The unit of observation was a 
lease,, rather than a farm. A total of 900 names would furnish ?00 usable 
schedules per area^ aasuming a one-thii^d response to the mail question­
naire,^ The 300 replies per area were svifficient for reliable results, 
in view of the kinds of analyses intended and the tjrpes of inferences 
expected to be drawn frcan the data to be collected from respondents. 
The content of tha questionnaire was determined by the Subcommittee 
through discussion, pretesting of the preliminary forms, and attention to 
the kinds of analyses expected to be made. The questions were designed 
to obtain information on the farm operated by the tenant, the tenant, the 
landlord, and the details of the lease covering one tract. In addition, 
five questions were included to obtain information on the opinions of 
tenants ooiicerniiig leasing problems and changes needed to improve leases. 
The questionnaires were the same in all states, except for a few details 
^The estimated one-third response was based upon experiences with 
mailed questionnaires in an earlier regional study. John F. Timmons and 
Raleigh Barlowe. Farm oivnership in the Midwest. Iowa Agricultural Exper­
iment Station Research Bulletin 56l. 1949. 
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on shares of crops, operating expenses and ownership of machinery. In 
accordance with requirements, the questionnaire was approved by the 
Bureau of the Budget.^ 
Printing and mailing of questionnaires, obtaining the sample, check­
ing the returned questionnaires, editing and coding schedules, and the 
punching of cards for lEM analysis were the responsibility of the parti­
cipating state, under uniform procedures approved by the Subcommittee, 
All regional analysis and the preparation of a regional report were per­
formed at Iowa State College by or under the direction of a full-time 
project leader in consultation with Subcommittee members. 
The Subcommittee met as needed 7fhen called by the Chairman. Each 
meeting was carefully planned. Materials and problems of procedure to be 
discussed were developed by the project leader and sent to members of the 
Subcommittee well in advance of each meeting. 
The general plans for the study including the design of the sample, 
the source of names of tenants, the rough framework of the questionnaire, 
the use of a mail questionnaire under the franking privilege, and use of 
IM equipment were completed by June, 1951, through individual assign­
ments and meetings of the members of the Subcommittee. The project leader 
assigned to the study by the Bureau of jigricultural Economics began work 
July 1, 1951. After that date all the details of procedure were his res­
ponsibility, subject to approval of the Subcommittee, 
^A sample questionnaire is included in the Appendix. 
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The project was financed by the participating State Experiment 
Stations, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics and the Farm Foundation. 
Each Station was responsible for the costs of the work done within the 
State. In addition, each participating agency transferred funds or other­
wise contributed substantially to the costs of the work done at the 
regional headquarters of the study, at Iowa State Oollege, 
Questionnaires were mailed to tenants during January and February, 
1952, Aa attempt was made to increase the rate of response by use of 
colored paper in the questionnaires, repeat mailings, publicity materials 
in local papers, announcementa on the radio, and prepared statements 
through regular channels to key persons such as the County Agricultural 
Extension Agent and the county offices of Production and IVferketing Admin­
istration. 
The data for Mnnesota vrere used for pilot analysis in the regional 
study, t&rvin Kottke, graduate student at the University of Mnnesota, 
was responsible for the detail of work in that state. A plan was devised 
whereby the IBM tabulations for Minnesota were made at the Business 
Office at South Dakota State Oollege. A nxunber of preliminary sorts and 
comparisons were made, thus laying the foundation for the regional work 
at Iowa State Oollege. 
A detailed outline including hypotheses to be tested, proposed tests, 
and content and organization of the regional report was prepared by the 
project leader and reviewed by members of the Subcommittee. This outline 
served as the basis for selection of cross-runs to be made, and a set of 
instructions for IHVI work was prepared from it. Only the more important 
cross-runs coilLd be completed because of budget limitations. 
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A preliminary draft of the regional report was discussed at the Land 
Tenure Research Workshop sponsored by the North Central Land Tenure 
Research Oommittee and held at Blackduck, Minnesota, in August, 1953. 
The study was examined critically by a group of 50 agrieultural econo­
mists, as to methods used, results and conclusions drawn from the evidence. 
A revised draft of the regional report was prepared by the project leader 
and distributed to members of the Subcommittee in January, 1954-. After 
review by the Subconmittee in a three day meeting devoted to that purpose, 
a revised draft was prepared and presented to the Korth Central Land 
Tenure Research Committee in April, 1954. 
The Framework for Analysis of Rental Practices 
Leasing and ownership are alternative methods of obtaining the use 
of farm real estate. These two methods are not perfect substitutes for 
each other because of the subjective values attached to ownership includ­
ing status, feeling of independence and greater certainty of tenure. 
This study recognizes farm tenancy as a method of obtaining the use of 
farm lands, buildings and equipment by operators who otherv/ise might not 
be able to do so and a method by v/hich farm owners obtain the services of 
operators. 
Selected phases of current leasing practices are analyzed to: 
(l) appraise their economic significance; (2) indicate the nature of the 
economic problems involved in leasing; and (J>) suggest some of the adjust­
ments required to solve the problems of leasing. That landlords and 
tenants need help in solving their probleins of developing effective leas­
ing arrangements is attested by the continuing number of requests for 
7 
assistance or advice received each year by the Extension Services, 
£>olleges of Agriculture and the United States Department of Agriculture. 
The framework for analysis of rental problems and practices includes 
definition of the fvinction of the farm firm, the function of a lease, and 
the nature of the basic problem in leasing arrangements. Understanding 
the meaning of these definitions is essential in the separation of lease-
oriented problems from other economic problems of the farm as a ^ irm. The 
analytical framework itself is the principles of production organization 
applied to the particulars of leasing arrangements. 
The farm as an operating unit is the production unit in agriculture. 
The purpose or function that this unit serves in agriculture, as in any 
\ 
industry, is to provide a framework within which production decisions are 
made and executed. An operating unit may include resources in several 
ownerships and be composed of several decision making units. In essence, 
a separate firm or decision making unit exists whenever two different 
resource owners pool their resources in production. 
A leasing arrangement is an agreement within the farm as an oper&ting 
unit. Essentially, a lease is a contract between a landlord and a tenant 
concerning use of resources, for a given time period, and for a specified 
payment. !Ehe lease may be either written or oral. It may cover all or 
only part of an ownetrship unit. The tenant may own other land, may rent 
tracts of land from other landlords and operate them all as a unit, or he 
may rent from only one landlord. The landlord may share in the cash oper­
ating expenses, the ownership of livestock, or provide the use of machinery 
and equipment; or he may furnish only the land, with or without buildings 
and improvements. 
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The economic f'onction of a lease is two-fold: (1) to provide a 
basis for combining resources in production; and (2) to distribute income 
to resource owners within the firm. 
The lease as such takes as given the kinds and amounts of resources 
owned or controlled by the parties to the agreement. The fact that one 
individual may own a dozen farms, all of which he rents to as many dif­
ferent tenants, may influence the kind of terms he is willing to offer or 
accept. Or, the fact that a tenant owns or has access to enough machinery, 
livestock and operating capital to farm a laiit twice as large as the 
average in the commmity may put him in a better position to bargain with 
a landlord. However, the lease is an oi>erating agreement regardless of 
the amount of resources each party owns or controls. The agreement as 
such merely states the conditions of use and the manner and amount of pay­
ment to be received by both parties for the use of resources in the firm. 
The basic economic problem in the development and use of farm leases 
stems directly from the fimction to be performed by the lease. Namely, 
the problem is to determine the terms that are necessary in the lease to 
allow and encourage an efficient combination of resources and to distri­
bute the income to the owners of the resources in accordance with the pro­
ductivity of the resources. 
Numerous questions arise within any firm regarding resource valuation, 
level of output, combination of enterprises, and choice of alternatives 
in production, regardless of who owns the various production resources. 
Strictly speaking, none of these questions are leasing problems per se, 
unless efficiency in use of resources or income distribution within the 
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firm is affected by terms or conditions of the lease.^ 
The function of the lease and the nature of the basic problem in 
leasing as defined above establish the frame of reference for analysis of 
rental practices. Any leasing practice may be analyzed in terms of its 
effect upon efficiency of resource use and upon distribution of income to 
resource owners within the farm firm. 
In economic analysis, efficiency of resource use is a function of 
quantity and price relations. Constmier preferences are expressed in sets 
of prices in the market. Resources are used efficiently within the firm 
when profits are a maximum. Thus, leasing practices may be analyzed in 
terms of their effects upon the profits of the firm by specifying the 
conditions for any farm firm and those for tenant operated firms to max­
imize profits. 
Reduced to the simplest of terms, the conditions required for any 
farm firm to maximize profits from given quantities of resources over a 
period of years are; 
Excluded from analysis in this study are the whole set of problems 
of tenants finding farms, landlords finding tenants, finance, and scale 
of operation. These and other problems are associated with tenancy and 
must be dealt with in the larger franjework of improving land tenure. 
However, the content of the lease and the uature of leasing practices, 
though influencing them and influenced by them, are not the main device 
or method to solve the problems involved. Also, this study takes as given 
the rate of payment and the shares that are reported, and does not treat 
the problem of determining the cash rent per acre or the fraotional share 
of expenses and returns. 
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1. Relation of factor to factor. An increment of one factor is 
substituted for an increment of another factor until the cost of 
the increment of the one is exactly equal to the cost of the incre­
ment of the factor it replaces in the production of a given output. 
This rate of substitution applies within one production period and 
between production periods. 
2. Relation of product to product. An increment of one product is 
substituted for an increment of another product until the value of 
the increment obtained is exactly equal to the value of the incre­
ment replaced. This rate of substitution applies to any two 
products in one production period and between two time periods. 
vVhen these two conditions are satisfied the final unit of each 
factor earns the same rate of return in each of its uses in the firm. ^ 
^This is the case of the multiple-product firm operating under com­
petition and uncertainty, with a given amount of resources. The only 
further requirement for the firm with unlimited capital is that the mar­
ginal rates of transformation of factor into product equals the ratio of 
their prices; namely, increment of factor divided by increment of product 
equals price of product divided by price of factor, and all ratios equal 
1. These are a simplification of the three Hicksian conditions of equil­
ibrium- The illustrations used by Earl Heady for the tenant firm are an 
application of the Hicksian conditions. For the formulation as given 
above, however, the writer is particularly indebted to John Nordin, Iowa 
State College, and to V/alter E. Ghryst, Production Economics Branch, 
Agricultural Research Service, U.S.D.A. 
Obviously, the maximum profit combination for the given farm firm 
does not necessarily maximize income for the individual operator if there 
are greater income earning opportunities available to him outside the 
firm. Firms can maximize income from given quantities of resources with­
out the industry being in equilibrium. In other words, simply because the 
majority of firms maximize income from given resources does not deny the 
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If profit is to be a maximuni when the farm or tract is tenant oper­
ated there can be no condition in the leasing arrangement that will change 
either product coat or factor return. Four incentive conditions are 
required within the lease to encoixrags operation at a level that will 
maximize income from the combined resources of tenant and landlord. 
Otherwise there is incentive for either the landlord or the tenant to 
attempt to maximize returns from the resources he contributes, and the 
sum of the returns to each maximized separately is always less than the 
total when returns are maximized on the combined resources. If the farm 
is operated at the highest profit combination without meeting these con­
ditions there is a transfer of income from one resource owner to the 
other. 
Conditions necessary within the leasing arrangement to encourage operation 
at the maximum profit from the combined resources of landlord and tenant 
The four conditions are: 
Incentive condition 1. The share of the factor of variable input 
must be the same as the share of output of product obtained from it. 
(cont) possibility of greater total product by shifts between firms. 
Hor/ever, the problem under discussion here is at the intra-firm level, 
although admittedly, faults in leasing arrangements can and do contribute 
to economic inefficiency by retarding adjustments in allocation of 
resources between farms. 
See J. R, Hicks. Value and capital. Second edition. Oxford at the 
Clarendon Press. 194-6. Chapters 6 and 19. 
See Earl 0. Heady. Economics of agricultural production and resource 
use. New York, Prentice-Hall Inc. 1952. Chapters 6 and 8. 
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Incentive condition. 2. The shares of all products must be the same. 
Incentive condition Each resource owner must receive the full 
share of the product earned by each unit of resource he contributes. 
Incentive condition 4. Each resource owner must have opportunity to 
receive return on investment made in one production period but not 
forth-coming until a subsequent period. 
The four conditions provide a tangible basis for the analysis of 
leasing practices in terms of the economic functions of a lease. In the 
follov/ing chapter leases are examined to find whether or not the incentive 
conditions are present. The testing device is a comparison of shares, of 
contributions and returns, and of associated characteristics of leasing 
arrangements. The comparisons do not prove whether resources are used 
efficiently on rented farms or whether there are income transfers between 
resource owners under a given lease. Much more detailed analysis is 
needed to determine the degree of efficiency in resource utilization. 
Also, it must be engshasized that the presence of all incentive conditions 
in a lease does not guarantee that resources will be used efficiently. 
Operators may not have the necessary information or may not choose to 
react to the incentives. 
Absence of any one of the conditions needed to encourage efficiency 
in use of resources on tenant operated farms or tracts can motivate 
decisions and actions concerning use of resources and cause departure from 
the highest profit combination for the combined resources of landlord and 
15 
tenant. The conditions are several. Each of them laust be present in 
each lease, whether the tenant rents one or more trac"';s, is a part-ovmer, 
or pays a cash or a share rental. Gash leases automatically satisfy the 
first two conditions, but share leases may or may not. For purposes of 
analysis it is not necessary to know how many leases depart from two or 
more incentive conditions. It is only necessary to knov/ that one of the 
incentive conditions is not present, 
oignificance and limitations of the incentive conditions 
Efficient production measured by maximum profit for the firm is a 
social goal which may differ from the goal or purpose of the individual. 
If both the necessary conditions for income maximization and the incentive 
conditions are met, however, the societal goal and the individual goal are 
the same, ¥ith the income for the firm at a maximum, production of goods 
and services is a maximum and is in harmony with the prefer^ces expressed 
by consumers through market prices.^ Also, with the income of the firm at 
maximum the incomes of both landlord and tenant are a maximum. Thus, the 
total set of conditions necessary for the tenant operated firm to maximize 
profits provides a guide to both individual and social goals. 
iThe fact that some factor prices are sticky and some product prices 
are administratively determined through legislated programs does not deny 
the argument, because in spite of these imperfections in markets, prices 
are given to the firm at any one time. However, administered prices may 
not be in line with consumer preference and total production may not 
result in a maximum contribution to total welfare. 
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One of the limitations of the incentive conditions for profit max­
imization is involved in the functions of the lease. If through joint 
determination and mutual agreement of landlord and tenant the firm is 
operated at the maximum profit combination even though one or more of the 
incentive conditions is absent, then the efficiency goal has already-
been attained. In particular cases income transfer from one party to the 
other may be a primary and an intended purpose. An income transfer takes 
place within the firm if either party receives less than the full share 
of the product earned by the resource he contributes to the firm. For 
example, if the return to land in a cash lease is calculated to be at the 
rate of $25.00 per acre and the tenant pays only $15.00 as cash rent, 
income from the land is transferred to the tenant. 
If an income transfer takes place but resources continue to be used 
efficiently and the parties to the agreement are aware of the transfer, 
society suffers no loss. Only the parties to the agreement are affected. 
If one wishes to give part of his income to the other the choice is his 
own.^ 
Income transfers are an expected and rational event in leases among 
relatives. A father may purposely pay all of the fertilizer costs even 
though he receives only half the corn, in order to increase the income of 
his son. Likewise, a son or daughter taking over the home farm after the 
parents have retired may pay a cash rent above gross returns to land in 
iThis applies in the case of efficient operations. Obviously, if 
an income transfer motivates continuity of non-economic units and retards 
inter-firm allocation of resources, society does lose. 
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order to provide support for the parents. Similar transfers might take 
place among non-relatives. 
V/hen the income transfer is not an intended purpose and it occurs 
as a result of the lease, the lease is at fault. One party or the other 
is receiving less than full return for the use of the resources he con­
tributes. 
Purposes or goals other than income maximisation influence the use 
of resources in production. Preference for consumption expenditure in 
the present is an example. The family with teen-age children, considering 
alternative uses of $2000.00 profit from farming operations, may purposely 
choose a new automobile rather than to invest in contouring and terracing 
the farm. An individual xaay choose to go fishing on the day or two well 
suited to plowin:g corn—thus choosing leisure rather than income. In 
choosing other use of his time or other resources, the individual attempts 
to maximize his satisfactions. The conscious choice of leisure as com­
pared to a few more dollars of income by working more hours, or the 
preference to raise only spotted Poland-China hogs when the income earning 
possibilities are greater by devoting capital to milking Holstein cows, to 
him is a rational Choice. He is using his resources to obtain the satis­
factions he wants. Use of resources by an individual has no effeftt upon 
prices of factors and of products. But if through this type of preference 
by groups of individual producers the supply of a given product is less 
« 
than consumers are willing to take, price of the given good will increase, 
and thereby encourage a higher price for the factors which go into it. 
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In all firms there are decisions to be made between consumption 
expenditures and invesiraents in production. Problems of firm-iiousehold 
relations are not peculiar to tenant farms and do not deny the efficiency 
concept as a test of the use of resources committed to production. In 
economic analysis the nets of preferences are taken as given at any one 
point of time and supposedly are reflected in market prices. 
Resources cannot be used efficiently if the quantities available for 
combination are less than those required for an economic unit. Here again, 
the problems of economic crganization as influenced by quantities of 
resources available are the same for the leased farm as for any other 
farm firm. This does not deny that the leasing of a tract of land may be 
the method by which a given operator increases the size of his business, 
or that capital limitations affect resource use on tenant operated farms. 
Principles of economic analysis apply the same whether all resources are 
in one ownership or are split between two or more parties. Limited 
resources and the existence of non-economic units is not necessarily a 
fault of the lease or of leasing as a method of operating. 
The major limitations of the necessary conditions are methodological 
and technological. The problems of calculation are complex. Knowledge 
is lacking for a wide range of production functions. Some of the factors 
cannot be added in small increments. It takes a trained technician to 
calculate or estimate marginal costs in a multiple product firm, and most 
farms are multiple product. These difficulties do not deny the efficacy 
of the framework of analysis. Tenants and landlords will need the 
assistance of technicians in solving leasing problems, the same as they 
need the assistance of soil specialists or animal husbandry technicians. 
17 
In addition to the above limitations for the set of incentive con­
ditions as a whole there are several that apply to each by itself. The 
following discussion of the four incentive conditions attempts to assess 
the more important limitations and indicate the significance of each as a 
methodological tool in the analysis of leasing practices. 
The discussion of limitations is based upon three assumptionB. First, 
plans are made and executed for given production periods, usually one 
year. Some of the resources are fixed for the given period. For example, 
the quantities of land and buildings are fixed and therefore their costs 
are fixed costs. Secondj in the production planning process as well as in 
the production process, variable resources are added to fixed resourcea in 
such kinds and quantities as to equate the return on the final unit of the 
variable in each of its usesi This means that the final units of labor 
used in production of corn, hogs, soybeans, wheat or of milk result in 
the same value of product* Third, adjustments are made between production 
periods in the fixed resources so that in the long run all resources are 
variables. 
Distinction between fixed and variable resources is particularly 
important because management decisions cannot be made effectively without 
that distinction. A fixed resource has a constant cost over a given tima 
period and over a given range of output. The cost of a variable resource 
depends upon the level of output. Although the economic principles apply 
the same to tenant operated as to other farm firms, the distinction 
between fixed and variable factors and costs by landlord and tenant is 
itself a crucial decision in the development of a leasing arrangement. 
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Fixed costs may be divided between tenant and landlord to determine the 
rental share. Also, the labor of the tenant is a fixed cost for the pro­
duction period in the sense that some portion of it must be used, regard­
less of the level of production; but, it is a variable cost in choice 
between enterprises.^ 
Incentive 1. Sharing of costs and returns. The share of the factor 
of variable input must be the same as the share of output of product from 
it. Difference between share of cost and share of return motivates 
operation at other than the highest profit combination, or causes transfer 
of income from one resource ovmer to the other. Cash leases fulfill this 
condition because the tenant furnishes all the variables and receives the 
returns from them. A simple illustration may suffice to indicate why this 
condition is a necessary one in any share lease to motivate operation at 
the highest profit combination, and why income is transferred between 
resource ovmers if the shares differ and the firm is operating efficiently. 
This illustration is an example of Weintraub's statement that, 
"Sometimes a factor is technically fixed although the payment of its 
services is variable....." Weintraub's discussion of factors of pro­
duction and fixed and variable factors is appropo but is not sufficiently 
definitive. The problem of handling costs of labor and of management is 
an example of the need for further theoretical analysis of leasing 
practices. Management can be treated as a fixed cost, with an evaluation 
placed upon that supplied by both landlord and tenant. If treated as a 
variable, the return from management goes to the resource owner and is 
shared between landlord and tenant in a share lease, possibly in a different 
proportion than that in v/hich it is furnished. See Sidney Weintraub. 
Price theory. New York, Pitman Publishing Corporation. 194?. p. 55 
and Chapter 5. 
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Assume that conmeroisd fertilizer is a necessary input for corn 
production, and that a 50-50 sharing of the corn is the form of the 
rental payment. If the cost of fertilizer is also shared 50-«>50> both 
parties to the agreement will be interested in applying fertilizer until 
the final unit of application just pays for itself in value of corn pro­
duced. Any difference between share of cost of ferljilizer and share of 
value of corn changes the level at which application of fertilizer is 
most profitable. If the tenant pays all the o-osts of fertilizer, the 
most profitable application for him is to apply fertilizer until the cost 
of the final unit of input is equal to half the value of the additional 
corn produced by that input. This results in a different level of output 
than would be the case if the share of cost were the same as that of share 
of return. 
Suppose further that the two parties agree to apply fertilizer at the 
most profitable combination, but the tenant (or the landlord) pays all the 
costs of fertilizer. The one who paid the costs of fertilizer would 
receive a return of less value than the cost of the final units of input, 
and the other party would be receiving an income from those inputs. 
There is only one case in which unequal shares of cost and return on 
a variable will not motivate change from the highest profit combination 
for combined resources of landlord and tenant or cause shift in income 
between resource owners. If the farm is operated at the highest profit 
combination one variable cost can be matched or balanced against another 
in such manner that total variable costs and returns are shared in the 
same proportions as are total fixed costs. 
The requirement that the share of variable cost be the same as the 
share of the return means that all variable costs must be shared, in any 
share rental arrangement. In practice, some items of variable cost may­
be so small as to be of no effect. Also, a given technique such as the 
use of weed spraying may produce such high returns that it is used 
regardless of who pays the cost. These minor limitations do not deny the 
general applicability of the incentive condition. 
In this study the test of incentive condition 1 is made by comparing 
shares of selected items of costs and returns, to find the frequency of 
equal sharing by economic areas. The number of departures from equal 
shares of costs and returns indicate the number of leases in which there 
are economic motivations for operation at other than the highest profit 
combination for all resources. 
Incentive 2. Equal shares of all products. Cash leases automati­
cally fulfill the condition because the rental is a fixed coat for all 
products. In share leases any difference between shares of two products 
provides incentive to move away from the quantities of the two products 
that result in the highest profit from the combined resources of landlord 
and tenant. Difference between shares of products offers incentive for 
each resource owner to maximize the return from his own resources, even 
though the share of cost is equal to the share of return in each of the 
products. There are a number of cases in which this incentive condition 
does not apply and is not necessary to encourage operation at the highest 
profit combination. These limitations are discussed below, after the 
illustration of why equal shares of products- are a necessary condition if 
decisions as to level of output are made by either the landlord or the 
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tenant alone. 
The reason why all shares of product must be the same my be demon­
strated by simple examples. In the simplest case, suppose that a farm is 
producing two crops that are competitive and the per unit costs and 
product prices for these two are the same. The landlord or the tenant 
with opportunity to make the choice would have income incentive to produce 
all of the crop of which he received the larger share. If the shares were 
the same, however, that combination of the two at which the final unit 
returns were equal would be chosen, because that combination would provide 
the highest profit. V/hether rfssourees^ were limited or unlimited, pro­
duction. of some quantity of each of the two crops would result in a higher 
income than if all resources were devoted to the production of one. 
The more usual case is that of producing two or more crops with dif­
ferent unit costs, different yields, and different prices with a given 
quantity of resources. But the incentive effect of differences in shares 
of the crops is exactly the same as that above. Because of the oppor­
tunity to obtain a higher income, the operator will want to shift 
resources into the production of that crop which gives the highest income 
on the factors he contributes. This will not necessarily be the one on 
which the lower share rental is paid because differences in unit costs 
may more than con:q?ensate differences in shares, and some minimum acreage 
of a crop like clover may be essential in the rotation to maintain the 
yield and income from corn. The inclination usually will be to shift 
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-.laore respttrces into production of the crop with the lower recital ishare.^ 
In the case of joint decisions and equal bargaining poweis of land­
lord and tenant, differential shares will have no effect if the share of 
cost equals the share of return in all products and decision is made to 
operate at the highest profit combination for the combined resources of 
landlord and tenant. In the case of joint decisions and unequal bargain­
ing powers of the two parties, the effect of differential shares is 
indeterminate. The result may be either a change in resource allocation 
among products, a shift in income from one party to the other, or both. 
Any analysis of differential shares must therefore take into account 
the question of who makes the decision as to the amounts of variable 
resources and the quantities of the different products to be produced. 
If decision to operate at the optimum product quantities has already 
been made, obviously the objective of the incentive condition has already 
been achieved, and then only the income transfer is a debatable issue. 
Also, it follov/s that if shares of products are the same throughout the 
firm, the shares of costs are likewise equal when incentive condition 1 
^In the multiple product firm the quantities of any two products to 
be produced for the highest profit combination are indicated by equating 
of ratios of marginal products and product prices. Profit is a maximum 
when the ratio of marginal products is inversely equal to the ratio of the 
product prices. Under differential shares, the operator inversely equates 
the ratios of marginal products of his resources to the ratio of product 
prices, at a level which is different from that of the total resources. 
In short, differential shares, with decision by the tenant, changes the 
opportunity line for choice between products and thereby changes the 
point at v;hich the ratio of marginal products will equal the ratio of 
product prices. The same situation will apply if decision is made by the 
landlord; then the landlord will want to operate at that combination which 
maximizes profit on the resources he contributes. See Earl 0. Heady, 
op. cit., Chapter 20. 
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is met. Even, though decisions are made jointly by landlord and tenant 
the making of them might be easier and less debatable, if incentive con­
ditions 1 and 2 are both met.^ 
Share leases are examined in the following chapter by comparing 
shares of products. Again, as in the tests for equal shares of costs and 
returns, these comparisons show only whether or not the condition is 
present in the lease. The data are not in sufficient detail to determine 
whether in fact the firm does use resources inefficiently or whether in­
come is transferred from one party to the other. 
Incentive Share of product earned by each resource. This 
incentive condition applies to both fixed and variable resources and to all 
leases. If the resource owner does not have opportunity to receive the 
full share of return from the resource contributed he has incentive to 
move away from the highest profit combination. If through joint decisions 
the firm is operated at the highest profit combination and one or the other 
party receives less than his full share of the product earned, there is 
an income transfer. Although the logic is simple and the necessity for 
the incentive is obvious, in practice the problems are complex. The chief 
limitation of incentive condition 5 is the problem of calculation in the 
multiple product fim. 
iThe case of complementary products does not complicate the problem 
of choice under differential shares, because even with decisions made by 
either party, it is to the advantage of the decision maker to operate out­
side the complementary range. In the case of supplementary products, 
differential shares might encourage product substitution to the extent 
that the products became caupetitive. 
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The import of incentive condition 3 is that any living facilities on 
the rented farm need to be separated from the production facilities and a 
separate payment be specified for them. Otherwise, the landlord has no 
method of making decisions as to how much to invest in housing and the 
tenant cannot calculate how much he is paying for housing, which to him 
is a consumption good. Likewise, if the landlord is to receive the full 
return on his investments in fixed improvements us^d in production under 
a crop-share or crop-share-cash lease, he needs to receive a direct and 
specific payment for such items as barns, sheds and fences. 
Only partial tests can be made in this study to determine whether 
the incentive condition is present in leases. The data are not in 
sufficient detail to test whether owners of fixed resources receive the 
full return from them. The main test is a comparison of shares of costs 
with shares of returns on selected variables, because the condition cannot 
be fulfilled unless the resource owner receives the same share of return 
as he pays in costs of variables.^ 
Incentive 4. Opportunity to receive return on investment. The 
terms of the lease cannot increase the uncertainty of the firm, be the 
cause of shift in use of resources between time periods, or change the 
selection of products within a production period. This incentive con­
dition applies to both fixed and variable resources used in production, 
and applies likewise to investments made by the landlord in housing 
facilities. 
iThis condition requires that the resource owner receive the mar­
ginal value product of the resources he contributes. 
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Tenant and other farms encounter the same set of risks and uncer­
tainties as business organizations. Future prices and yields are unknown. 
Floods, grasshopper infestations, hail, wind storms and similar risks 
pay not the least attention to the incidence of land ownership. 
A lease is for a given time period. It may contain no provisions 
for renewal, no compensations for the value of unexhausted improvements 
at the time of termination, and no specific agreement as to form and 
length of termination notice. These and similar characteristics are 
forms of uncertainty peculiar to leasing. If the tenant has no assurance 
that his one-year lease will be renewed the tendency will be to choose 
products that can be finished within the lease period. This might mean, 
for exaii^le, the choice of a hog enterprise rather than a dairy enter­
prise that under a longer and certain tenure would be more profitable. 
Thus, uncertainties within the lease may result in less than the maximum 
income that would be possible v/ithout them. 
Uncertainty and the lack of technical knowledge are two different 
phenomena. The difference betv/een them sometimes confuses the analysis 
of leasing praoticea. An. individual operator may have no knowledge of 
yield response to fertilizer, the effects of spraying, the income effects 
of rotation grazing, or any similar technology; this lack of knowledge 
cannot be classified as an uncertainty. Nor should uncertainty be con­
fused with lack of opportunity, lack of capital resources, or the strength 
of the bargaining position of either the landlord or the tenant. A 
tenant may take a farm which is smaller than one his machinery and equip­
ment could handle, and take it on a one-year lease with no promise of 
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renewal because that is tha best opportunity available to him. The only 
characteristic of such situation that can properly be classed as an un­
certainty in leasing is the lack of provision for renewal of the lease. 
Particular practices and characteristics of leasing arrangements are 
examined in the following chapter. The method of analysis is a compar­
ison of selected characteristics to see how they would likely affect the 
outlook or actions of the operator in the use of resources. 
Other economic implications of leasing practices 
Numerous other characteristics of leases, of landlords and of ten­
ants influence both resource use and distribution of income within the 
firm. Also, leasing practices affect the allocation of resources among 
firms; for example, the fact of an income transfer from landlord to tenant 
may be sufficient reason in itself to encourage operation of a farm by a 
tenant whereas he would otherwise seek another and larger farm or seek 
non-agricultural employment. Content of the individual agreement depends 
upon what the parties are able to do—because of the amount and kinds of 
resources at their command—as well as upon what they want to do. The 
type of landlord, such as the governmental agency that controls a signi­
ficant portion of the land in an area, may influence the form and content 
of leases offered by other land owners in that area. 
Need for the various types of leases such as cash, crop-share, crop-
share-cash, livestock-share, labor-share and special, arises because of 
differences among tenants and among landlords as to what and how much 
they are willing and able to contribute to the firm. The cash lease and 
the labor-share are opposites, v/ith each adapted to given sets of char­
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acteristics of the tenant and landlord. The tenant with sufficient 
capital resources in the form of machinery, ec^uipment, livestock and 
operating funds—one willing and able to assume the full risks of the 
firm—finds the cash lease best suited to his purposes, A tenant with 
only the value of his labor to contribute may find that a labor-share 
lease offers the best opportunity. 
The effects of characteristics of leasing practices are many and 
diverse. Awareness of the nature, extent and distribution of them has 
particular significance to programs for improvement of leasing arrange­
ments, The usual channsls of information in adult education simply may 
not reach the parties concerned, particularly non-resident and non-farm 
landlords. 
Comparisons and counts of frequencies of associations or relations 
betf;een type of lease and characteristics of landlords and of tenants may 
thus serve to indicate need for changes in types of leases. Likewise, 
con^aring selected characteristics of landlords or of tenants with other 
characteristics or with selected practices should disclose both the need 
for and the kinds of changes to make leasing practices more effective in 
accomplishing their purposes. 
Data for each of the items QT characteristics such as type of lease, 
age of renter, or type of landlord, were calculated as percentage distri­
butions within economic areas. In each instance the given item or cate­
gory was calculated as a percent of the total number of respondents 
replying to the two questions. The cases of non-applicable and no response 
were excluded. For example, in the comparison of type of lease and 
length of lease, the leases were sorted into types and then each type was 
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sorted by lengtli of lease; the percent of leases of each, length was then 
calculated for each lease type, using the number of cases replying to 
both items. Tests of statistical significance were then made on the 
differences between proportions. The purpose vms to ascertain whether 
there r/ere any significant differences. Similar teiSt ^vas made for each 
set of items compared. 
Significance of differences between proportions depends upon and 
varies with the size of the samples involved. Because of the volume of 
calculations to be made in these tests, a set of prepared tables showing 
significance of differenaes was used. The difference between the two 
proportions being tested was checked against the difference required for 
significance at the five percent level, for the given sizes of samples.^ 
IVernon Davies. Table showing significance of differences between 
percentages. Station Circular Ho. 102. Y/ashin^ton Agricultural Experi­
ment Station, Pullman, Hashington. September, 1950, 
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MALYSIS OF IITOENTI-VS CONDITIONS IN LEASES 
Economic areas are the geographical units used in this study. Data 
are presented for selected areas to illustrate the findings and demon­
strate the content of leasing practices.^ The results apply only within 
areas. Ko inference can be dravm from the findings in any one area about 
the situation for a whole state because there are variations between 
areas. Data for economic areas must be weighted to obtain state totals 
or averages. Likewise, no summaries have been prepared for broad regional 
totals or averages because of the weighting problems involved and because 
such averages would cover up some of the v/ide variations from area to 
area throughout the Mdwest on many of the characteristics of leasing 
practices. 
Percentages were calculated for the number of cases reporting both 
items in each comparison. Thus, the number of cases usually differs from 
the number of respondents for the area. 
Share of Cost and Share of Return 
Under a cash lease the rental is a fixed cost to the tenant and a 
fixed return to the landlord. The landlord's income is the same regard­
less of the level of operation, and his interest in the intensity of 
operation would be that of insuring that the land is not depleted by the 
tenant. Cash leases meet this condition in that the tenant applies all 
^Data for all 4-6 economic areas are included in the Appendix tables. 
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the variables and receives all the return froEi them. 
Under any form of share rental the fractional share of the product 
paid to the landlord is a variable cost to the tenant because the amount 
of rental varies with the level of production. The fractional share 
retained by the tenant is his return from the variable inputs he furnishes. 
Thus, share of cost may be compared with share of return for a given 
factor of input by comparing the share of the cost of the factor with the 
share of the product. In the following examples this is done by counting 
the number of share leases in which the shares are the same. 
No test of statistical significance of variation within areas is 
needed. The incentive condition is either present in or absent from the 
lease. Although the amount of difference between share of cost and share 
of return vrould influence the incidence of the incentive, any departure 
from equal shares is taken as a departure from the necessary condition. 
Shares in livestock-share leases 
With few exceptions the number of cases of equal shares exceed the 
number of cases of unequal shares of livestock owned compared to live­
stock or product sold in each economic area (Table 1). Differing shares 
appear to be the exception rather than the rule; few areas have less than 
60 percent of leases reporting the same share for the given type of live­
stock owned. 
On those farms with a constant number of dairy cows for the year, 
share of co;7s owned actually would be a fixed cost, and in those cases 
this type of comparison would not apply as a test of equality of share of 
variable cost and return. The case would be the same for farms with a 
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cow-calf, beef enterprise; the breeding cows would be a flxe^' cost, 
Feeder cattle and hogs would be a variable cost on most farnS. If live­
stock owned are a fixed cost, and the two parties to the leusa share all 
income and variable costs in the same proportion that they furnish total 
value of fixed resources, obviously the share of livestock owned can 
differ from the share of livestock or product sold and the difference 
would not be an incentive for either party to change the level of output 
because livestock as a fixed cost can be balanced against some other 
fixed cost. 
Table 1. Number of livestock-share leases and percent with same share of 
livestock owned as of product sold 
State Dairy cattle and Beef cattle and Hogs owned and 
and products sold beef sold hogs sold 
are^a f— mZ T "NO7 " % 
cases same cases same cases same 
Ind 2b 63 81 82 100 130 100 
la 4. OO
 
91 51 96 105 96 
Ean 6 31 71 42 98 38 97 










Neb 4 14 57 23 70 17 94 
SD 1 4 50 23 78 14 78 
T,7is 5 242 86 49 88 241 92 
^Area with largest number of livestock-share leases, in each state. 
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The percentages of leases with, the same shares in Table 1 are no 
indication of the frequency of equal shares of variable costs and returns 
in livestock-share leases, because there is no evidence ivhether the live­
stock owned are a fixed or a variable cost in the individual lease. How­
ever, the comparison is one that can be made by the landlord and tenant 
in making an agreement. Difference between share of cost and share of 
return might be the determining criteria in deciding whether to sell a 
grain or feed it to livestock. 
Difference in shares can be used purposely as a method of achieving 
an income transfer. For example, a son renting from a widowed mother 
might own all the dairy cattle but share the milk check with his mother 
as a means of supporting her. A father might own a larger share of the 
livestock as a method of helping to finance the farming operations of his 
son. Also, in terms of harmonious relations between the parties, the 
landlord night purposely provide the tenant's family with milk, meat or 
eggs for family consumption, while maintaining equality of share of ov/ner-
ship and share of product sold off the farm. Such prerequisites might 
have no effect upon the choice of enterprises or the combination of 
factors in the firm, but would stimulate a willingness and satisfaction 
in day-to-day associations. 
In practical application under share rentals, the effect of a dif­
ference between share of variable cost and share of returns upon use of 
resources may be nominal or unimportant. Shares of breeding fees and of 
veterinary expenses are examples (Table 2). Although these expenses are 
variable in the sense that the amounts depends upon the number of animals 
or frequency of treatment, they are not costs that cause the operator to 
change the amount of production. Breeding fees will be paid, whether the 
landlord or the tenant pays them, or whether the costs are ghared in one 
or another proportion. There is no effect upon the volume of production 
if $100.00 of breeding fees paid by the landlord are matched by |100,00 
of veterinary expense paid by the tenant. But there may not be an oppor­
tunity for specific matching of expense items so that the matching pro­
duces the same result as would a sharing of both. Furthermore, if one 
peo-ty pays all the veterinary expenses he might be more hesitant in 
deciding that there is sufficient need for the services of a veterinary 
to examine a sick cow. 
The percent of livestock-share leases with the same share of cost as 
of return on selected items varies from area to area. In ?/isconsin area 3 
in which livestock-share leases are numerous, nearly all leases have equal 
sharing on all the selected items compared. In other areas, particularly 
if there are few livestock-share leases, unequal shares are more frequent 
than equal shares, as in Eebraska area 4 and South Dakota area 1. As a 
general practice, the major items of variable expenses and returns are 
shared the same in livestock-share leases. 
Table 2. Number of livestock-sliare leases and percent with same share of selected sales as of 
selected expense 
D^iry products sold and Hogs sold and _ Beef calves sold 
State FeeSnjou^t' Breed.fees Tet. exp. Feed bou^t Breed.fees ¥et. exp. Feed bought Yet. exp. 
and No. f. No, No, % No. % No. No. % No. % No. % 
area^ cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same 
Ind 2b 66 62 52 71 66 62 130 97 98 89 129 97 75 93 75 93 
la 4 86 98 72 99 86 98 101 99 8o 98 101 99 45 93 45 93 
Kan 6 33 64 21 48 33 61 36 94 23 83 36 83 37 92 37 81 
Minn 6 83 95 68 90 83 89 79 99 65 91 79 95 19 100 19 100 
Heb 4 12 25 7 0 13 23 18 83 11 73 19 74 18 CO
 
18 78 
SD 1 5 0 4 0 3 0 13 77 13 62 11 73 18 67 15 60 
^is 3 249 97 220 95 248 94 250 98 224 92 250 94 44 89 43 93 
®Area with largest number of livestock-share leases, in each state. 
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Shares in crop-share and erop-share-cash leases 
The frequency of unequal sharing of costs and returns in crop-share 
and crop-share-cash leases suggests that two or more other methods are 
being used in making leasing arrangements. One is a strong reliance upon 
customary practice, with the tenant paying all variable expenses commonly 
accepted as a tenant*s responsibility; the costs of picking corn are 
seldom shared. Another is to reduce the share of the return going to the 
landlord if the tenant pays all or a larger share of the variable expenses; 
the modal share of crop is one-third or one-fourth in western South Dakota 
and sharing of variable expenses is infrequent (Tables 3a-3c). 
Practice varies widely among economic areas on sharing of a given 
expense and there is viride variation as to sharing of different expenses 
v/ithin an area (Tables 3a-3c). Fertilizer is more frequently shared in 
the same proportion as the crop than is seed or harvesting exp.enses. 
Table 3a. Number of crop-share and crop-share-cash leases and percent 
with same share of corn as of selected expense 
State FertiJLizer _ material Corn picking 
and Ho» Mo# ^ No* jo No* 
area^ cases same cases same cases same cases same 
Ind 2b 125 97 123 90 67 49 121 6 
la 2b 200 88 243 88 199 40 210 2 
Ban 3b 114 68 115 6 56 30 71 3 
Mnn 1-4 46 50 57 42 38 34 50 56 
Keb 4- 107 45 212 3 128 8 196 2 
SD 2b 29 10 81 11 55 16 78 15 
^Area with largest number of leases of both types, in each state. 
Wisconsin -excluded, because of small number of leases. 
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Table 3b. Mumber of crop-share and crop-share-cash leases and percent 
with same share of oats as of selected expense 
Small ^ ain 
State Fertilizer seed Lime Combining 
and ijo, Ijo. No.' ' JT No. 
r»Qcs,ao ~ area® cases same cases same cases same cases same 
Ind 2b 75 89 73 75 66 29 74 53 
la 2b 192 48 202 30 115 35 205 14 
Kan 3b 96 83 93 8 30 50 88 3 
Minn 1-4 90 48 121 6 15 20 109 49 
Neb 4 56 57 81 2 30 13 90 1 
SD 2b 26 19 83 1 10 0 78 22 
®-Area with largest number of leases of both types, in each state. 
./Isconsin excluded because of small number of leases. 
Table 3c. Number of crop-share and crop-share-cash leases and percent 
with same share of wheat as of selected expense 
Sm^T" grain 
State Fertilizer _CombitiXi.g^ Hail 
 ^ No. • f No. No. f No. % 
area cases same cases same cases same cases same 
Ind 2b 78 97 76 86 78 58 17 02 
la 2b 3 67 3 67 4 25 2 100 
Kan 3b 157 So 141 5 138 4 100 70 
Minn 1-4 77 52 87 47 87 47 49 57 
Keb 4 104 50 185 2 199 1 150 41 
SD 2b 34 15 115 3 112 28 59 31 
^Area vrith largest number of leases of both types, in each state. 
V/isconsin excluded because of small number of leases. 
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The continuing difficulty of making adjustment in leasing practice to 
allow for changes that take place in technology is shown by the variations 
in sharing of expenses of crop production within areas. The differences 
in practices of sharing costs of fertilizer, seed, spraying and corn pick­
ing illustrate the problem of adjustment (Table 3a). Each of these 
expenses is a variable cost and each effects the level of production and 
the combination of factors in production. 
The cost of fertilizer tends to be shared in the same proportion as 
the return on corn in the economic areas in which fertilizer is regularly 
used on corn. In these same areas, corn picking is usually paid by the 
tenant, or is shared in a different proportion than is the corn. Appar­
ently, the differences in practice for these two expense items are the 
result of using custom rather than careful analysis of the problem as the 
guide in making agreements. 
Corn picking has historically been a cost paid by the tenant. Before 
the introduction of mechanical equipment this was mainly a labor cost. 
Under the crop-share lease, labor of the tenant was one of the inputs to 
match the annual use-value of land and buildings provided by the landlord, 
'.'/hen the corn picker came into use the cost of picking continued to be the 
tenant's responsibility. The capital investment in mechanical equipment 
was looked upon as merely a substitution of machinery for hand labor, and 
the additional machinery supplied by the tenant may not have been evaluated 
specifically in the process of equalizing the contributions of fixed 
resources by landlord and tenant. 
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In contrast, the application of conmercial fertilizer came about as 
an addition to the expenses of production. There was no substitution of 
capital for labor, as in the case of the addition of the mechanical picker. 
There was no historical experience to guide the making of agreements on 
cost of fertilizer. Consequently, when fertilizer application became a 
necessary practice the general tendency was to share the expense. Both 
parties to the agreement realized that benefit would accrue to both if 
fertilizer v/ere used. 
A specific example from the experience of recent years will illustrate 
the fact that not solving one problem satisfactorily and completely at the 
time it arises often causes further and more complicated problems later. 
The use of mechanical pickers on the higher than average corn yields in 
years of heavy damage from corn borers and wind, resulted in more than the 
usual amount of corn being left on the ground after picking. Suppose that 
in a specific case the amount of corn left in the field was estimated as 
10 bushels per acre. The leasing agreement called for a 50-50 sharing of 
the corn, with the tenant paying all picking costs. Only by additional 
hand labor could the corn on the ground be saved. The tenant realized 
that for every dollar of labor he spent in harvesting corn on the ground 
he received only half the value of corn. The landlord insisted on receiv­
ing his full 50 percent share of total yield. 
This particular problem was further aggravated by the fact that on 
those farms on which the tenant paid all costs of corn picking or paid a 
larger percent of picking than his share of the crop he usually paid all 
expenses of spraying for corn borer. Spraying for borer would have 
increased the yield and would have decreased the amount of corn on the 
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ground; but, with all spraying paid by the tenant there was tendency for 
some to refuse to spray. The lack of sharing of one expense contributed 
to com loss and increased the nxmber of instances of disagreaoent betvfeen 
landlord and tenant on what to do about corn on the ground. These dis­
putes would not have arisen had both spraying and picking expenses been 
shared in the same proportion as was the corn crop. Ihus, even though a 
given item of expense may appear to be of little importance as to the 
method of handling it, the nature of subsequent problems arising from it 
cannot be seen in advance. 
Sharing of all variable costs would require more careful bookkeeping 
and might also lead to more joint decisions being made. These changes in 
prospect might be unacceptable and looked upon as interfering with freedom 
of action. Viewed in terms of the function of the lease the advantages of 
sharing variable expenses might be seen to out?;eigh any disadvantages 
involved—when the parties understand the problem. 
Equal Shares of All Products 
The requiranent that the shares of all products be the same applies 
to all types of leases. Cash leases fulfill this incentive condition 
because the share is the same for all products. Any form of share rental 
may fulfill the condition, depending upon the details of the lease. 
Equal shares of products does not imply that the landlord must share 
in livestock enterprises under any share lease. The requirement can be 
met in the crop-share or the crop-share-cash lease for the farm with live­
stock as a major source of income by equal shares of the crops produced; 
in effect, the tenant's livestock enterprise is separate and apart from 
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the crop enterprises in which he and the landlord combine resources. If 
the cash payment in a crop-share-oash lease is for use of crop land, how­
ever, the incentive condition is not fulfilled.^ 
As with incentive condition number 1, departure from equal shares of 
products results in an income transfer from one to the other party or en­
courages shift in use of resources. The data are not in sufficient detail 
to ascertain which of these happens on the individual farm, and none but 
the parties concerned can judge if income transfer is an intended purpose. 
Shares of livestock sold in livestock-share leases 
Comparison is made upon the basis of number of cases in which both of 
the given types of livestock are reported. The farm with dairy cattle but 
no beef or with beef but no dairy drops out of the comparison of shares of 
these two enterprises. Ihe maifl. comparison ia v/ithin economic areas, in 
one table at a time.^ 
^This case is discussed in more detail under incentive condition 3 
because crop-share and crop-share-cash leases on farms with livestock as 
a major source of income have a problem in working out the arrangement so 
that each resource owner will receive the full share of the return that 
his resources earn in the farm firm. 
^Comparison of shares within areas between tables has limited meaning 
here because the individual cases reporting may not be the same ones in 
each table. That is, the case reporting dairy cattle and beef cattle, 
dairy cattle and hogs, dairy and poultry, hogs and beef, and beef and sheep, 
may not be the same farm. Multiple cross comparisons were not made be­
cause of the small number of cases that would fall into sub-sorts, but 
more ingiortant so far as the test is concerned, the principle is illustrated 
by comparinis only two types at a time. The amount of the share is unim­
portant in testing whether the shares of enterprises are the same or 
different. 
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The majority of livestock-share leases provide for the same shares 
for sales of different types of livestock in major livestock enterprises. 
If beef and hogs or dairy and hogs are produced, the shares of sales tend 
to be the same (Tables 4a-4b)» 
Some of the cases of differing shares of sale of one type of live­
stock compared with another are instances in which one party owns all the 
livestock in a minor enterprise. In general, these minor enterprises are 
not of sufficient size to cause a shift in the kinds and amounts of pro­
duction on the farm or to cause a shift in the use of capital. Instead, 
they are contributions to family living which may do far more to promote 
good viill and satisfaction with the lease than their denial would accom­
plish in preventing small transfers of income. Yet, if allowed to go too 
far, the amount of income transferred could become sizeable. A large 
flock of hens fed out of the undivided crops, for example, could take a 
load or more of the corn or v/heat actually belonging to the other party.^ 
If tv/o or more types of livestock are major sources of income and the 
shares of sales differ, then the task of figuring out arrangements for 
sharing of variable expenses is indeed complicated. Especially in the 
case of joint costs, such as that of pasture for a dairy herd and a beef 
herd, differences in shares call for compensating adjustments which in 
general are complicated and cumbersome in operation. Equal shares through-
IKo particular problem need arise in the ownership of hens, cows, or 
pigs for home consumption, because a limit on numbers can be agreed upon 
in the lease or the tenant can pay all of the costs involved. Data 
supplied by respondents were not in sufficient detail to describe the 
particulars of the arrangements under which the tenant or the landlord 
owned all of one type of stock under a livestock-share lease. 
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Table 4a. Number of livestock-share leases and percent with same share of 
dairy products sold as of other products or livestock sold 















Ind 2 b 40 48 62 66 49 53 49 59 
la 4 35 91 88 97 72 71 72 69 
Kan 5 17 35 19 37 20 45 20 50 
Minn 6 15 93 75 96 75 37 76 42 
Neb 4 11 27 11 91 5 Bo 5 80 
SD 1 5 20 5 20 5 60 5 80 
Wis 3 44 82 235 96 210 39 212 41 
®-Area with largest number of livestock-share leases, in each state. 
Table 4b. Number of livestock-share leases and percent with same share of 
hogs sold as of other livestock sold 













Ind 2b 77 92 19 95 78 32 
la 4 51 96 l6 88 80 69 
Kan 5 22 73 6 50 25 48 
Linn 6 17 88 16 94 69 40 
Neb 4 16 88 3 34 6 0 
SD 1 14 79 4 75 6 17 
T/is 3 51 88 37 92 207 40 
®Area with largest number of livestock-share leases, in each state. 
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out all enterprises is a simple device to provide a general rule for 
solving problems of sharing two products. The problem of determining 
whether the share of both should be one-half or some other amount can be 
solved only in the individual case, by careful calculation. 
Shares of crops in crop-share and crop-share-cash leases 
The frequency of differing shares in crop-share and crop-share-cash 
leases suggests that the practice itself is a compensating adjustment to 
deal with particular problems in share leases. One example is the common 
difference ;ibetween share of corn and share of oats. The explanation is 
often offered that a lower share is paid on oats than on corn to adjust 
for the differences in expenses of the two crops and differences between 
expenses paid by each party on each of the crojps. The cost of seed is 
more frequently shared for corn than for oats (Tables 3a and 3b).. Thus, 
differential shares may result from differences in sharing of variable 
expenses, or because some variable expenses are not usually shared. 
The necessity that shares be the same on all crops to encourage 
efficient use of resources is apparently more widely recognized in some 
economic areas than in others, judging by the proportions of the same and 
of differing shares reported from area to area (Table 5). But as in the 
comparisons of livestock shares, differences in proportions among areaa 
are less important than are differences within the lease. The comparisons 
in Table 5 indicate that there are income transfers or incentive for in­
efficient use of resources in one-third or more of the crop-share and crop-
share-cash leaser in several economic areas. 
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Table 5. Kximber of crop-share and crop-share-cash leases and percent with 
same shares of selected crops 
Corn and Oats and 



















Ind 2b 8 100 77 97 73 90 7 100 7 100 
la 2b 259 57 208 82 4 100 194 74 4 100 
Kan 3b 127 87 3 67 186 84 6 83 159 97 
Minn 1-4 66 48 12 75 39 41 13 85 93 97 
Neb 4 113 92 6 17 243 94 6 33 106 98 
SD 4a 142 79 19 63 73 74 20 95 78 100 
Wis 5 34 85 2 50 9 89 1 100 6 100 
^Area with largest number of leases of both types. 
Share of Product Earned by Each Unit of Resource 
The actual determination of whether the resource owner receives a 
return on a final xmit of input equal to the cost of the input is a 
difficult one. The determination can be made only by careful calculation, 
allocating the returns to each of the factors used in the firm. Yet, in 
practice, farm operators are aware that too much fertilizer does not pay; 
that cultivation of corn beyond some number of times to control weeds 
gives no additional yield of corn; that more money invested in brood sov;s 
will give a higher return than will more money invested in feeder cattle. 
In other words, farm operators apply marginal analysis. 
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Only partial tests can be made in this study to determine whether or 
not there is opportunity under the lease to receive the full share of the 
product earned by the resource contributed. Specifically, the resource 
owner must receive the same share of the product as he pays in share of 
the cost of the variable factor. Namely, incentive condition 1 must be 
met. 
Even if incentive condition 1 is met, however, incentive condition 3 
is not automatically met. But condition 3 cannot be met unless condition 
1 is met. Additional information is needed to teat whether condition 3 
is in fact met when number 1 is fulfilled. 
If the annual use value of the fixed resources supplied by the land­
lord is equal to the annual use value of those supplied by the tenant, 
then the two parties can share 50-50 in all variable expenses and in all 
income. This arrangement meets the requirement of both incentive con­
ditions 1 and 3. Likev/ise, any other proportion between fixed resources 
supplied by the two parties will serve. If the value of the fixed re­
sources supplied by the landlord is twice that of the tenant, then a 2/3— 
1/3 sharing of variables and income will meet both incentive conditions.^ 
The comparisons of costs and returns indicate that shares of variable 
costs differ from shares of returns in some of the leases in all economic 
areas (Tables 2 and 3). Resource owners do not have opportunity to re­
ceive the full return on resources contributed if the shares of cost and 
1 Both incentive conditions can be met without achieving the highest 
profit combination for the farm as a firm. It still must follow that 
inputs of variables must be applied to the fixed resources until marginal 
costs equal marginal returns, in each enterprise. 
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return differ. Furthermore, incentive condition 3 applies to fixed 
resources the same as it does to the variable resources, obviously, if 
the annual use value of the fixed resources of a tenant exceeds those of 
the landlord and the share rental is 50-50, there can be both inefficiency 
in resource use and an income transfer. 
Incentive condition 3 and the cash lease 
The cash lease as a type meets the requirement that the resource 
owner receives the full share of the return earned by the resources he 
contributes only if the cash rental rate for the land (and that for any 
other fixed factor such as buildings) equals the rate at which the unit 
of land (or other factor) contributes to the earning, and only at the 
highest profit combination for all resources used in production.^ If the 
cash rental is above or below the actual earnings of the fixed factors 
there is an income transfer and the incentive condition is not fulfilled. 
This calculation and con5)arison can be made only farm by farm. There is 
no general test. 
Incentive condition 3 and the share lease 
Crop-share leases fulfill condition 3 if conditions 1 and 2 are met, 
and if land is the only fixed resource supplied by the landlord. It is 
highly improbable that the costs of buildings, fences and other such fixed 
factors will be truly rewarded in any simple crop-share rental. The prob-
^Technically, the condition is met if the marginal value product of 
land equals the net cash rent. This equality can be achieved at several 
levels of production, but the rent is an optimum only at one level. 
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ability is even smaller if livestock are a major source of income and the 
landlord also furnishes fixed resources which contribute to the tenant's 
livestock enterprises. There is no direct method of relating costs and 
earnings of a combination of fixed resources supplied by the landlord in a 
single share of crops, without sharing variable expenses. The best that 
can be done is that the average annual value of the rental share approx­
imates the sum of the earnings of the resources the landlord supplies. 
Crop-share-cash and livestock-share leases offer opportunity for 
incentive condition 3 to be fulfilled. There is nothing inherent in 
either form of lease as such to prevent the condition from being met. 
There are, however, at least two requirements or details needed in the 
individual agreement to encourage decisions which will give to the re­
source owner the full share of the product earned by the resources he fur­
nishes. One is a separate and distinct pajonent for the use of any housing 
or living facilities that the landlord furnishes; this separate and dis­
tinct payment enables the landlord to decide how much to invest in housing 
facilities and choose between investments in housing and other investments 
in the firm or outside the firm. At the same time, a separate payment for 
housing gives the tenant a basis for choosing between investments in con­
sumption goods and investments in production. The second requirement is 
that a separate and distinct payment be made for the use of the fixed factors 
that the landlord furnishes for use in the production processes of the 
farm business. These factors must earn and receive their return the same 
as do variable factors in the business. 
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The crop-share-cash lease in which payment is made on a per acre 
basis for use of pasture and hay is a common departure from equal shar­
ing in all products paid as rent (namely, from the second incentive con­
dition). The practice of paying a cash rental for pasture and hay plus a 
share of other crops meets the third incentive condition only if the pay­
ment per acre equals the return to land in this and in other uses of land 
of the same productivity on the farm; this would mean that the amount 
could be determined only at the close of the crop year.^ 
Building rentals are paid on tevi farms (Table 51). It follows that 
the cash rental in the great majority of crop-share-cash leases is for 
pasture or hay. Cash rental rates are known to change slowly.^ Thus, it 
appears that few cash-crop-share leases fulfill condition 3. 
Further evidence that leases do not include the incentive for resource 
ovmers to obtain the full share of the product earned by the resources is 
provided in a simple count of all leases as to v/hether or not the landlord 
shares in the cash operating expenses. The practice varies, by type of 
lease and from area to area, with sharing in crop-share and crop-share-
cash much more frequent in the eastern than in the western economic areas 
^Heady and Kehrberg discuss the lump sum payment, particularly as a 
means of avoiding the effects of premium rates on pasture and hay in dis­
torting the cost structure. The same idea would apply to any per acre 
rate in which the tenant could see an advantage in either increasing or 
decreasing the acreage of hay. 
Earl 0. Heady and 3arl 17. Kehrberg. Relationship of crop-share and 
cash leasing systems to farming efficiency. Iowa Agricultural Experiment 
Station Research Bulletin 386. 1952. p. 667-668. 
2,/alter E. Chryst. Adjusting farm rents to changes in prices, costs 
and production. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Ames, Iowa, Iowa State College 
Library, 1952. p. 79• 
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(Table 6). In central South Dakota, for example, expenses are shared in 
10 percent of all leases; whereas in Indiana area 2b expenses are shared 
in 99 percent of all leases. Sharing of variable expenses is essential 
for the resource owner to receive the marginal value product of his 
resource, except in a cash lease. 
Table 6, Percent of leases with landlord sharing cash operating expenses 
by type of lease 



















Ind 2b 275 274 99 0 100 100 100 100 100 
6 186 175 94 18 100 90 100 - -
la 2b 333 322 97 56 98 99 100 
6 242 203 84 58 89 98 100 - 67 
Kan 1 269 130 48 50 41 55 100 100 
6 333 310 93 13 94 98 100 - -
Ivlinn 1-4 324 209 65 26 75 78 97 
7-8 347 278 80 37 91 89 98 - -
Keb 1 256 129 50 17 46 59 100 85 
3b 311 242 78 - 74 81 100 - 100 
SD 1 155 63 41 8 42 22 88 73 
3b 199 20 10 - 10 7 50 - -
V/is 1 171 62 36 22 75 100 90 38 
3 331 315 95 74 100 71 99 - 100 
®Areas with the high and lov; proportions for each state. 
Another indication of the need for revisions in current leasing 
practices concerning sharing of expenses is provided by comparing the 
share of crop paid as rental when expenses are shared with that when expen­
ses are not shared. For this comparison the distributions of shares of 
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corn were calculated for each ecoaomic area in v/hich there vrare 20 or more 
cases of sharing and 20 or more of non-sharing of cash expenses for crop-
share and crop-share-cash leases combined. The distribution of shares of 
the crop with arrangement for sharing of ejqpenses is compared with the 
distribution of shares in the leases vfith no arrangement for sharing cash 
expenses (Table 7}«^ In seven of the 13 economic areas there is a signi­
ficant difference in shares of corn; the share is higher for leases with 
landlords sharing operating expenses (Table 7). In the other six areas 
the distribution of shares of corn is the same whether or not expenses are 
shared. 
selection of areas on some such basis is essential because in some 
economic areas the number of cases of non-sharing is too small to allow 
meaningful comparison. 
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Table 7- Percent of crop-share and crop-share-cash leases with selected 
share of corn under agreements in which landlords share operating expenses 
con^iared with those in which landlords do not share operating expenses 
Landlords share operating Landlords do not share 
State expenses operating expenses 
and No. i of leases with share No. % of leases with share 
area leases 1/3 2/5 1/2 leases 1/3 2/5 1/2 
Kan 3b* 132 60 26 14 34 47 53 0 
4* 155 23 60 16 29 55 38 7 
Minn 7-8* l8l 7 57 34 20 35 55 10 
Neb 1 54 90 6 4 50 80 8 8 
2 90 61 4 3 30 70 0 0 
3a 143 78 18 4 45 87 11 0 
3b 218 19 76 5 52 27 65 6 
4 150 89 7 3 115 95 3 2 
5* 209 29 71 0 68 51 46 0 
6* 185 3 81 16 34 0 94 6 
7 156 4 65 31 58 3 76 19 
SD 4a* 54 65 6 26 93 83 10 2 
4b* 30 10 37 53 202 17 78 5 
*Significantly larger share of corn in leases with landlord sharing 
operating expenses. 
Shares in different types of share leases 
V/ithin economic areas the shares of corn are the same in crop-share 
and crop-share-cash leases. In half of the (46) areas livestock-share 
leases have significantly greater proportions of the 50-50 share (Table 8a). 
Resource owners in all leases could not receive full returns on their con­
tributions if the shares of crops were the same in all leases. The fact 
that shares are the same in many leases of different types in all areas 
suggests that condition 3 is not being met in some leases. 
Table 8a. Landlord's share of corn by type of lease 
State 
Crop-share leases 
% with share 
Crop-share-cash leases 














2/5 1/2 5/5 
4/5 
Ind 2b 1 1 98 2 2 96 1 98 1 
la 4 6 94 2 4 94 5 93 4 
Kan 6* 15 35 50 5 24 69 2 7 89 4 
Mizm 6* 28 8 60 4 23 38 12 27 1 1 93 3 
Neb 4* 94 3 2 1 1 89 8 2 31 10 56 3 
SD 1* 88 8 4 14 86 18 18 9 37 18 
V/is 5* 48 2 50 23 25 50 1 7 2 89 1 
One or more significant difference in proportions between lease t3^es. 
Area with largest number of cases, each state. 
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The similarity of shares among types of leases in half the econoinic 
areas covered by this study suggests that it is not common practice to 
depart from some customary share, regardless of type of lease. Adjustments 
in earnings of resources furnished by the parties to the agreement are 
apparently made by adjusting the share of expenses.^ 
Shares of fertilizer are the same in crop-share and crop-share-cash 
leases (Table 9a). Livestock-share leases have a higher landlord's share, 
with a greater frequency of the half share. The difference between live-
stock-share and crop-share leases is significant in 20 of the 46 economic 
areas.^ 
Although the landlord's share in livestock-share leases is higher than 
in crop-share leases, it must be noted that in all areas there are many 
leases of the two types v/ith the same shares of expenses. As in the case 
of shares of corn, condition 3 can not be fulfilled in some leases if the 
shares are the same in different types. 
Form of rental payment and the source of income 
The source of income on the farm rented for cash is of no consequence 
in the lease. The crop-share or crop-share-cash lease is another matter. 
If livestock or livestock products are the major product sold and the land­
lord receives only a share of the crop, the operator has incentive to 
^Comparisons vfere also made for wheat; see Appendix Table 8b. Find­
ings ?/ere enough the same that illustration with the share of corn suffices 
for the purpose here. 
^See Appendix Table 9b for landlord's share of lime, and 9c for land­
lord's share of small grain seed. 
Table 9a. Leuadlord's share of fertilizer by type of lease 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State % with I share f. with share 
Tf5-
4/5 














Ind 2b 3 94 3 2 2 96 1 97 2 
la 4 67 33 2 98 1 91 5 3 
Kan 6* 4 18 28 41 9 5 17 13 56 9 2 4 72 4 18 
Minn 6* 25. 12 44 19 30 22 9 39 1 1 1 91 4 2 
35eb 4* 42 43 4 2 9 36 46 3 15 12 12 53 6 17 
SD 6 50 6 25 19 100 20 50 30 
Wis 5* 12 18 47 3 20 50 50 4 3 2 77 3 11 
% 
One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
^Area with largest number of cases, each state. 
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decreaise the number of acres and production of cash grain crops in order 
to increase production of forage crops. This may move away from the high­
est profit combination for the combined resources of landlord and tenant. 
Also, the landlord does not have opportxmity to receive the full return 
on some of the fixed resources he contributes. 
Grop-ahare and crop-share-cash leases are the most freq,uent type of 
lease for farms with hogs as a major source of income. As high as 75 per­
cent of the leases are crop-share-cash (Table 10a). The comparison is 
made for full-tenants renting from one landlord, and the lease applies to 
a whole farm rather than a tract or part of a farm* liuch the same situ­
ation exists with other major sources of income.^ 
Opportunity to Receive Return on Investment 
Lack of agreement as to conditions under which the lease will be re­
newed and the fact that the lease is for a given time period are two oat» 
standing characteristics of leasing practice that create problems concern­
ing the flow of income. If resources are to be used efficiently within 
a given time period and between time periods, both parties to an agree­
ment need some assxirance that they v/ill receive those returns which are 
forthcoming only over a period of time. The use of lime is an example. 
The benefits accrue over a period of years, but the costs are usually 
paid in one year. If the tenant is to be interested in applying lime 
and he shares in the cost of application, he must either stay on that 
farm long enough to receive the full benefit or he compensated in case 
^See Appendix Tables 10b and 10c. 
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labia 10a. Percent distribution of types of lease for farniS with hogs as 
a major source of income 
State Type of lease 
and Mb. of Cash Crop- Gro'p-share- "Livestock-
area^ cases share cash share 
Ind 2b* 44 0 2 14 82 
la 2a 109 10 2 66 21 
Kan 6 11 9 9 45 36 
Minn 7-8* 8? 29 2 39 30 
Neb 6* 50 12 12 62 14 
SD 4b* 64 5 3 78 11 
Wis 3 52 19 2 0 79 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested 
against percent distribution of all leases. 
^Area with largest number of cases reporting. 
the lease is terminated. In other instances there may be need for the 
landlord to receive compensation. 
Tenants cannot expect to continue on the same tract indefinitely. Hot 
only changes in ownership of the farm or tract, but also changes in opinion 
of the landlord result in uncertainty of tenure. 
Uncertainty of continuity at the expiration of a given lease period 
may offer opportunity to make adjustments wanted by both landlords and 
tenants. The advantages and disadvantages by no means act for one party 
alone. The landlord may have another tenant to whom he wishes to rent the 
farm. The tenant may be looking for another and larger farm, or one v/ith 
improvements more to his needs and tastes. In this respect, tenant 
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operation may offer fewer obstacles to change and possibly lower costo of 
changing operating imits than does ovmer-operatorship. 
In general, the mere fact that operating decisions are subject to the 
will of two parties leaves less room for choice by either party. Under some 
leasing arrangements the operator has complete freedom of choice as to crop-
rotations, selection of enterprises, and farming practices. Nevertheless, 
undertainty as to renewal at the expiration of the current lease may cause 
him to choose those combinations that will maximize his income in the perioc. 
covered by the lease rather than over a longer time period. Uncertainty 
may also be involved in the frequency of contacts of the two parties and in 
their opinions of each other. Unless there is a mutuality of imderstanding 
one party may not know what to expect in reaction from the other concerning 
use of a new practice. 
If the land is in a temporary or unstable ownership status the tenant 
has additional uncertainty of tenure. Land in estates being probated, that 
owned by speculators, some of that managed by governmental agencies, and 
that held by landlords of advanced years, sets up a condition under which 
the tenant is inclined to operate in the short run. In any situation in 
which ownership is subject to change at a near but lonlcnown date there are 
stronger chances that the given tenant will not be able to renevf his lease. 
Uncertainty is an attribute of the outlook for many landlords, too. 
Although the land has been rented for ten years or more, it was not 
necessarily known by the landlord that the tenant would stay for another 
year. Uncertainty as to the continuity of the tenant on the given unit 
increases the problems of making and maintaining improvements. The new 
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tenant may not be interested in the kind of improvements requested by the 
previous one. 
If numerous changes in tenants or in farms result from the conditions 
of uncertainty as to renewal, nature of future operations, or quality of 
performance that will be accepted, the fault is in the terms and conditions 
of the lease as such. In the following paragraphs selected characteristics 
of leases are discussed, to show some of the implications for resource use 
and income distribution through time. 
l.fejor product sold and length of lease 
V/ith no understanding on renewal the tendency would be to select pro­
ducts that could be finished ?/ithin the terra of the lease. Tenants would 
have reason to select enterprises which would not necessarily maximize the 
income for the farm over a period of years. There would be a tendency to 
stay away from enterprises such as dairy products or beef cattle, because 
of the disruption costs if the lease is not renewed. 
Current leasing practices demonstrate the tendency for length of lease 
to be the same regardless of type of product (Table 11). The comparison 
between major product and type of lease is for tenants renting all the land 
they operate from one landlord. Each farm may have more than one major 
source of income. But on any farm operated under a one-year lease there 
would need to be some specific arrangement for the operator to receive a 
return on investments in any enterprise extend.ing beyond the length of the 
lease. Dairy and beef require more than one year for production. Even 
though the landlord does not share in livestock enterprises, difference 
between length of lease and time required to produce the product increases 
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Table 11. Wiomber of leases and percent with one-year term by major 
product sold; full tenants, one landlord 
State Cash grain Dairy Beef Hogs 
and Kg. > No. °fc Ko. "% "NoT > 
area® leases 1-year leases 1-year leases 1-year leases 1-year 
Ind 2b 37 57 4 75 5 20 37 51 
la 4 15 69 29 59 13 46 85 64 




1 47 62 23 43 17 41 84 60 
Neb 6 36 83 2 50 30 87 46 76 
SD 4b 45 78 7 29 24 71 59 78 
Wis 3 2 100 191 61 12 50 47 64 
^iixea with largest number of cases reporting. 
the uncertainty of operation and decreases the opportunity for the resource 
ovmer to maximize returns on his investments between production periods. 
ivlajor product sold and length of termination notice 
V/hether the major product sold is a grain crop or livestock, short 
notices of termination are more frequent in practice than are notices of 
eleven or more months, and length of notice is the same among different 
products (Table 12). A notice of 4 months or less supposedly would be 
sufficient to bring the farm business to settl^ent if cash grain is the 
product. A longer period would be needed to settle accounts and for both 
landlord and tenant to make arrangements for another year if the livestock 
enterprise is dairy or beef cattle. Apparently, the length of termination 
notice is not adjusted to fit the type of product sold. Furthermore, 
short notices increase uncertainties of operation for both parties. 
Table 12. Number of leases aad percent with 1 to 4 and 11 or more months termination notice by-





































Ind 2 b 26 35 15 2 50 0 4 50 0 25 40 4 
la 4 10 50 0 23 17 0 8 25 0 65 32 2 
Kan 6 20 40 0 7 43 14 11 9 27 10 30 0 
fvlinn 7-8 29 24 10 15 20 13 13 15 15 60 18 8 
Neb 6 22 14 14 1 0 0 19 16 0 33 21 6 
SD 4b 25 24 8 2 50 0 15 40 0 33 27 9 
Wis 3 2 0 0 159 34 3 10 70 0 34 38 6 
with largest number of cases. 
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Major product sold and laonth lease begins 
The first four months of the year are the beginning dates for the 
great majority of leases (Table 13). Had the specific day been asked in 
the questionnaire, undoubtedly that date would have been March 1. Again, 
the comparison in Table 13 is for full-tenants renting from one landlord. 
A date early in the year would allow the tenant to get settled before 
the beginning of spring work. Also, a date before planting time in the 
fall would be suitable in winter-grain areas and for farms on which the 
major livestock enterprise is fattening of beef cattle.^ a March 1 moving 
date may be too late for early farrowing of spring pigs. Lack of differ­
ences between beginning dates regardless of the major product sold suggests 
that beginning date is not adjusted to type of product. This might 
influence the choice of products, as well as the allocation of resources 
between production periods. 
July or August is the most frequent beginning month for the distri­
bution of all leases in several economic areas in Kansas, as shovm in 
Appendix Table 59. 
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Tatie Percent of leases begiiming in given months by major product 































Ind 2b 77 5 8 100 0 0 100 0 0 82 0 8 
la 4 92 0 8 96 0 4 92 0 0 93 2 4 
Kan 6 93 3 0 90 10 0 100 0 0 91 0 9 
DiLnn 7-8 76 9 11 78 4 13 83 0 6 83 5 8 
Neb 6 100 0 0 100 0 0 93 0 7 92 4 2 
SD 4b 93 2 2 100 0 0 96 0 4 91 0 2 
V/is 3 100 0 0 96 1 2 92 0 8 96 0 4 
^Area with largest number of cases reporting. 
Type of lease and length of lease 
One-year leases are the laost frequent length of lease for all types of 
leases (Table 14). Although both length of lease and type of lease are the 
result of many related forces, significant differences would be expected in 
proportions of one-year leases. In view of the longer production period 
involved in livestock enterprises, the percentages of one-year leases in 
livestock-share airrangements should be smaller than the proportions of one-
year agreements in cash, crop-share or crop-share-caah leases. This ?/ould 
be the case especially in dairying or in raising beef, in which more than 
one year is essential for efficient planning of production. 
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Table 14, Number of leases and percent with one-year term by type of lease 
State Cash Crop-share Crop-share -cash Lives tock-shi 
and No. % No. % i?o. i Ho. 
area^ 1-yr. 1-yr. 1-; yr. 1-yr, 
Ind 2 b 1 0 59 68 52 69 120 53 
6 11 73 103 68 19 63 38 50 
la 3a 14 93 25 68 83 76 57 56 
5* 49 80 26 65 86 69 76 43 
Kan 2a* 1 0 157 52 114 51 23 13 
7a* 19 90 82 77 92 87 12 58 
Minn 1-4 84 70 130 55 61 67 23 52 
7-8 71 59 65 66 133 54 61 48 
Meb 1* 84 42 56 75 84 73 21 48 
3b 9 100 83 75 187 82 14 86 
sa 1 35 37 66 52 27 56 22 50 
3b 2 50 51 76 134 81 8 87 
Wis 2ab 74 76 15 80 9 78 131 57 
6-7 100 56 7 86 3 33 85 42 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types, 
^Areas v/ith lowest and highest proportions one-year leases, each state. 
The small differences in percentages of one-year leases among types of 
leases suggest that in practice length of lease is the same, regardless of 
type. The differences are statistically significant in l6 of the 46 econ­
omic areas; in each of these areas the proportion of livestock-share leases 
is significantly smaller than the proportion for one or more other type 
of lease. 
Distribution of one-year leases among types of leases (Table 15) 
varies among economic areas mainly because of differences in proportions 
of lease types among areas (Table 17). One-year leases exceed those of any 
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other length in all economic areas (Table 16). 
The purpose in fitting type of lease and length of lease to the needs 
of the individual case is to provide the incentive for resources of both 
landlord and tenant to be used efficiently. These are points for agreement 
between individual landlords and tenants. There are many reasons for the 
existence of one-year leases. It is one device landlords can use to 
encourage husbandry on the part of a tenant. Likevdse, the one-year lease 
may be to the advantage of the tenant when he may want to change farms. 
Rone the less, adjustments in type and length of leases miglit benefit 
both landlord and tenant. Among others is the effect of imcertainty about 
length of the agreement. Small percentages of tenants in several economic 
areas reported that length of lease was not covered in the agreement. A 
contract is not binding legally, unless a specific period of time is named. 
Also, 2 to 29 percent of tenants in all areas reported the length of the 
lease as "indefinite". Probably in most of these "indefinite" instances 
the lease vias initiated as a one-year agreement and then continued on from 
year to year v/ithout specific discussion between the parties. 
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Table 15. Pei-cent distribution of one-year leases by type of lease 
State 
and Gash Crop-share Crop-share- Livestock-
area® cash share 
Ind 2b 0 28 26 45 
6 7 64 11 17 
la 5a 10 14 50 26 
5* 26 11 40 22 
Kan 2a 0 57 41 2 
7a 10 58 48 4 
llinn 1-4 52 59 22 7 
7-8 25 25 39 15 
I^eb 1 25 27 59 6 
?b 4. 26 65 5 
SD 1 17 44 19 14 
5b 1 25 69 4 
,.'is 2ab 56 8 4 49 
6-7 54 6 1 55 
One significant difference in proportions when tested against percent 
distribution of all leases by type. 
3-Areas with lov;est and highest proportions of one-year leases, each 
state. 
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1 year 2 or 3 
years 
4 or 5 
years 
Indefinite Other 
Ind 2b 60 2 4 16 l8 
6 1 64 2 5 10 19 
la 3a 70 4 7 6 13 
5 62 6 3 11 10 
2Can 2a 48 5 2 29 16 
7a 2 81 1 3 8 5 
iviinn 1-4 1 62 15 8 8 6 
7-8 1 56 15 9 11 8 
Neb 1 1 59 15 8 2 15 
5b 3 81 4 3 4 5 
3D 1 48 25 5 12 10 
3b - 79 4 3 10 4 
Wis 2ab 1 65 9 5 4 16 
6-7 - 50 19 8 10 13 
^Areas with lowest and highest proportions of one-year leases, 
each state. 
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Tlie Four Incentive Conditions Taken Together 
All four of the incentive conditions must be met in each lease to en­
courage efficiency in the use of resources and prevent transfers of income 
from one to the other party. Absence of any one of them creates a motiva­
tion for the resoxirce owner to move away from the highest profit combina­
tion in use of the combined resources of landlord and tenant or results in 
an income transfer. The conditions apply whether the given lease is for a 
whole farm or a tract of land, and whether the operator is a part-ovmer or 
a full tenant. 
That some farms may not maximize income and use all resources effic­
iently even though the necessary conditions are present and even though the 
lease is perfect as a contract does not deny the importance of the incentive 
conditions. Rather, it is to be emphasized that the leasing problem per se 
is solved as soon as there are arrangements in the lease to motivate 
efficient use of resources and prevent unintended income transfers. This 
does not necessarily solve the economic problem conanon to all farms—namely 
the problem of combining and using i^esources efficiently. 
Adjustments in content and detail of leases are apparently made slowly 
as the need becomes recognized. The process seems to be that provisions are 
added to the previous agreement without disturbing the general content. One 
type of adjustment is that of making a change in the share of cost of one 
item to take care of a change that has arisen in another. For example, a 
tenant needs new brooder houses for the hogs he is raising on a farm he 
rents under a crop-share lease. He and the landlord agree that the land­
lord will furnish the brooder houses, and to match that cost the tenant 
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will apply a given, amount of fertilizer. The adjustment may be satis­
factory to both parties, but often the expediency merely postpones the 
solving of the economic problem involved. Usually the need for compen­
sating adjustments arises because one or more of the incentive conditions 
is absent. 
As illustration, suppose a tenant on a crop-share lease desires to 
shift to dairy farming. The change in enterprises requires additional 
buildings and fences and a change in crop rotation. The proposed solution 
is for the landlord to provide the buildings and fences, receive the old 
share of cash crops, and receive a cash rental per acre of hay and pasture. 
The common argument in favor of this type of adjustment is that the landlord 
can afford to make expenditures to help shift to a livestock type of farm­
ing because crop yields will be increased. His income from higher yields of 
crops on a smaller number of acres and from the cash payment for use of hay 
and pasture will be higher. Supposedly the tenant's income is increased. 
If both are satisfied, what is the fault in this type of practice? 
Ivlors direct methods of adjustment are available to handle shifts in 
type of farming and changes in methods and costs of operating. For example, 
a flat annual payment for the use of buildings will give the landlord 
direct return on his investment and at the same time show the tenant how 
much additional income from livestock is needed to cover the cash payment. 
Compensating adjustments tend to increase the opportunity and the incentive 
for each party to try to maximize the return on the resources he contri­
butes instead of causing both to try to maximize the return to the combined 
resources. Apparently, one or more adjustment has been .aiade In many 
leases in all economic areas to compensate for the absence of the incentive 
conditions. 
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Several types of compensating adjustments aitiount to reasonable approx­
imations of the incentive conditions. Specific balancing of variable costs 
is an example. Under a high level performance in management and a mutuality 
of interest between landlord and tenant, the same result is obtained if each 
party pays one of two equal expenses or each pays half of both expenses. 
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult in practice to calculate the ratio 
of costs to returns along a scale of intensity. Even with only one item of 
variable cost for one type of input (for example, the amount of concentrates 
to feed to hogs), the answer at best may be only an approximation because 
the exact results from units of additional input simply are not known. This 
is even more the case when there are multiple variables involved. But lack 
of detailed knov/ledge does not deny the necessity of experimenting to find 
the combination that results in the highest income. 
An arrangement for the tenant to pay all costs of fertilizer to bal­
ance all of another expense paid by the landlord might run into difficulty 
only in an occasional year. Suppose an agreement specified that ^ 00 pounds 
of a given kind of fertilizer would be applied at the proper time and place 
in the rotation. An unusual season occurs; rainfall is heavier than usual; 
the crop prospects are better than usual; and there is possibility of higher 
yield by an application of nitrogen fertiliser. Both parties will benefit 
by the additional yield. V/ho pays the cost of the additional fertilizer? 
The con5)ensating cost arrangement cannot take care of this type of case in 
advance. 
Compensating adjustments as worked out in practice, with definite 
agreement as to form and amount, suggest that landlords and tenants have 
fairly specific ideas about the items or inputs being sdjusted, "They know 
that a given arrangement of different shares works to the advantage of one 
or the other, and how much it is doing so. Otherwise, they would have no 
idea as to how much of an allowance to make in some other item. The 
adjustment would be simple and would fit all cases, if the 4 incentive 
conditions were met. 
Compensating adjustments sometimes take the form of one party assuming 
more than his proportionate share of a given expense in order to raise the 
level of farming practice and thereby increase the total income of the farm. 
The use of lime and fertilizer is an example. Landlords may pay all of the 
costs to get the tenant to adopt the practice. This type of incentive may 
be useful in accompliahment of desired results, but if continued indefin­
itely after its utility has been demonstrated the result is an annual in­
come transfer. There are instances of tenants being the leaders in tech­
nology, with the landlord being reluctant or refusing to allow a practice 
that will increase production on the farm. Contouring and terracing for 
water control and soil conservation are examples. The tenant may pay all 
costs of contouring and terracing, merely to demonstrate the effects. In 
such cases, whether one or the other party bears more than his proportionate 
share of cost, the result is a lack of compensation for the specific contri­
bution. The fact of income transfer may be less important to the two 
parties to the agreement (and to society, because of the production obtained) 
than would be the lack of use of the practice—in the short run; but the 
practice would remain as a source of dissatisfaction in the long run. 
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OmER ECONOiVilG IMPLICATIONS OF LEASING PRACTICES 
Tlie primary purpose in comparing selected characteristics of leases, 
renters and landlords is to examine the possible effects upon resource use. 
iilthough some of the relations between given characteristics may have no 
direct implications upon resource use and may serve only to describe 
current leasing practice, the indirect implications may indicate need of 
adjustments in lease content. Some of the comparisons may illustrate the 
nature of advantages of one group of tenants or of landlords, the signi­
ficance of written versus oral leases, or demonstrate the effects of var­
iations in practices, and thus show the need for changes in educational 
programs. Furthermore, methodical examination of selected characteristics 
or practices may help in the solution of leasing problems by demonstrating 
that some of the associations commonly believed to be important are of 
little economic consequence. 
The same economic areas are used for all comparisons, to facilitate 
discussion. The area used as example for each state is one with a suffi­
cient number of leases of each type to test variation in proportions. 
These areas are not representative of whole states because economic areas 
within states vary in the proportions of numerous characteristics. The 
areas used as examples only characterize leasing practices in those areas 
and illustrate conditions in the 7 states. 
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Charaoteristics of Leases 
Tsrpe of lease 
The general form of the type of lease apparently is established by 
customary practice, and then variations are made within it to fit some of 
the needs of the individual case. This is shown by the tendency for com­
parability among types of lease within areas as to length of term, length 
of termination, shares of expenses and of returns, and the lack of differ­
ences on numerous items such as age of operator, age of landlord, tjrpe of 
owner and sex of landlord. 
The comparability between leases suggests the need for more careful 
study on the part of parties to the individual contract as to the content 
and terms of the agreement. Each lease is a contract fitting a particular 
situation. Although some of the practices that are common in an area will 
fit the individual case, the agreement can serve its full purpose only if 
it is tailored to the needs of the individual landlord, the individual 
tenant, and the specific property in question. 
The distribution of types of lease in all economic areas is given in 
Table 17 for all respondents to facilitate discussion of the relation 
between given characteristics for selected areas. The distribution in 
following tables is shown only for cash, crop-share, crop-share-cash, and 
livestock-share leases becaus-e the small numbers of labor-share and special 
leases were not sufficient for tests of significance. 
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Table 17. Percent distribution of leases by type of lease 
State No. Casli Crop- Grop-share- Livestock- Labor- Other 









2b 275 - 27 20 52 - 1 
6 186 6 62 11 21 - -
la 297 20 7 48 24 - 1 
lb 272 5 21 44 29 - 1 
2a 339 7 11 64 17 - 1 
2b 342 5 14 62 19 - -
3a 189 8 14 45 33 - -
5b 167 6 17 45 31 - 1 
4 221 19 7 22 51 1 -
5 252 21 11 36 32 - -
6 245 34 11 25 29 - 1 
1 314 1 71 23 4 - 1 
2a 344 - 56 36 8 - -
2b 303 1 48 46 5 - -
3a 303 1 53 42 2 1 1 
3b 352 4 39 50 6 - 1 
4 314 1 35 51 13 - -
5 277 13 26 51 10 - -$ 343 6 32 45 17 - -
7a 225 9 40 45 6 - -
7b 361 6 53 35 5 - 1 
1-4 329 26 45 20 9 - -
6 275 45 11 11 55 - -
7-8 352 21 20 40 19 - -
1 204 31 22 51 9 - 7 
2 362 2 73 18 5 - 2 
5a 269 4 41 44 11 - -
5b 328 3 29 62 5 - 1 
4 360 2 42 46 9 - 1 
5 334 - 37 55 6 - 2 
6 515 13 32 45 8 - 2 
7 271 4 29 55 6 - 6 
1 172 21 42 16 15 - 6 
2a 222 2 37 50 6 - 5 
2b 203 4 40 46 7 1 2 
3a 185 6 31 55 4 - 4 
3b 219 1 26 67 5 - 1 
4a 193 1 27 63 5 - 4 
4b 296 4 19 67 8 - 2 
1 179 68 5 1 12 - 14 
2ab 254 31 7 3 54 - 5 
3 332 13 1 2 85 - 1 
4 263 4^ 2 2 42 - 5 
5 230 25 21 2 44 - 8 
6-7 227 47 3 1 44 - 5 
8-9 278 29 4 2 64 - 1 
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The crop-share-cash lease is the most frequent type in 25 econoBiic 
areas, the crop-share in 9 areas, the livestock-share in 6 areas, and the 
cash lease in 5 areas. Labor-share leases are as much as one percent of 
all leases in only three areas. The proportion of special leases is also 
small in all areas,^ 
Type of lease and size of tract rented, "/ithin economic areas the 
number of acres rented from this landlord ara distributed differently among 
types of leases (Table l8). In crop-share leases there are higher propor­
tions of small tracts than in other types of leases. Few tracts of less 
than 100 acres are rented under livestock-share leases. Although the pro­
portion of leases of one type in a size group is frequently larger than 
that of another in the same area, fev? are higher than all others in the same 
area. There is no consistent pattern of differences vrithin areas. The 
average size of tract rented conforms with the differences in size of farm 
between areas; there are more of the larger tracts in the wheat and range-
livestock type of farming areas (Kebraska, Kansas, South Dakota) than in 
corn-hog, dairy, and general farming areas (lowa, Mnnesota, Indiana, 
,/isconsin) for all types of lease.^ 
^The distribution of types of leases among individuals as ovmers was 
also calculated and was the same as for all owners, because individuals are 
85 percent or more of all owners in all areas. 
^The comparison here is on size of tract rented from this landlord. 
It must be remembered that in numerous cases the tenant rents land from 
more than one landlord. For comparison of number of acres rented and farmed, 
see Appendix Tables 79 and 80. 
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The absence of small tracts under livestock-share leases is explain­
able in that the tenant usually has only one landlord and the size of tract 
needs to be large enough for an economic unit. Any tenant renting from 
more than one landlord might purposely rent an additional small tract to 
enlarge his operating unit even though the terms were unfavorable. 
Full tenants renting all the land they operate from one owner and 
renting a complete economic unit would have no reason to select one type of 
lease over another because of any peculiar relations between type of lease 
and size of tract as such. However, the tenant with limited resources 
would likely select a large tract on share rent rather than a smaller one 
under a cash rental. The cash renter would need to be able to assume the 
risk and to furnish all machinery, livestock and operating expenses. Cash 
renters of a given size of tract would need a higher net worth (for the 
same type of farming) than tiTOuM share renters in the same size of business. 
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Table l8. Distribution of size of tracts rented by type of lease 
Percent of cash leases Percent crop-share leases 
State with acres with acres 
and Under 50 100 180 260 Over Under 50 100 180 260 Over 
area 50 99 179 259 499 500 50 99 179 259 499 500 
Ind 6* 64 18 9 9 27 30 27 8 8 
la 3a 0 46 27 20 7 24 38 26 12 
iCan 6* 22 6 28 . 33 11 26 31 28 14 1 
iiinn 7-8* 2 24 48 19 ,7 4 45 36 9 6 
Keb 1* 2 4 8 2 24 60 7 19 32 25 13 4 
SD 1* 6 9 23 3 14 45 2 9 51 4 22 12 
;/is 5* 26 27 29 9 9 50 31 19 12 2 
Percent crop-share-cash leases Percent livestock-share leases 
State v/ith acres with acres 
and Under 50 100 186 260 Over Under 50 100 l86 260 Over 
area 50 99 179 259 ^99 500 179 259 4^ 50^ 
Ind 6* 5 10 45 25 • 10 5 23 36 10 26 5 
la 3a 16 46 20 18 5 27 36 21 11 
ICan 6* 7 15 43 16 19 35 24 35 6 
Ivlinn 7-8* 1 5 52 24 17 1 1 44 33 16 6 
Neb 1* 4 21 4 29 42 5 24 71 
3D 1* 3 19 19 26 33 4 4 16 76 
./is 5* 50 25 25 1 17 49 26 6 1 
One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types 
Type of lease and sex of the landlord. There is no consistent 
pattern of differences in the proportions of male landlords among types of 
leases (Table 19). The percent of livestock-share leases with male land­
lords is significantly higher than one other type of lease in 9 of the 46 
economic areas, but is larger than all other types in only 2 areas. There 
is no significant difference in the proportions betv;een other types of 
leases. 
Sex and type of landlord may have impact upon the content of leasing 
agreements and thereby become important in programs to improve leases. The 
problem is partly one of reaching and impressing all landlords and all 
tenants. Tenants can be found. They live on or near the farms operated 
and can be contacted through usual informational channels such as Extension 
programs. But non-resident landlords, non-farm landlords, corporations and 
government agencies may or may not be touched by usual educational programs. 
Also, beliefs, mores and preferences of tenants may make it more difficult 
for an agreement to be satisfactory if the landlord is a woman.^ 
^Comparisons were also made between sex of landlord and length of 
lease; size of tract rented; and age of landlords. See Appendix Tables 60, 
63 and 74. 
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Ind 6 72 73 71 68 74 
la 3a 74 53 77 70 82 
Kan 6* 75 78 80 68 85 
ilinn 7-8 79 87 75 75 82 
Neb 1 15 68 81 79 67 
SD 1 79 64 80 75 87 
Wis 5 74 71 76 75 78 
One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
percent for all leases. 
Type of lease and percent written agreements. Smaller proportions of 
crop-share leases than of all leases are written; the difference in propor­
tions is significant in 33 of the 4-6 economic areas. Livestock-share leases 
are written more frequently than are all leases in 4 areas, but are written 
less frequently in 4 areas. The proportion of v/ritfcen cash leases is signi­
ficantly latger than that for all leases in 8 areas. Crop-share-cash leases 
tend to be written more frequently than any other type of lease (Table 20 
and Appendix Table 20). 
It is the other factors involved in making the agreement rather than 
type of lease alone that determines whether the lease is written. Confusion 
of the tenant in replying to the question would be the same among types of 
leases. If the tenant had rented the same land a number of years from the 
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one landlord, there may have been doubt in his mind, particularly if it 
had been written the first year but had never been specifically extended 
in writing. 
Table 20. Percent written leases by type of lease 
State ~ ~~ 
and Oash Crop-share Crop-share- Livestock-
area cash share 
Ind 6* . 18 15 37 46 
la 3a* 33 4 55 46 
San 6* 5 5 24 14 
Mnn 7-8* 50 25 47 42 
Neb 1* 64 30 55 48 
SD 1* 72 41 52 33 
Wis 5 33 13 25 40 
One or more significant difference in proportions when tested 
against percent for all leases. 
Type of lease and number of years rented. The number of years rented 
is the same for leases of different types (Table 21). Although the percent 
of leases of one type that has been in effect for a given number of years 
(for example, 38 percent of the crop-share leases in Minn. 7-8) may be 
larger than the similiar percent for another type of lease, there is no 
consistent pattern of significant differences in proportions. 
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Table 21. Percent distribution of number of years rented this land by 
type of lease 
3tate Cash Crop-share _ Grop-share-cash Livestock-share 
and Kumber of years rented 
area 1 2-4 IQi- I 2^4 5-9 lOi- 1 2-4 5-9 lOi- 1 2-4 5-9 10» 
Ind 6* 18 46 9 27 9 30 29 32 10 5 25 60 5 45 37 13 
la 3a 13 20 27 40 8 50 23 19 18 34 26 22 12 34 34 20 
Kan 6 5 15 30 50 1 33 38 28 1 42 33 24 4 40 33 23 
i.dnn 7-8*9 29 40 22 17 38 28 17 9 22 44 25 4 31 44 21 
Neb 1 6 25 28 41 11 35 33 21 7 30 32 31 5 43 38 14 
SD 1* 9 20' 17 54 6 41 32 21 4 55 26 15 8 46 38 8 
".7is 5* 21 26 34 19 22 50 15 13 75 25 12 34 28 26 
One or more significant difference in proportions betY/een lease typea. 
Type of lease and landlord ovm machinery. Tenants usually own the 
farm machinery under cash, crop-share, and crop-share-cash leases 
(Table 22). Ovmership of machinery by the landlord is significantly more 
frequent under livestock-share leases; but the tenant owns the machinery 
in as high as 50 percent of the livestock-share leases in some areas. 
Ownership of machinery by the landlord under any type of lease should 
be determined by the amount each is able to supply and what each does in 
respect to other contributions. Ownership of machinery has been the 
traditional function of the tenant. Sharing arrangements have developed 
with the increased amount of investment in machinery and the us^a of costly 
items -Of special aquipment. 
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Table 22. Percent of leases with landlord sharing ownership of machinery 
by type of lease 
State 
and Ml types Cash Crop-share Crop-share- Livestock-
area cash share 
Ind 6* 15 0 3 3 62 
la 3a* 42 8 23 28 76 
Kan 6* 28 33 l8 19 6? 
Minn 7-8* 19 3 16 13 50 
Neb 1* 16 3 6 12 58 
SD 1* 19 6 12 9 52 
Wis 5* 30 7 11 25 53 
5^ 
One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
«> 
Type of lease and length of termination notice. There is no con­
sistent pattern of significant differences in termination notices between 
types of leases (Table 23). There are significant differences, but the 
type of lease with a higher proportion varies from area to area. The 1 to 
4 month termination notice tends to be the most frequent length. Length 
of termination notice apparently is not fitted to type of lease.^ 
Other provisions in the lease influence and are influenced by the 
agreement on termination notice. Among others are the length of lease, 
and with one-year leases predominating it is to be expected that there 
would be few notices of more than one year. Likewise, any form of auto-
1a similar comparison by type of landlord shows that there is no 
significant difference between types in length of termination notice; 
Appendix Table 69. 
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matic renev/al clause ana any provision to pay for unexhausted improvements 
might easily negate the importance of teriaination notice as 3uch. 
Table 23. Percent distribution of length of termination notices by type 
of lease® 
State Cash Crop-share Orop-•share--cash Livestock--share 
and 





months of notice 
-12 1-4 5-8 9-12 1-4 5-8 9-12 
Ind 6 25 0 13 47 12 12 47 20 13 52 23 3 
la 3a* 43 14 14 44 6 0 54 25 3 42 38 2 
Kan 6* 50 12 12 19 15 10 40 25 9 29 29 14 
Minn 7-8* 29 17 10 17 24 5 15 27 14 14 48 2 
Eeb 1 16 40 7 15 55 3 15 48 8 0 47 7 
SD 1 26 26 5 38 5 7 56 22 6 29 29 7 
"..'is 5* 47 8 6 37 3 3 50 0 0 60 7 6 
One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
^Data excluded for notices over 1 year, instant, by agreement, and 
not in lease. 
Type of lease and age of renter. 'The age of renters is much the same 
for crop-share and crop-share-cash leases (Table 24). The percent of 
renters in the 25-34 age group is significantly larger under livestock-share 
leases than under one or more other type of lease in 20 economic areas. 
Also, there are more areas with no renters under 25 for cash leases than 
for other types of lease. In general, the tendency is for cash renters to 
be older than others and for livestock-share renters to be younger than 
others. But the age distributions are the same for all types of lease in 
one-third of the areas. 
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Table 24. Percent distribution of age of renters by type of lease 
Cash leases Crop-share leases 
























Ind 6* 0 57 18 18 9 18 6 26 25 26 15 4 
la 5a 0 58 51 8 15 8 4 56 28 52 0 0 
Kan 6* 0 40 15 25 0 20 5 22 41 17 12 5 
i.iinn 7-8 2 58 29 25 6 2 11 50 22 25 9 5 
Keb 1 0 26 55 16 16 7 5 50 21 55 11 0 
SD 1* 0 11 25 55 20 11 5 52 55 21 10 1 
Wis 5* 7 15 45 20 10 5 0 22 26 51 17 4 
State 
Crop-share-cash leases 
Percent of renters, ase 
Livestock-share leases 
























Ind 6* 5 5 45 20 20 5 10 46 51 10 0 5 
la 5a 8 46 25 18 5 0 5 49 55 10 5 0 
Kan 6* 4 55 29 22 9 5 18 59 26 14 5 0 
Hinn 7-8 5 41 51 17 8 0 5 42 51 16 5 1 
Neb 1 4 52 54 14 11 5 0 42 46 8 4 0 
SD 1* 7 41 22 22 7 0 12 64 8 12 4 0 
Wis 5* 0 0 25 25 25 25 8 49 20 15 8 0 
5^ 
One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
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In interpreting the distribution of ages among types of lease in 
Table 24, it must be remembered that the leases reported are for tracts of 
land and that only part of the leases are for whole farm units. Thus, some 
of the farming operations involved may include leases of other types. 
Number of years rented this land 
As shovm in Table 21 there are few significant differences in number 
of years land is rented by type of lease. Other characteristics of leases, 
of tenants, and of landlords do vary by length of time land has been rented. 
A few of these are given below.^ 
Mumber of years rented this land and age of renter. In general, the 
proportions of older tenants increase as the number of years rented 
increases. Larger percentages of the tenancies of 10 or more years are of 
tenants between 45 and 64 years of age than is the case with tenancies of 
one year duration (Table 25). Larger percentages of the tracts rented one 
year than of those rented longer are rented by tenants under 25 years of 
age. 
^Comparisons v/ere also made for shares of fertilizer, shares of corn, 
and size of tract rented. There were few areas with significant differences; 
see Appendix Tables 62 and 64. 
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Table 25. Percent distribution of age of renters by number of years rented 
this land 
















% of renters, 
Under 25- 35- 45-





Ind 6* 31 38 19 12 9 40 28 16 5 2 
la 3a 16 52 32 8 55 18 17 2 
Kan 6* 40 20 20 20 16 37 26 18 3 
Minn 7-8* 17 40 23 17 3 10 50 25 11 2 2 
Neb 1* 13 52 17 9 9 4 51 17 20 7 1 
SD 1* 17 50 17 8 8 4 49 18 22 7 
Wis 5* 12 41 20 18 6 3 12 36 26 16 7 3 
Tracts rented 5-9 years _ Tract£ rented 10 or more years 
State ^of renters, age of renters, age 
and Under 25- 35- 45- 55- 65<- Under 25- 35- 45- 55- 65i-
area 25 34 44 54 64 25 34 44 54 64 
Ind 6* 4 36 26 15 11 8 5 30 39 19 7 
la 3a 53 35 8 4 14 36 36 12 2 





1 44 34 15 6 12 30 37 18 3 
Heb 1* 30 48 13 7 2 11 34 25 23 7 
SD 1* 2 37 46 11 4 8 20 40 22 10 
Wis 5* 2 34 37 16 9 2 7 32 30 18 13 
One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
distribution of age of all renters. 
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Niomber of years rented and length of lease. Number of years rented is 
apparently influenced but little by the length of the lease. There is no 
consistent pattern of difference in proportions of one-year leases 
(Table 26), The proportion of one-year leases in one-year tenancies is 
larger than the proportion in another group in 7 areas; the proportion in 
the 2-4 year tenancies is larger in 8 economic areas, and that for the 5-9 
year tenancies is larger in 7 economic areas. 
Distributions of number of years rented and proportions of one-year 
leases cannot be interpreted to mean that no problems exist for landlords 
and tenants regarding length of lease, number of years rented, or renewals. 
V/ithin types and within areas, many problems can exist because individuals 
have not made adaptions. 
Table 26. Percent written leases and one-year leases by number of years 
rented this land 







lOi- 1 2-4 5-9 
% one-year 
10-e-
Ind 6 *63 27 17 14 *69 68 73 52 
la 5a *77 47 34 29 81 76 60 65 
Kan 6 *60 22 11 9 *80 79 58 64 
Minn 7-8 *68 47 59 35 *76 55 56 49 
Neb 1 *57 54 50 44 *77 65 65 46 
SD 1 75 47 38 58 35 . 52 44 49 
Ylis 5 *50 35 24 16 •72 65 65 50 
•One or more significant difference in proportions between classes. 
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Mumber of years rented and percent written leases. Tracts rented one 
year are more frequently covered by written leases than are tracts rented 
two or more years (Table 26). Apparently the practice is common for the 
lease to be written for the first period, and then it is extended orally. 
The proportion of written leases decreases as length of tenure increases. 
Stttaller percentages of the tracts rented 10 or more years are covered by 
written leases. 
Written and oral leases 
Whether the lease is written or oral may have important consequences 
in settling disputes when disputes arise. Content of the lease is more 
likely to be specific on details, when written. The majority of leases are 
oral in nearly all economic areas (Table 27). 
The general content of written leases is the same as that of oral 
leases. The differences between them are in details. 
There is no significant difference between male and female landlords 
in frequency of written leases. Likewise, the percent of written leases 
is the same whether or not the landlord shares in ownership of livestock, 
machinery, or payment of cash expenses (Table 27)o 
If the length of lease is for more than one year it is more likely to 
be written (Table 28). A higher percentage of the 2 to 5 year than of the 
one-year leases are written. Leases in which the length of term is 
indefinite, or at will of the two parties, are seldom written. 
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Table 27. Percent written leases by sex of landlord and by selected 
practices in sharing 
State All leases Landlords Does landlord share 






Yes No Yes Ko 
Ind 6 23 24 17 *46 17 *48 19 23 20 
la 3a 43 42 44 46 42 41 44 44 17 
Kan 6 15 12 17 14 16 9 18 l6 4 
Minn 7-8 42 41 39 -40 43 35 44 43 40 
Neb 1 50 47 46 41 52 43 50 52 52 
3D 1 49 46 34 42 52 *32 55 *41 57 
Wis 5 30 33 20 *38 24 *49 23 34 25 
*Significant difference between proportions. 
Larger percentages of the oral than of the written leases have instant 
notice for termination and termination notice "not in lease". Written 
leases have higher proportions of notices of 1 to 6 months (Table 29). 
Vifritten leases tend to be more specific concerning termination.^ 
^The percent of written leases does not vary with age of landlord; 
Appendix Table 77. 
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1 year 2-3 years 4-5 years Indefinite Other 
Ind 6 





































*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease 
lengths. 
Table 29. Percent distribution of length of termination notices in 
written and oral leases 

























Ind 6* 89 11 24 53 9 9 5 
la 3a* 6 86 6 2 19 46 17 18 
Kan 6* 75 11 3 11 23 46 14 1 16 
liinn 7-8* 16 57 11 5 11 30 32 15 6 17 
Neb 1 19 60 7 14 13 66 4 1 16 
SD 1 31 49 8 6 6 25 53 12 2 8 
V/is 5* 19 73 6 2 48 44 5 3 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between y/ritten 
and oral leases. 
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Content of leases on landlord and agent managed tracts 
Tenants who dealt with an agent of the landlord in making the agree­
ment usually also dealt with his agent in the operating decisions laider the 
lease. Likewise, the tenant dealing directly with the landlord in making 
the agreement also dealt with him in making the operating decisions.^ 
This suggests that tenants deal with agents mainly in cases in which the 
land-owner is non-farmer and non-resident. 
Significantly higher proportions of the leases made by tenants who 
deal with the agent of the landlord are written (Table 30). Y/hether this 
extends after the first year of the contracts is unknown. The agent acting 
for the landlord gets the contract in writing. It would appear that the 
agreements would continue to be in writing after the first year, because 
tenants who deal with the agent in developing the lease also deal with him 
in operations under the lease, and presumably during the life of the agree­
ment. 
^See Appendix Table 76. 
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Table 30. Percent written leases, percent one-year leases and percent of 
leases with cash rental for buildings, renters dealing with landlord and 
those dealing with agent 
State ' With landlord With agent 
and Written One-year Cash bldg. Written One-year Cash bldg. 
area leases leases rental leases leases rental 
Ind 6 *21 63 6 83 80 
la 5a *40 *67 3 78 100 
Kan 6 *11 *66 12 46 89 8 
Minn 
CO 1 *40 56 4 65 56 9 
Keb 1 *46 61 8 82 44 
SD 1 *42 50 4 92 30 
'^vis 5 29 61 11 50 64 
*3ignificant difference in proportions between groups. 
In most economic areas a slightly higher percent of the leases are for 
one year when the tenant deals with an agent of the landlord, but the 
difference is significant in only 9 areas. In only one of the 46 areas is 
there a significant difference in the proportion of leases with payment of 
a cash rental on buildings. Cash rentals for use of buildings are paid in 
as many as 25 percent of the leases (crop-share-cash, and livestock-share, 
and cash) in only 5 economic areas.^ 
Comparisons were also made for percent of tenants dealing with land­
lord by type of lease, and by age of landlord. There were few significant 
differencesi Appendix Tables 31 and 75. In a comparison of percent of 
tenants dealing with agent of landlord by type of landlord there v/ere no 
consistent differences betvreen individuals as landlords; but, other land­
lords—i.e. including estates, corporations, and the government—were 
significantly higher in use of agents; Appendix Table 70. 
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Comparison of leases by relation of landlord 
Parent-son tenancies would be expected to have income advantages to 
one or the other party not found in non-related tenancies. It is the 
purpose in many related tenancies to shift part of the income from given 
resources to the other party; it should follow that in related tenancies 
there ?rould be a larger proportion of leases with differences between share 
of cost and share of return, larger shares of given expenses and larger 
shares of ownership of livestock and equipment by the landlord. 
Leases between non-relatives are compared with those between a father 
(or a mother) and a son in the following tables. The questionnaire asked 
each respondent to indicate the relationship of the landlord. In the 
analysis of data these replies were grouped into categories of: none; 
father; mother; father-in-law; mother-in-law; grandparent; brother or sister; 
son or daughter; uncle or aunt; and other. Sujmnary is given here only for 
the non-related as compared with tenants renting from a parent. 
Relation of landlord and type of lease. Parent-son leases have a 
significantly higher proportion of livestock-share leases and a lovrer pro­
portion of crop-share than do non-related ones (Table 31). There are 
larger proportions of younger tenants among leases between related parties 
than among non-related (Table 36). The implication is that young tenants 
renting from parents have opportunity to share in a larger business. This 
is an income advantage that results from the fact of relationship alone. 
The content or terms of livestock-share leases might be the same among 
related and non-related cases with no shift in income in the firm; but the 
fact of more livestock-share leases among related tenancies indicates 
greater opportunity to get established earlier in a larger business. 
Table 31. Percent distribution of types of leases by relation of landlord 
Non-relative Parent 




 Cash Crop- Crop- Live­ No, of Gash Crop- Crop- Live' 
area leases share share- stock leases share share- stoc] 
cash cash 
Ind 6 122 4 66 10 20 18 55 6 39 
la 3a 110 6 15 52 27 35 11 3 34 51 
Kan 6* 187 5 40 44 11 63 11 6 46 37 
I,inn 7-8* 181 22 21 46 11 94 19 17 30 34 
Neb 1* ljj8 31 27 35 4 61 23 10 21 26 
SD 1* 110 24 46 20 6 25 8 32 4 36 
Wis 104 28 29 4 37 75 17 5 68 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between relation 
types. 
Relation of landlord and type of renter. There is no significant 
difference in the distribution of types of renters in non-related compared 
with parent-son tenancies in 25 of the 46 economic areas. In 19 of the 
other 21 areas the proportion of full tenants with one landlord is larger, 
or that of part-owners with more than one landlord is smaller, for 
relatives (Table 32 and Appendix Table 32). In general, part-ownership is 
less frequent and full tenancy with only one landlord is more frequent 
among relatives. In other words, the typical case for the son renting from 
a parent is that the son owns or rents no other land. One possible advant­
age is that relatives deal with fewer landlords and thus have fewer persons 
to satisfy in organizing resources into an efficiently operated firm. 
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Table 32. Percent of full tenants and part-owners by relation of landlord 
Non-relative Parent 
btate Full tenant Part--owner Full tenant Part' -owner 
and 1 2 or s- 1 2 or i- 1 2 or 4- 1 2 or •s• 
area land­ land­ land­ land­ land­ land­ land­ land-
lord lords lord lords lord lords lord lords 
Ind 6 19 25 20 36 22 33 22 22 
la 3a 62 22 12 4 68 17 6 9 
Kan 6 22 34 14 30 14 41 14 30 
Minn 7-8* 30 21 22 7 66 20 7 6 
Neb 1 39 27 18 16 46 21 16 16 
SD 1* 23 16 29 32 44 12 28 l6 
Wis 5* 38 12 31 19 57 12 28 3 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
Relation of landlord and acres rented this landlord. There are 
significant differences between one or more of the size groups in 29 of the 
46 economic areas. More non-relatives rent tracts of less than 100 acres; 
more relatives rent tracts of l80-259 acres or larger (Table 33 and 
Appendix Table 33). 
The larger size of tract rented by relatives is an indication but not 
a proof of advantage resulting from kinship. The difference shown here may 
be more than compensated by tracts rented from other landlords. 
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Table 33. Percent distribution of size of tracts rented by relation of 
landlord 
State Non-relatives, with acreage Parents, v/ith acreage 
and Under 100- 186- 260- 500 Under 100- 180- 260- 500 
area 100 179 259 499 * 100 179 259 499 •f 
Ind 6* 47 27 11 14 1 33 49 6 6 6 
la 3 a* 23 56 18 18 5 11 34 46 9 
Kan 6* 33 37 15 14 1 11 34 32 19 4 
f/iinn 7-8* 22 47 15 15 1 7 51 30 11 1 
Neb 1* 13 17 9 23 38 6 10 4 27 53 
SD 1* 11 34 6 20 29 8 12 21 59 
•Jis 5* 47 35 13 4 1 25 38 27 9 1 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types, 
Relation of landlord and deal with landlord. Larger proportions of the 
tenants renting from parents than those renting from non-relatives deal 
directly with the landlord (Table 34). Hon-relatives deal with an agent 
more frequently than do relatives; but the general practice for both is to 
deal with the landlord. 
Agents familiar with leasing problems and trained in farm management 
could offer useful service to the development of leasing arrangements among 
both relatives and non-relatives, by acting as consultants. The leasing 
arrangement used may not always be the one best adapted to the property and 
to the parties. Opportunity for the tvro parties to discuss the terms with 
an expert could lead to solution of some of the problems peculiar to 
related tenancies. 
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Relation of landlord and frequency of written leases. Jritten leases 
are significantly more frequent in non-related than in closely related 
tenancies (Table 34). In general, less than one out of three or four 
leases between parent and son are written, whereas in the same area one-
half or more of the leases between non-relatives are written. 
This difference between related and non-related tenancies is not 
indicative of difference in resource use or frequency of income shifts 
between parties. Instead, the difference only reflects ,the relatively 
greater intimacy of contact and dealings among relatives and the tendency 
for relatives to deal orally. 
Relation of landlord and length of termination notice. The proportion 
of leases with 1 to 6 months termination notice is significantly higher 
araong non-relatives than among relatives (Table 34). The proportions of 
leases with no agreement on termination and the proportions of leases v/ith 
instant notice are higher for relatives than for non-relatives. Thus, 
leases between non-relatives tend to be more specific about termination 
notice. Notices of more than onn year are infrequent in all leases 
(Tables 23, 29, 34). 
Relation of landlord and length of lease. Significantly higher per­
centages of leases are for one year among non-relatives (Table 34). The 
proportions of agreements for 2 to 5 years are the same for non-relatives 
and relatives. Higher proportions of the parent-son leases are in terms of 
"so long as we both agree" or for a period longer than five years.^ 
^This detail is hot shown in the table but is available at the 
Agricultural Experiment Station, each state. 
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Differences in length of lease between the two groups indicate an 
advantage to tenants renting from relatives. The longer term lease 
facilitates planning of farm operation for a longer period of time. 
Problems of selecting the length of lease should be exactly the same 
whether there is or is not kinship between parties. Length of lease would 
need to be fitted to the kinds of products, and that choice should be 
unaffected by kinship. Undoubtedly, part of the difference in distribution 
of length of lease between the two groups is explainable by the greater 
frequency of livestock-share leases in related tenancies. 
Relation of landlord and ownership of livestock. Ownership of part or 
all of the livestock by the landlord is much more frequent in parent-son 
than in non-related tenancies (Table 34). The differences in proportions 
are significant in all but seven economic areas. Ownership of livestock by 
the landlord is one of the methods of increasing the size of the farm 
business. In such case the tenant has the opportunity of operating on a 
larger scale and sharing in a greater total farm income. This type of leas­
ing arrangement is less frequent among non-relatives, except in areas in 
which livestock-share leases predominate. In economic area 3 of 7/isconsin, 
for example, ownership of livestock by landlords is as frequent among non-
relatives as among relatives. 
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Table 34. Percent comparison of selected characteristics of leases by 















leases mos. year 
notice leases 
Ind 6 96 *32 *66 *70 100 6 40 43 
la 3a 87 *56 *75 77 94 26 45 67 
Kan 6 92 *18 *55 *74 100 0 29 61 
Minn 7-B *88 *51 *46 61 99 25 29 49 
Neb 1 *92 *56 *65 *68 100 34 52 46 
SD 1 *84 *56 *51 52 100 24 36 38 















Ind 6 *20 96 15 39 100 33 
la 3a *27 99 *33 51 97 66 
San 6 *11 92 *25 38 93 52 
Minn 7-8 *11 81 *15 38 79 29 
Neb 1 * /J 50 *11 47 63 35 
SD 1 *12 *32 * 9 54 71 55 
Y/is 5 *38 70 *22 69 77 48 
•Significant difference between proportions. 
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Relation of landlord and payment of cash expenses. There is no 
significant difference betv/een relatives and non-relatives in the practice 
of payment of cash expenses in 34 economic areas. The general practice is 
for the landlord to share some of the expenses, whether or not related to 
the tenant (Table 34). 
The extent of sharing of expenses, the shares paid by the landlord on 
given items, and the practice of sharing variable expenses in the same pro­
portion as returns are shared are quite another question. It is in these 
details of arrangement that shifting of income from one party to the other 
can take place. 
Relation of landlord and ownership of machinery. Ownership of 
machinery by the landlord is more frequent in parent-son tenancies than in 
non-related ones (Table 34). This again is one of the practices used by 
parents in helping to finance the operations of a son. The same type of 
arrangement would be applicable among non-relatives. 
Ownership or lack of ownership of machinery by the landlord is no cause 
in itself for a shifting of income. Investment in machinery and equipment 
is merely one of the essential fixed expenses that must be handled the same 
as other fixed expenses in evaluating the contributions of the parties to 
the agreement. 
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Relation of landlord and cash payment for hayland. Relatives and 
non-relatives pay the same rates per acre for the use of hayland under 
crop-share-cash leases (Table 35). The differences in the percentage dis­
tributions of rates per acre within areas are explainable by differences 
in quality alone.^ 
Table 35. Comparison of selected characteristics of crop-share-cash leases 
by relation of landlord 
Mon-relative _ Parent 
State % with hayland ^Twith cash % with hayland with cash 
and rental per acre, |rental for rental per acre, | rental for 
area® 1 2-4 5-9 10-14 buildings 1 2-4 5-9 10-14 buildings 
Ind 6 42 
la 3a 5 56 2 9 45 9 
Kan 6 19 4 10 11 
Minn 
CO 1 10 59 21 5 4 75 11 
Keb 1 33 7 7 50 
SD 1 50 5 
^Wisconsin area deleted; too cases. 
significant difference between related and non-related might ezist 
in the niimber of acres for which the payment is made. Even though the 
niomber of acres used for hay could be the same, relatives may arbitrarily 
decrease the number of acres for which charge is made. The data are not in 
sufficient detail to test this difference. 
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Relation of landlord and cash rental for use of buildings. There is 
no significant difference between relatives and non-relatives on the 
frequency of the practice of paying a cash rental for use of buildings 
(Table 35). Relatives and non-relatives follow the same general practice 
regarding this type of cash payment by the tenant. Payment of a cash 
rental for use of buildings is the exception rather than the rule. 
Relation of landlord and age of renter. There are significantly 
higher proportions of tenants 25 to 34 years of age and significantly lower 
proportions 45 or older renting from parents than renting from non-
relatives (Table 36). The proportions of tenants over 55 years of age who 
rent from parents are smaller than the proportions of non-relatives over 
55.^ 
This type of difference between related and non-related tenancies 
results from the institutional arrangements within which tenancy functions, 
rather than from peculiarities within leasing systems. The parent or other 
relative may purposely choose to give the tenant such advantage. The young 
tenant gains in experience, capital accumulation and in the opportunity for 
continuity of operation on the same land. Resources may be used more 
efficiently because of the interest in future ownership. 
^The difference between related and non-related disappears as the 
degree of relationship changes. Tenants renting from an uncle or cousin 
have the same age distribution as do tenants renting from non-relatives. 
Additional data are available at the Agricultural Experiment Station, 
each state. 
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Table 36. Percent distribution of age of renters by reli.tion of landlord 
Non-relative farent 
State % of renters, age % ot Icenters, age 
and Under 25- 35- 45- 55- 65i- Under 25- 55- 45- 55- 65i-
area 25 34 44 54 64 25 34 44 54 64 
Ind 6* 5 27 30 18 16 4 5 56 22 17 
la 3a 5 44 28 17 5 6 50 29 12 3 




CO 1 4 34 28 22 10 2 6 48 31 15 
Neb 1* 2 35 25 20 12 6 3 36 48 5 7 
3D 1* 4 29 25 28 10 4 8 52 56 4 
Wis 5* 5 30 29 18 12 6 10 41 25 20 4 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
Relation of landlord and type of landlord. Significantly greater 
proportions of landlords are retired farmers and farm widows in related 
than in non-related tenancies. Landlords are business or professional Dian 
mora frequently in non-related tenancies (Table 37)• 
Table 57. Percent distribution of types of landlord by relation of landlord 
Non-relative Parent 
State fo landlords fo landlords 
and Active Retired Bus. or Farm Non-farm Other Active Retired Bus. or Farm Kon-farm Other 
area farmer farmer prof. widow widow farmer farmer prof. widow widow 
Ind 6* 7 19 48 12 7 7 18 24 12 35 0 12 
la 3a 11 22 43 9 5 10 9 57 6 20 0 9 
Kan S* 13 32 34 7 6 8 25 44 0 27 0 3 
Minn 7-8* 15 28 27 7 9 14 12 67 0 19 1 1 
Neb 1* 22 19 27 12 7 13 25 44 0 23 2 7 
SD 1* 22 18 31 5 7 16 17 63 4 17 0 0 
Wis 15 24 34 13 5 12 12 45 9 24 3 7 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Relation- of landlord and age of landlord. Parents are older than non-
related landlords (Table 38). Less than 15 percent of the parents are 
under 54 years of age, but 20 to nearly 40 percent of non-relatives are 
under 54 years of age. The proportions of parents "between 55 and 74- are 
significantly larger in 17 economic areas. Non-relatives are distributed 
more evenly among all age groups than are parents. 
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Table 38, Percent distribution of age of landlords by relation of landlord 
State H on-relative 
and ~~~~~|rof~Tandlords, age 
area Under 25 25-54 35 -44 45-5 4 55-64 65-74 75-84 85?-
Ind 6 1 5 20 27 28 15 4 
la 3a* 1 2 13 13 28 26 14 3 
Kan 6* 5 15 37 26 16 1 
Ivlinn 7-8* 1 11 20 29 25 10 4 
Keb 1* 2 8 24 29 22 14 
SD 1 4 10 23 21 31 10 1 
Wis 5* 2 10 15 33 26 14 
State Parent 
and 




45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85' 
Ind 6 5 11 39 33 11 
la 3a* 15 35 21 23 6 
Kan 6* 25 16 38 17 3 
iiinn 7-8* 1 7 35 34 17 5 
Heb 1* 2 12 15 45 25 2 
SD 1 4 36 52 8 
Wis 5* 7 31 30 , 23 9 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Relation of landlord and number of years rented. There are signi­
ficant differences between parents and non-relatives in the number of years 
tracts have been rented (Table 39). More of the parent tenancies have been 
in effect five years or longer. This indicates that tenure is longer for 
the son renting from his father than for a tenant renting from a hon-
relativa. 
Table 39. Percent distribution of number of years rented this land by 
relation of landlord 
Non-relative Parent 
State % of tracts rented ' ^~oFTriicTi~rinted 
and 1 2-4 5-9 101- 1 2-4 5-9 10» 
area yr. yrs. yrs. yrs. yr. yrs. yrs. yrs. 
Ind 6 11 30 31 28 12 12 41 35 
la 3a* 20 39 25 16 26 41 33 
Kan 6* 2 43 33 22 26 35 39 
B/iinn 7-8* 14 23 42 21 1 32 44 23 
Neb 1* 8 37 30 25 9 21 43 27 
SD 1* 9 40 22 29 4 36 56 4 
Tfis 5* 24 41 24 11 9 31 27 33 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between groups. 
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Characteristics of the Renter 
Several characteristics of renters have been discussed in the 
preceding section. Age, size of tract, proportion of written agreements, 
number of years rented, termination notice, relation of landlord and type 
of landlord apply to renters as well as to leases. The particular items 
may be used to characterize either the lease or the renter, depending upoii 
the point of emphasis. 
Age of renter 
Age is directly related to the accumulation of capital; tenants who 
have acquired their livestock and equipment through their own earnings are 
usually older ones. Yo\mg tenants generally would have sufficient capital 
to operate farms that are smaller than those operated by tenants nearing 
the retirement age. Few tenants under 25 years of age have cash leases 
(Table 24). Younger tenants have rented the same land fewer years than 
have older tenants (Table 25). Tenants renting from parents are younger 
than those renting from non-relatives (Table 36). 
Age of renter and type of renter. Larger proportions of renters in 
the younger age groups than of those in older age groups are full tenants 
(Table 40). The percent of renters under 55 who are full tenants is signi­
ficantly larger than the percent of part-owners in all but two of the 46 
economic areas. At 55 and over the proportion of part-owners is signifi­
cantly larger than that of full tenants in more than half of the economic 
areas. 
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Ind 6* 84 16 55 47 40 60 55 65 32 68 33 67 
la 3 a* 90 10 91 9 68 32 67 33 75 25 0 100 
Kan 6* 91 9 76 24 48 52 54 46 38 62 20 80 
Minn 7-8* 100 0 91 9 76 24 63 37 48 52 33 67 
Heb 1* 100 0 90 10 61 39 44 56 32 68 50 50 
SD 1* 72 28 57 43 40 60 32 68 0 100 20 80 
'i7is 5* 57 43 78 22 48 52 51 49 38 62 33 67 
^Significant difference bety/een proportions within two or more age 
groups. 
Age of renter "and size of tract rented from this landlord. There is 
no consistent pattern of relation between age of operator and size of tract 
(Table 41). In 18 economic areas there are no significant differences. In 
the other 28 areas, one or more proportion is larger (or smaller) than the 
comparable proportion for all leases, but there is no single age group with 
all proportions differing from the a\'"erage. There are too few cases in the 
65-74 group for reliable tests of difference. In general, tenants of all 
ages rent the same size of tract. But this does not mean that they operate 
the same size farm because many of them rent from more than one landlord and 
only one tract is reported here. 
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Table 41. Percent distribution of size of tracts rented by age of renter 






% of tracts 
with acres 

























Ind 6 58 33 8 0 45 47 6 2 42 40 16 2 
la 3a* 10 70 10 10 11 68 19 2 25 51 17 7 
Kan 6* 5 56 39 0 10 70 11 1 36 52 12 0 
Miim 7-8 13 73 13 0 17 67 15 1 18 72 9 1 
Keb 1* 17 17 33 33 12 29 30 29 7 13 23 57 
SD 1* 0 57 0 43 7 19 22 52 9 40 23 28 
Wis 5* 43 50 7 0 29 67 3 1 53 42 5 0 
45-54 years 55-64 years 65-74 years 
State 
/o of tracts 
with acres 





























Ind 6 50 35 13 2 46 36 18 0 56 44 0 0 
la 3 a* 40 60 0 0 25 37 37 0 100 0 0 0 
ICan 6* 32 47 18 3 64 20 16 0 30 70 0 0 
Minn 7-8 24 61 13 2 9 78 9 4 0 67 0 33 
Keb 1* 17 37 17 29 4 32 14 50 12 38 25 25 
SD 1* 6 50 14 30 24 35 24 17 20 60 0 20 
V/is 5* 32 61 7 0 62 28 5 5 50 50 0 0 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
distribution of all tracts by size groups. 
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Age of renter and proportion of written leases. There is no signifi­
cant difference in the frequency of v/ritten leases among tenants of 
different ages compared ?/ith percent of all leases vTritten in 29 of the 46 
areas. In practice, the age of the tenant apparently has little effect upon 
y.'hether the lease is written (Table 42). The class interval itself could 
account for the differences shoTO in Table 42. A few tenants just past 25 
and a few more not quite 35 would be enough to make the 25-34 year age 
group larger than the corresponding proportion for all renters in a given 
area. 




Under 25 25-34 35-44 45 -54 55-64 65-74 
Ind 6 45 21 31 15 18 11 
la 3a 50 49 43 30 50 0 
Kaa 6 9 18 10 25 14 0 
Mnn 7-8 60 44 36 44 39 33 
Meb 1 50 53 50 38 58 60 
3D 1 33 46 48 56 56 60 
\7is 5* 21 52 18 23 24 12 
*One or more significant difference between proportion for age groups 
and proportion for all leases. 
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Type of renter 
Full tenants renting from one landlord are somewhat more frequent in 
related than in non-related tenancies (Table 32). Full tenants tend to be 
younger than part-owners (Table 40). In general, however, there is no 
consistent pattern of differences between full tenants and part-owners or 
betv/een tenants renting from one or more than one landlord. 
Type of renter and share of corn. There are few significant differ­
ences between the proportions of leases with a 50-50 share of corn for full 
tenants and part-ovmers (Table 43). Share of crop paid as rental varies 
between areas; the 50-50 share predominates throughout the corn-belt and 
the 1/3 or 2/5 share predominates in the v^heat and grazing areas, for both 
full-tenants and part-owners,^ 
Type of renter and share of expense. There is no significant differ­
ence betvreen the proportions of leases with a 50-50 share of lime or of 
hired labor for full tenants and part-owners. The prevailing practice is 
for the tenant to pay the costs of hired labor (Table 43). Full tenants 
and part-owners pay the same share of expenses. 
^This same situation appears when further breakdovra is made betv/een 
full-tenants with one landlord and full tenants v/ho rent from more than one 
landlord; the shares are the same. Likevase, there is no significant 
difference between shares for part-owners renting from one landlord and 
part-o;7ners renting from more than one landlord. 
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Table 43. Percent of leases v/ith 50-50 shars; corn; limsi hired labor; 
full-tenants and part-owners 
State Corn Lime Hired labor 
and Full Part- Full Part- Full Part-
area tenant owner tenant owner tenant owner 
Ind 6 53 39 12 6 8 2 
la 3 a 91 97 24 23 7 7 
San 6 *74 57 36 31 7 7 
Iviinn 7-8 *50 31 37 29 5 0 
Keb 1 16 5 9 0 12 0 
CO
 
*26 4 11 8 8 6 
..Wis 5 83 64 35 25 21 20 
*Significant difference between proportions. 
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Characteristics of Landlords 
In all economic areas 80 percent or more of the owners of rented land 
are individuals (Table 44). An estate is the owner of as much of 10 percent 
of the tracts in only five economic areas. Partnerships account for the 
ownership of not more than 5 percent, and a corporation is owner of 1 to 3 
percent of the tracts in half the economic areas. The government is owner 
of 1 to 4 percent of the tracts in nine areas and of 8 percent of the tracts 
in one economic area; the latter is Indian and county lands in ?/estern 
South Dakota. 
Table 44. Percent distribution of types of ormer 
State No. of Individual Estate Partnership Corporation Government Other 
and leases 
area 
Ind 6 185 91 5 2 1 0 1 
la 3a 189 88 7 5 0 0 -
Ean 6 341 93 5 1 1 0 0 
Minn 
oo 1 352 87 10 2 - 0 1 
Keb 1 281 85 5 2 3 4 -
SD 1 171 81 6 2 2 8 0 
Wis 5 230 95 2 1 2 0 0 
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Type of landlord 
Individual ovmers were classified as: active farmers; retired farmers; 
business or professional men; farm widows; non-farm 7ddOT;s; and others, to 
include other individuals, estates, corporations and government. The dis­
tribution Of types of landlords is very much the same in all economic areas, 
as illustrated by the examples in Table 45. 
• Table 45. Percent distribution of types of landlords 
31ate Active Retired Bus. or Farm Non-farm Other 
and farmer farmer prof. widow widow 
area 
Ind 6 10 22 36 14 7 11 
la 3a 13 30 28 13 5 11 
Kan 6 12 29 24 16 4 15 
Ivann 7-8 14 41 16 10 5 14 
Keb 1 23 26 17 13 5 16 
SD 1 19 26 24 8 5 18 
V7is 5 11 29 23 17 4 16 
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Type of landlord and type of lease» Tliere is no consistent difference 
between type of lease and type of landlord within areas (Table 46). In 
general, the distribution for each type of landlord follows closely the 
distribution of all leases by type (see Table 17). The proportion of one 
type of lease for one type of landlord is smaller (or larger) than that for 
another type of landlord in half the areas; but the pattern of difference 
varies from area to area.^ 
The significance of the association between type of lease and type of 
landlord is in the effect of the capital position of the individual landlord 
upon the kind of lease he v/ants and the extent of his interest in the day to 
day operations of the farm. An active farmer who plans to lease his farm as 
a part of his retirement plan would likely be interested in a livestock-
share lease. In contrast, a farm wxdoYf would likely be interested in a cash 
lease, particularly if dependent entirely upon the rented farm as a source 
of living expenses, because of the certainty of the given cash rental from 
year to year. 
similar comparison ?/as made by age of landlord with the same result; 
lease types do not vary consistently with age of landlord; see Appendix 
Table 72. Nor does size of tract vary consistently with type of landlord; 
see Appendix Table 67. 
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area 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Ind 6 11 61 6 22 2 71 12 15 6 60 9 25 
la 3 a* 4 24 36 36 5 14 43 38 6 10 46 38 
Kan 6* 0 39 37 24 5 29 47 19 12 41 28 19 
Minn 7-8* 16 24 42 18 25 20 31 23 18 14 55 12 
Neb 1* 27 13 44 8 21 30 23 14 19 36 38 0 
3D 1* 16 47 22 16 9 36 13 29 15 56 12 7 








area 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
Ind 6 0 32 12 36 8 77 8 8 14 62 19 5 
la 3 a* 17 12 46 25 0 22 56 22 19 5 52 24 
Kan 6* 2 27 61 10 8 25 67 0 4 27 53 16 
Minn 7-8* 22 25 36 17 5 22 56 17 24 18 40 18 
Ueb 1* 37 17 23 14 46 8 31 8 47 21 26 7 
SD 1* 8 62 23 8 38 
OO K
\ 
25 0 52 23 13 10 
7is 5 24 24 3 38 20 10 0 50 25 25 0 36 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types of 
landlord, 
^Type of lease: 1—cash; 2—crop-share; 3—crop-share-cash; 
4—livestock-share. 
Landlord and length, of l3asa. The proportion of one-year leases is 
muoh the same for landlords of different types and for landlords of 
different ages (Tables 47 and 48). The small number of landlords \indsr 
25 years of age (Table 48) explains the higher proportion of one-year lease 
in that age group. iUthough the proportion of one-year leases for one type 
of landlord (or one age of landlord) differs significantly from that of 
another in the same area, there are no coiisistent differences from area 
to area. 
Type of landlord and age of landlord, separately and together, are 
matters of importance to the tenant because of the need of opportunity for 
the two parties to pool their resources over a period of years. Any tenant 
renting from a landlord of advanced years knows that a change in landlords 
is certain in the near future. 
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Ind 6* 64 67 72 70 46 42 60 
la 3a 70 67 70 67 81 67 75 
Kan 6* 69 88 68 72 60 100 58 
isainn 7-8 56 65 56 58 50 47 54 
Neb 1* 59 58 63 72 57 77 45 
SD 1* 48 48 52 60 50 57 21 
Wis 5 62 65 54 63 57 60 76 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
Table 48. Percent one-year leases by age of landlord 
State 
and Under 25 2^-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 85s-
area 
Ind 6 50 75 63 64 64 63 67 
la 3a* 83 83 50 55 76 8l 88 
Kan 6* 100 80 80 59 73 71 100 
I.iLnn 7-8 50 52 62 48 6l 53 75 
Eeb 1* 60 29 70 67 53 59 100 
SD 1 100 75 80 67 41 40 47 
iVis 5 100 67 82 69 58 67 45 40 
*0ne or more significant difference in proportions between age groups. 
Type of landlord and age of landlord. The proportions of landlords of 
different types change iiith age of landlord (Table 49). There are few land­
lords of any type under 35 or over 85. The proportion of active farmers 
decreases and that of retired farmers increases vdth the increase in age# 
The change takes place gradually. There are few significant differences 
between the proportions of retired farmers 45 to 54 compared with those 55 
to 64; but in most economio areas the proportion of retired farmers 65 to 
74 is greater than that of retired farmers 45 to 54. The proportion of farm 
widows also increases vdth age of landlord; but the number of cases in the 
younger age groups is so small that the differences in proportions are not 
statistically significant. The proportion of landlords who are business or 
professional men remains the same with change in age, as does that of non-
farm vddows.^ 
^Comparison was also made betv/een age of landlord and age of tenant; 
the distribution of age of tenants is the same for all ages of landlord; 
see Appendix Table 75. 
Table 49. Percent distribution of types of landlord by age of landlord 
State Percent of landlords 25-34®- Percent of landlords 35-44^ Percent of landlords 45-54^ 
and 123456125456 123456 
area 
Ind 6* 25 75 12 0 50 12 12 12 12 3 59 3 3 19 
la 3 a* 33 17 50 25 50 25 25 11 29 4 14 18 
Kan 6* 100 33 47 7 13 27 20 24 20 4 4 
Minn 7-8* 50 50 42 4 21 8 25 31 18 35 6 4 6 
Neb 1* 60 40 50 21 29 44 15 37 2 2 
SD 1 75 25 40 50 10 38 15 31 4 12 
V/is 5* 100 9 9 36 27 9 9 9 3 53 3 9 22 
State Percent of landlords 55' -64a Percent of landlords i 65-74^ Percent of landlords i 75 -84a 
and 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
area 
Ind 6* 10 14 47 12 2 14 10 37 23 17 12 2 4 36 24 20 12 4 
la 3a* 20 29 29 8 6 8 3 46 26 23 3 4 57 14 21 4 
Kan 6* 11 28 38 10 4 10 12 37 18 18 5 11 9 60 9 21 2 
iviinn 7-8* 18 48 15 10 4 6 4 58 8 11 10 9 3 56 18 21 3 
Neb 1* 24 24 17 16 3 16 17 48 3 23 5 5 3 45 16 11 13 13 
SD 1 21 39 15 9 6 9 12 49 22 12 2 2 7 40 7 20 27 
Wis 5* 19 24 36 8 2 12 12 45 8 27 8 3 50 3 33 6 6 
*One or more significant difference in proportions betv/een age groups, 
^Type of landlord; 1—active farmer; 2—retired farmer; 3—business or professional; 
4—farm widow; 5—non-farm widow; 6—other. 
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Type of landlord and frequency of written leases. Y/ritten leases 
occur with the same frequency among all types of landlords in one-third of 
the economic areas. In half the areas, the proportion of written leases 
is significantly higher for landlords who are business or professional men 
than for farmers or farm widows. The proportion of non-farm v/idows with 
written leases is significantly larger than all others in two areas and is 
larger than farm-widows, active farmers and retired farmers in seven areas. 
Thus, written leases are more frequent for business men and non-farm widows 
(Table 50). 
The sane need for written leases is present among all types of land­
lords. Agreements between father and son can involve such close working 
relationships in the day to day operations that whether the lease is written 
or oral is of no consequence. However, the fact of planning the content of 
the lease and making it specific on the important details should result in 
fewer misunderstandings betv/een parties and encourage the reaching of agree­
ments on matters that are often present and continuing sources of dissatis­
faction but upon which decision fully acceptable to both is never made. The 
question of improvements on buildings, for example, might be raised under an 
oral lease without action being taken. Spelling out the details under a 
written lease would tend to encourage action and actual solution of the 
problem. 
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Ind 6 17 20 31 21 8 19 
la 3a 40 41 48 29 67 48 
Kan 6* 7 9 21 6 50 27 
iviinn 7-8* 28 55 61 34 50 60 
Neb 1* 44 44 51 50 77 53 
SD 1* 42 40 55 23 38 74 
V/is 5 42 30 35 19 30 35 
*One or more significant difference in proportions betv/een types. 
Type of landloi'd and cash payment for buildings. There is no signi­
ficant difference between types of landlords in the proportions of leases 
v/ith cash payments on buildings (Table 51). The proportions are for only 
those leases in which a definite answer was given by the tenant. The 
respondents who did not reply are excluded. Therefore, the percent of all 
landlords receiving a cash payment for buildings is smaller than the data 
in the table indicate. In practice, specific cash payment for use of build­
ings is the exception rather than the rule. 
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Table 51. Percent of landlords receiving a cash payment for use of 
buildings by type of landlord 
State Active Retired Business Farm Non-farm Other 
and farmer farmer or prof. v^idow widow 
area 
Ind 6 6 7 9 5 
la 3a 4 8 
Kan 6 5 8 31 12 12 
Ivlinn 7-8 9 10 9 
Keb 1 11 20 25 
SD 1 14 
Wis 5 17 
Tenant Suggestions to Improve Leasing Practices 
Respondents were asked to express their ideas on changes needed in 
rental agreements in their community to: (1) increase the income received 
by both renters and landlords; (2) increase soil conserving practices on 
rented farms; (3) encourage keeping more livestock on rented farms; and 
(4) encourage making improvements in buildings and land on rented farms. 
Roughly a third of all respondents gave one or more specific suggestion. 
'The content of suggestions made by tenants for the improvement of 
rental practices indicates that many tenants in their ovm thinking draw a 
clear distinction between terms of the lease as such and the problems of 
organization and management on the leased farm. Apparently, there is a 
tendency to think of a lease as merely a contract or agreement which 
specifies dates and rates of payment. Organization and management of the 
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leased farm, after the lease terms are specified, are another and separate 
problem. The relation between the tv/o, and especially the effect of the 
terms and content of the lease upon the level of farm income apparently 
does not appear to be a specific problem in leasing. 
She suggestions are summarized by states because of the small number 
of replies per area. Percentages are calculated by talcing the number of 
tenants replying with the given or classified ansv/er as a percentage of 
those who gave any answer. Some tenants gave more than one suggestion, and 
therefore the sum of the percentages may exceed 100. It is the percent 
making the given reply rather than the distribution between different 
replies that is important. 
Suggestions to increase income 
Less than 20 percent of those v;ho offered suggestions on methods to 
increase income on rented farms proposed an increase in the length of lease 
as one way to do it'(Table 52). By inference, the cause-effect relation 
between length of lease and level of income does not appear as a problem 
important to a majority of tenants. One percent of those offering 
suggestions mentioned termination notice. 
Improvement of management practices was the most frequent suggestion. 
There is no v/ay of telling vfhether the respondent was thinking of changes in 
rotation, adding legumes, or increased use of fertilizer as management 
decisions, separate and distinct from the lease as such, or whether some of 
the practices were to be brought about by changes in provisions of the 
lease. 
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Table 52. Percent of tenants making specific suggestion, among tenants 
offering suggestions to increase income 
State Share Increase Increase Improve Landlord 
expense length termination practices furnish 
of lease notice more 
facilities 
Indiana 25 12 1 JO 12 
Iowa 22 17 1 37 10 
Kansas 27 19 1 52 3 
ilinnesota 25 l6 - 34 12 
Nebraska 25 11 1 55 7 
So. Dakota 21 12-55 4 
V/isconsin 23 10 - 24 10 
Those suggesting that changes be made in sharing of expenses usually 
also suggested that the landlord either share a part of an expense not now 
shared, or assume a larger share of a given expense—^most often of lime 
and fertilizer. The majority of those offering suggestions saw the problem 
of increasing farm income as a joint responsibility of tenants and land­
lords, working together. Few specifically stated that the contribution of 
more production facilities should be by the landlord alone. 
Suggestions to increase soil conserving practices 
The most frequent suggestion to increase conservation was some form of 
land-management practices—a change in rotation, use of manure and commer­
cial fertilizer, or keeping more livestock. These suggestions v/ere often 
posed as management problems alone, and few respondents expressed any ideas 
about particulars of relations between terms.of the lease and conservation 
(Table 53). 
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Table 53» Percent of tenants making specific suggestion, among tenants 















Indiana 10 26 29 11 -
Iowa 15 14 55 7 2 
Kansas 14 25 64 19 -
•viinnesota 11 22 53 4 1 
Nebraska 10 22 57 10 1 
So. Dakota 13 22 53 10 1 
Wisconsin 9 26 57 5 -
One exception to the apparent distinction batveen leasing and conser­
vation. problems was expressed by respondents who saw the main conservation 
problem as one of getting landlords to appreciate the needs for conser­
vation on their ovm farms. Five to 19 percent mentioned need to "educate 
the landlord", and this education applied to conservation on rented farms. 
Obviously, there is a problem in landlord-tenant relations, whether it is 
the landlord v/ho wants to conserve and the tenant is unwilling, or whether 
it is the tenant who wants to conserve but is held bade by refusal of the 
landlord. 
Sharing the costs of conservation practices was the second most fre­
quent suggestion offered by respondents (Table 53). Often this suggestion 
took the form of recommending that more landlords furnish materials and 
tenants do the work, thus indicating a v/illingness on the part of tenants 
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to bear some of the costs of conservation. Less than 1 percent of those 
making suggestions proposed an increase in governmental payments for con­
servation practices. 
Suggestions to encourage more livestock 
The most frequent suggestion to encourage greater numbers of livestock 
on rented farms v/as for the landlord to provide more facilities for live­
stock (Table 54). There is no indication in the replies as to how the pay­
ment V70uld be made to the landlord for these facilities. The information 
supplied by respondents'only indicates that provision of livestock facil­
ities by the landlord is the most important method of increasing livestock 
numbers, in the tenant's opinion. 
The most frequent suggestion in the economic areas in which cash grain 
is the major product sold was that changes are needed in the type of lease 
and type of farming. Usually this suggestion proposed a decrease in numbers 
of cash and of crop-share rentals or a revision in the cash-crop system of 
farming. There were no details of suggestion on substitutions, except that 
some respondents suggested the use of more stock-share leases. 
Few respondents mentioned need for longer leases to encourage greater 
numbers of livestock. 
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Table 54. Percent of tenants malcing specific suggestion, among tenants 
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Suggestions to encourage improvementg 
In conformity with the ideas on how to increase farm income, hov7 to 
encoixrage conservation, and hov; to increase livestock numbers, the most 
frequent suggestion to obtain additional improvements on rented farms was 
for the landlord to do more of it (Table 55). There v;ere few explanations 
of how this might be done, or particularly of the kinds and amounts of pay­
ments that tenants might make to give the landlords a return on the invest­
ments. Much the same idea is involved in the suggestion that the way to 
obtain improvements is for the landlord to furnish the materials and for 
the tenant to do the work. Approximately the same percent of respondents, 
though not necessarily the same ones, suggested that longer leases are 
needed to encourage farm improvements as suggested that same solution to 
increase income, conservation, and livestock numbers. 
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Table 55. Percent of tenants making s|)ecific suggestion, among tenants 












materials and ten^ 
ant do the work 
Indiana 11 7 46 6 
loiva 15 5 47 14 
JZansas 12 3 16 17 
Minnesota 12 2 58 10 
Nebraska 15 5 46 10 
So. Dakota 14 3 48 10 
Vifisconsin 7 — 64 8 
Reasons for dissatisfaction with lease 
All respondents were asked the question, "Are you satisfied with your 
rental agreement?" The reasons for dissatisfaction were summai'iaed in the 
same manner as were the suggestions to isaprove leasing practices. These 
reasons substantiate the suggestions offered to improve leases in the 
community. Three of the more detailed comments are quoted below, as an 
illustration that individual tenants are aware of the incentive conditions 
and of some of the needs for changes in leases: 
. .As far as shares, cash rent (l am satisfied), however I do 
think I would like a better agreement on fertilizers, grass seed, 
soil conservation and an agreement of some sort that would en­
able the landlord to improve buildings and yards ..." 
"I think that if we could have longer lease, say, 3 years it would 
pay me to help pay on fertilizer and lime and it would help both 
of us out. V/here (v/e have a lease for) one year we might have to 
move next year and leave what we have done." 
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"I have almost as much money invested in machinery as the landlord 
has invested in the farm and my upkeep and taxes amount to almost 
as much as the landlord's upkeep and taxes, Hov/ when this and ^  
rental agreement started it was to be the landlord's capital in­
vestment or farm against the renter's labor. So either I am not 
getting much for ray labor or nothing for my investment in machinery. 
True, I can get the farm v/ork done faster with modern machinery than 
'Tithout it, but I feed much more stock than what the farm will pro­
duce feed for which would be impossible without the machinery. Since 
I feed more stock over and beyond the amount the farm will produce 
feed for and the landlord doesn't provide capital for livestock and 
feed and yet dividing the net profit half and half, it seems to me 
that I do not receive full benefits for my efforts and labor put 
forth. I/kybe I am vrrong in my thinking but I am interested in what 
others do. In this day and age I know it is hard to know what is 
fair for both the renter and landlord." 
V/hether or not respondents v/ere aware of cause-effect relations 
hetveen length of lease and level of farm income, length of lease was one 
of the main reasons for dissatisfaction with the rental agreement 
(Table 56). Likewise, present practices in sharing of expenses, the lack 
of improvements or the condition of improvements, and the lack of interest 
on the part of the landlord in improving or conserving the farm, were 
mentioned as reasons for dissatisfaction. Few respondents stated that cash 
rent for hay or pasture was too high (but the proportion here would be 
greater if expressed for those actually paying a cash rent for hay or 
pasture). 
Some respondents expressed one or more reason for dissatisfaction 
even though they did not give suggestions for improving rental practices. 
By inference, removing the source or cause of the dissatisfaction F/ould be 
an improvement in leasing arrangement. 
131 
Table 56. Percent of tenants making speeific suggestion, among tenants 
expressing dissatisfaction with their lease 
State Lease No or poor Landlord Expenses Gash rent Ko oppor­
too improve­ not inter­ not on hay or tunity 
short ments ested in shared pasture for joint 
conserving fairly too high planning 
or improv­
ing 
Indiana 7 12 21 31 3 -
Iowa 10 24 16 45 6 5 
Kansas 22 21 39 27 3 4 
Mnnesota 14 16 14 31 4 1 
Hebraska 13 23 32 24 5 3 
So,- Dakota 12 16 23 33 7 4 
Wisconsin 6 18 13 44 - 2 
One outstanding feature of the reasons listed by tenants for dissat­
isfaction v/ith their leases is that these dissatisfactions eire ejqpressed 
against customary practices. Possibly the source of the dissatisfactions 
is that practices of the community have been applied without sufficient 
adaptation to the details of the particular case. 
Suggestions to improve leases involve no outstanding departure from 
custom. Relatively small percentages of tenants propose change in the 
length of lease; and length of lease does vary in practice. The changes 
most frequently proposed are made up of changes in management practices 
that effect the income of the farm. Seemingly, the change is proposed at 
an operational level only, rather than in terms of provisions in leases 
to encourage or bring about the result desired. 
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SOLVING LEiiSING PROHLEI.-B 
Keed for Method of ilnalyzing Leasing Problems 
This study developed from the continuing requests by landlords and 
tenants for information and advice on how to handle problems in farm ten­
ancy. The variety of requests received fey iLgricultural Experiment Stations, 
Extension Services, and Federal agencies prompted a survey of current? 
leasing practices. Even in the begirining stages of the study it became 
evident that an inventory of practices would not be sufficient; practices 
¥/ould need to be subjected to systematic analysis to be of assistance in 
solving economic problems. 
Only part of the solutions to problems can be found in the experiences 
of landlords and tenants, because satisfactory solutions to some phases of 
the problems have not been developed in practice. The questions bothering 
some tenants or some landlords may be answered by pointing out to them the 
methods that others have used in handling similar difficulties. Custom 
also perpetuates error. It is only in departure from unsatisfactory cus­
tomary practices that contribution is made to problem solution. Guides or 
norms of behavior for future action cannot be abstracted from history alone 
because the past does not contain all the experiences of the future. Use 
of current practice as the only guide to future actions is the same as 
using custom as a perfect model. 
The need for a systematic method of analyzing leasing problems arises 
from the existence of problems that landlords and tenants have been unable 
to solve for themselves. The great variety of questions raised by land­
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lords and tenants demonstrates the necessity of reducing these questions 
to comparable types and applying principles of analysis to each. type. 
The great variety of details involved in current leasing practices 
throughout the areas covered by this study demands that the proposals for 
changes in practice to solve the problems be stated in broad perspective. 
Only the general patterns of change can be specified. The solution in the 
individual case is a matter for separate and detailed analysis. 
There is no hope for solution to the economic problems of leasing, 
either in the individual case or in all cases together, without a workable 
framework of analysis for the problems involved. The tenant and the land­
lord need an economic rationale, a system of calculating, a method of 
determining what to do and hov; to do it, in developing the terms of a 
lease and in operating the farm under the lease. This economic frame of 
thinking is the same for the two parties, even though they contribute 
different resources to the agreement. 
For the purposes of this study a lease is defined as an agreement 
\7ithin a farm firm, betvreen a landlord and a tenant, concerning the use of 
resources for a given time period and at a named price. The purpose of the 
lease is two-fold: (1) to provide the basis for combining resources in 
production, and (2) to distribute income to resource owners within the 
farm firm. 
Efficiency in resource utilization is a test that can be applied to 
any farm, and the tests of efficiency are the same for all farms. A leas­
ing problem exists whenever characteristics or terms of the lease cause 
resources to be used inefficiently or cause unintended transfer of income 
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from one party to the other. This distinction separates leasing problems 
as such from the problems of organization and management that are common 
to all farms. 
Changes in Practices to Solve Leasing Problems 
Current leasing practices have been analyzed in the two preceding 
chapters to determine whether leases contain four incentive conditions and 
to examine the economic implications of selected characteristics of leases, 
of renters, and of landlords. From this analysis it follows that several 
changes in practices are needed to solve the problems with which landlords 
and tenants are confronted. The analysis has assumed specific functions 
for the lease, and has been directed toward lease oriented problems. The 
changes in practices are discussed below in broad perspective and in 
categories that individuals may apply to their own problems. In essence, 
the solution to lease oriented problems of the individual landlord and 
tenant rests in systematic analysis, applying economic principles to the 
particular set of conditions. The two parties together 7;ill have to v/ork 
out the details that will accomplish the desired results, and adjustments 
will necessarily take the form of reasonable approximations because of the 
complexity of some of the problems. 
Sources of Information 
The striking similarity of practice after practice, within and 
between economic areas, in itself prompts questions as to how well the 
terms of individual leases meet the requirements on the farms they cover. 
The lack of variation in practice and the lack of difference between 
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selected sets of terms or of characteristics of the lease, the tenant or 
the landlord, suggests that these many and broad details v;hich are the 
same cannot possibly match the variations in farms and the differences 
betv/een desires and abilities of tenants and landlords. These details 
require further study. 
Some of the comparisons of characteristics have no implications for 
use of resources or income distribution between landlords and tenants. 
Whether the lease is oral or written, for example, is of little consequence 
if the agreement is complete and serves to encourage good husbandry. The 
fact that shares of crops paid as rental are the same whether the tract 
has been rented for one year or ten years or whether the renter is a part-
ovmer or a full tenant mainly serves to describe existing situations. 
Other comparisons of selected characteristics of leases do emphasize 
necessity for adjustments in leasing practices. In many instances, the 
lack of variation is the strongest evidence of the need for adjustments in 
practice. For example, the tendency for one-year length of lease regard­
less of type of lease, provisions for termination notice, or kinds of 
products that are the major source of income, are indications that not 
enough adaptations are made in individual cases. Of still more consequence, 
the fact that shares of crops paid as rental vary little within areas 
strongly implies that land rental and land productivity are out of line on 
many farms. These details require further study. 
The lack of variation in rental practices within economic areas 
demonstrates the need for programs of education in which tenants and land­
lords \7ill be encouraged to malt:e adaptations to fit the particulars of 
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their situations, iiniong the more important of these adjustments would be 
that of getting away from standardized fractional shares of crops and of 
expenses. The share to be paid as rental is a problem for solution on the 
individual farm, through careful analysis, and is not a "given" proposition, 
to which other items are adjusted. As further illustration, the lack of 
differences between types of landlords as to length of termination notice 
indicates the need for a generalized program of education for all, point­
ing out the need for longer termination notice. This has many implications 
for use of resources on leased farms. A high proportion of one-year 
leases with short notices means that both landlords and tenants operate in 
a short-run environment. The tendency would be for enterprises to be 
selected for canpletion within one year. The short term outlook would tend 
to decrease investments by both parties in necessary or desirable improve­
ments. 
The above evidences demonstrate need for change in sources and kinds 
of information upon which decisions are made concerning terms of the lease. 
Especially, this means less use of custom and more analysis of the details 
of the individual case. Deciding that the share of corn should be one-half 
because one-half is the prevailing share in the area appears comparable to 
deciding that :^265.00 is the appropriate price for a specific dairy cow 
because the average price of all cows for the past year was :5265.0O. 
Customary practice may be used as a guide, a measure of alternative 
opportunity, and as a point of departure for the individual case. No two 
farms are the same, produce the same, or give the same return per unit of 
input. There is therefore no logical reason for the annual price for the 
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use of land, namely the cash or share rental, to be the same on all farms 
in an area. Similar reasoning applies to other terms and provisions of 
the lease. 
Selecting the type of lease 
Lack of variation in numerous details between types of leases indicates 
need for changes in practice concerning choice of type of lease. Although 
the selecting process for two given parties might be looked upon as a 
special problem in source of ixiformation, the selection of the general 
form of the agreement is important enough to be studied by itself. 
The type Of lease that v/ill fit the particular case depends upon the 
characteristics of the farm, the financial position and interests of the 
landlord, and the abilities, interests and financial position of the ten­
ant. The type of lease to be used needs to be fitted to Vtrhat the two 
parties are v/illing and able to do. 
One or another type of lease is more common than others in most econ­
omic areas (Table 17). If competition for farms is keen and tenants are 
bidding actively against each other to obtain the use of land, there may 
be little opportunity for a tenant to obtain the kind of lease he wants. 
The only opportunity may be to talce a farm under a type of lease that the 
landlord prefers. In any given case the two parties to a prospective 
arrangement stand to benefit by choosing that arrangement which best fits 
their purposes. 
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Terms and provisions of the lease 
The main type of change in practice to solve leasing problems is in 
the process of selecting the terms and provisions of the agreement. There 
is need for more landlords and tenants to figure out and agree upon the 
detail of terms that fit their particular situations. Although there is 
evidence that much is already being done by adjustments in minor provisions 
of leases, the evidence also shov/s that numerous practices are standard 
from lease to lease. One-year terms, short termination notices, fixed 
shares of crops and of expenses, and contribution of selected factors by 
the tenant, are illustrations (see Tables 6-51). Because of the variations 
among farms, parts of farms, buildings, input-output ratios, and more 
important, in the financial abilities and interests of landlords and 
tenants, standardized practices cannot fit equally well in all cases. 
If resources are to be used efficiently on rented farms and economic 
problems of leasing are to be solved to the satisfaction of both landlords 
and tenants, it follows that the planning process in the development of 
each leasing arrangement must be systematic and detailed. The first step 
in this planning process may v;ell be for the landlord and the tenant to­
gether to determine a carefully devised program of operation for the farm. 
What does it require in inputs of all kinds to make the farm or tract 
efficient? Attention then can be given to terms in the lease that will 
bring this plan to fruition. 
The rates of payment and the division of costs and expenses are the 
most important points of decision in any leasing arrangement. These terms 
determine the distribution of income to the parties. There is a dynamic 
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causG-effect relation betv/oen them and the achievement of the goals or 
purposes held by the parties to the agreement. Actual calculation and 
determination of the rates of payment and the method of sharing costs and 
returns is a complex problem because of the many uncertainties as to 
future prices and costs. The principles to be followed in the calculation 
process and the guides to achieve maximum income for both landlord and 
tenant are fairly simple, once they are fully understood. The further 
application of these principles is really the crux of the economics of 
farm leasing. 
The conditions required for any farm firm to maximise profits from 
given quantities of resources are the same (pp. 9-10). Four incentive 
conditions are needed to encourage efficient operations and prevent income 
transfers under a lease (pp. 11-26). Few leases contain all four incentive 
conditions (Tables 2-l6). 
Absence of one or more of the four incentive conditions from many 
leases cannot be interpreted as justification for a rapid and wholesale 
revision in leasing practices and in provisions of all leases. These and 
other changes in practices are matters for individual landlords and tenants 
to study, understand and apply. 
Written leases 
Written leases may be used as a method of putting other changes in 
practices into effect, but change from oral to written leases is a change 
in practice. There are two main reasons why more vn?itten leases should be 
used. First, written leases are less subject to error. The written pro­
vision is specific and fewer disagreements should develop through time as 
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to exact content of the agreement. Second, the process of writing out the 
details of an agreement may itself be cause for more careful discussion 
and atialysis of provisions. 
Periodic examination 
Leases are devised to cover given time periods. Changes in provisions 
are needed through time. The end of one period is a convenient time for 
revisions to be made for a subsequent period. Periodic examination of the 
provisions of the lease should give both parties to the agreement oppor­
tunity to remove causes of difficulties, and to make adjustments to changes 
in technology, costs and prices as those changes take place^ 
Consequences and Implications of Changes in Leasing Practices 
Changes in leasing practices T^ill have many and far-reaching effects 
upon organization and operation of both rented and owner operated farms. 
Changes within farm firms will affect allocation of resources between 
farms. 
Adjustments within leased farms will affect both the amount of income 
and its distribution—wherever terms of the lease as such are retarding 
efficient operations or changing income distributions in present practice. 
Detailed study is needed to point out just exactly where these are taking 
place; the present analysis stops short of such detail, and evidences only 
that many leases do not contain incentives for efficient operation. These 
adjustments will need to be made slowly, as an evolutionary process rather 
than as a revolutionary one, subject to the understanding and the will of 
both parties to the agreements. 
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The more important consequences of changes in leasing practices may 
be summarized as follows: 
lir Income transfers between parties in leasing agreements have 
itnportant policy implications, not only to farm tenancy, but also to the 
welfare of all persons employed in agriculture. Transfer of a few hundred 
dollars of income may be sufficient to cause an operator to continue oper­
ation on one \mit alone, whereas otherwise he would be inclined to rent 
additional land, move to another farm, or enter another occupation. In 
other words, income transfers may contribute directly to resource ineffi­
ciency and retard economic adjustments), by holding people in agricultural 
employment or preventing the transfer of land resources between farriis. 
Likewise, income transfers frora tenants to landlords may influence the 
prices at which land is sold, and may retard the sale of less than econ­
omic units, either to tenants or to persons who are already ovmer-operators 
emd are attempting to enlarge the operating \uiit. these problems and 
their implications require more study, 
2. Greater sharing in the decisions of day-to-day operations and in 
the division of expenses would tend to move the share lease in the direc­
tion of a full partnership, in the economic and legal meaning of partner­
ship. In order to protect both parties and to satisfy their interests, 
concurrent developments in the agreements will have to be provided to get 
away from the full personal liability that characterizes the legal partner­
ship, This calls for changes in legal practice, to make economics and law 
work together. 
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3. Tlie economic requirements of the lease need not interfere or 
change substantially the scope of decisions made by tenants or their free­
dom of action in making decisions in the operation of the leased farm. 
This too, can be a matter of agreement between landlord and tenant when the 
lease is drafted, 
4. Any greater detail of participation in decisions and sharing of all 
variable expenses (in share leases) calls for more and better farm book­
keeping. But this in itself can contribute to the solution of some of the 
problems of farm organization and management. The individual has little 
knov/ledge of specific changes to make in farming operations if there is no 
record of incojae and expenses. 
5. The bargaining process between landlord and tenant can be 
strengthened. If both parties go through a careful economic analysis 
pointed toward the objective of obtaining the highest possible returns for 
each, then differences of opinion on particular points can be matters of 
negotiation. The fact that shares of crop paid as rental seldom depart 
from a few standardized shares in broad economic areas clearly implies 
that there is little bargaining done on one of the basic phases of the 
lease. 
Economic principles and economic analysis are the foundation upon 
which effective bargaining can be developed. This analysis provides a 
framework of thinking for either party to come to conclusions concerning 
his own resources or contributions, and at the same time can give him an 
appreciation and understanding of those of the other party. 
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6« Separate and distinct payments for the main types of resources 
used in the rented farm give a basis for arriving at workable arrangements. 
If specific rental payments are made for the housing facility and for 
fixed improvements that contribute directly to production, appropriate 
adjustments will also be needed in cash rental rates and in share rentals. 
The economic rationale behind these specific payments is only that of 
making it possible for each party to figure out what each type of resource 
contributes to the income of the firm and thereby allow the resource owner 
to obtain a return from each resource. Pricing the factors separately 
should also contribute to more effective bargaining between landlords and 
tenants. 
7. Determining the rental is a problem common to all rental agree­
ments. If this basic problem can be solved in practice, so that tenants 
and landlords togetheir can determine the appropriate charges, the minor 
details of what to do about particulars will largely disappear. Circiom-
stances differ from farm to farm, tenant to tenant, and landlord to land­
lord. A set of economic principles that can be applied to any given 
situation by the parties themselves is needed as the basis for decisions 
on the many details that are matters of judgment, opinion or outlook, and 




"his study examines leasing practices on a regional basis, using 
economic areas as the geographical unit of study and selected character­
istics of leases, renters and landlords. Mail questionnaires were the 
primary source of information. The analysis has dealt with only some of 
the more important aspects of leasing practice, at the intra-firm level. 
Findings serve to demonstrate the need for additional research, 
especially upon details or problems that could not be encompassed in this 
one investigation. Several specific needs have been stated in previous 
discussion. The most important problems for further research are outlined 
briefly belov/, in broad fraoieworks. Delimitation of research problems and 
details of research projects, including procedures to be follov;ed in the 
analysis of selected problems are themselves matters for careful study. 
Altei-native tenure forms 
Little is known about the relative efficiencies of alternative leas­
ing arrangements and the specific influences of tenure upon the allocation 
and use of resources. Likewise, there is need for careful analyses of the 
factors and forces that explain the behavior patterns of landlords, ten­
ants and owner-operators. The different environments under which operating 
decisions are made presumably have effect upon the kinds of decisions 
made; for example, differences in planning horizons, purposes in land 
ownership and alternative income-earning opportunities affect resource 
allocation, iviore specifically, the purpose of inquiry is to find empirical 
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evidence of mis-allocations of rssources and of income transfers resulting 
from conditions of tenure. This would include analysis of the relations 
between intra-farn and inter-farm allocations of resources, analysis of 
operator reactions to incentive conditions, and analysis of the effects of 
income transfers betv;een resource owners. 
Determining the rental rate 
This study takes as given the shares of crop or livestock and the 
cash rental. Mo analysis was made of the methods by which landlords and 
tenants arrived at the decisions about rental rates. In addition to the 
development of an economic rationale or system of analysis by which 
individuals can arrive at decisions concerning rental rates there is need 
for study of factors affecting the bargaining powers of landlords and 
tenants. iQ.so, there is need for study of the evaluation problems, parti­
cularly for land, buildings, labor and management. 
Agent managed farms 
Increasing numbers of tenant operated farms are managed by agents of 
the landlord. Few empirical data are available to indicate the effect of 
agents upon the operation of the rental market, land prices, or terms and 
provisions of leases. 
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Impact of governmental programs 
Price support for agricultural products, conservation, credit and 
other governmental programs affect resource use and income distribution 
to resource omers. Careful studies of these influences over which 
parties to a leasing agreement have no control may be able to point out 
revisions in programs that can serve to make the programs more effective 
in purpose. 
Other problems 
Tenants have difficulties in obtaining farms. Landlords have diffi­
culties in obtaining tenants. Tvio types of problems are involved. One is 
in the lack of information about rental opportunities. The other is in 
the selection processes by which the two parties reach agreement, with the 
landlord choosing among several possible tenants and the tenant making 
choice between farms and landlords. Research upon this type of weakness 
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Table 1. Number of liTestock-share leases and percent with same share 
of livestock owned as of product sold 
State Dairy cattle and Beef cattle and Hogs owned and 
and dairy products sold beef sold hogs sold 
area Wo. % Ho. % No. I0 
cases same cases same cases same 
Ind. 2b 63 8l 82 100 130 100 
6 21 76 22 95 36 97 
la. la 1^8 73 62 100 69 96 
lb ^7 55 62 91 70 96 
2a 35 91 J+6 96 54 98 
2b 33 85 50 ,94 59 93 
3a 36 86 52 98 56 98 
3b 3^ 88 1^0 100 1+5 100 
4 89 91 51 96 105 96 
5 38 92 66 97 74 99 
6 86 46 98 65 95 
Kan. 1 2 100 Ik 79 6 100 
2a 9 100 28 75 17 100 
2b 7 57 12 83 9 100 
3a 2 100 Ij. 100 2 100 
3T3 13 54 19 8k 12 100 
k 15 53 28 100 21 100 
5 19 53 21 8x 23 83 
6 31 71 1+2 98 38 97 
7a 5 80 9 56 1+ 100 
Tb k 75 8 100 rj 100 
Minn. 1-J+ 2k 67 11 82 21 95 
98 6 m 79 19 89 80 
7-8 k2 88 37 92 62 94 
Neb. 1 6 66 18 9k 9 89 
2 0 12 92 2 100 
3a 8 100 25 96 11 91 
3b 12 75 13 85 12 83 
4 l4 57 23 70 17 94 
5 k 75 13 92 15 93 
6 10 60 17 9k 19 100 
7 13 85 15 93 16 94 
S.D. 1 If 50 23 78 14 78 
2a 3 0 10 80 6 100 
2b 2 100 11 100 7 100 
3a 0 rj 57 5 100 
3b k 100 9 100 7 100 
i|-a ij. 75 5 80 6 100 
ifb 11 61+ 18 100 18 94 
Wis. 1 18 33 3 100 4 50 
2ab 124 65 l4 86 88 90 
3 21+2 86 k9 88 24I 92 
if 99 55 6 83 62 82 
5 90 70 10 70 70 91 
6-7 88 66 13 92 67 85 
8-9 159 86 17 88 l40 94 
Table 2. Number of livestock-share leases and percent with same share of selected sales as of selected 
expense 
Dairy products sold and Hop:s sold and Beef calves sold and 
State Feed bought Breed.fees Vet. -exp. Feed bought Breed.fees Vet. exp. Feed bought Vet. exp. 
and No. % No. Jo No. io No. io No. io No. io No, io Wo. io 
area cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same 
Ind. 2b 66 62 52 71 66 62 130 97 98 89 129 97 75 93 75 93 
6 19 58 17 76 19 68 34 88 26 92 33 88 20 80 18 89 
la. la 50 33 58 50 54 67 99 45 91 66 98 44 98 43 98 
lb 54 30 43 30 54 28 67 97 53 89 69 94 55 96 57 95 
2a 36 86 32 88 37 86 54 96 42 88 55 98 36 100 37 97 
2b 3i^  85 26 88 34 85 58 100 4o 93 58 100 4o 98 4o 98 
3a 38 79 26 81 39 77 57 98 35 94 58 98 49 94 50 96 
3b 35 89 27 85 34 88 46 98 34 91 46 98 39 95 39 95 
86 98 72 99 86 98 101 99 80 98 101 99 45 93 45 93 
y liO 85 30 87 39 85 72 99 48 94 71 99 56 98 55 98 
6 h6 83 i+0 83 47 79 62 98 50 96 63 97 4l 100 43 98 
Kan. 1 5 20 3 33 5 20 5 80 4 75 6 83 7 86 7 86 
2a 12 33 5 80 12 58 18 61 5 100 18 78 21 62 21 48 
2b 7 57 5 100 7 57 10 90 8 75 10 50 13 85 13 69 
3a 3 33 1 0 3 33 2 50 0 2 50 4 100 4 100 
3b 15 33 10 50 15 47 12 92 8 75 12 75 8 75 8 75 
18 hh 10 10 13 31 18 89 4 75 18 94 16 94 16 88 
5 20 65 15 60 20 55 24 63 16 69 24 67 22 73 22 77 
6 33 6k 21 48 33 61 36 94 23 83 36 83 37 92 37 81 
Ta 7 57 5 60 7 57 4 100- 2 100 3 100 6 83 6 83 
Tb 6 33 6 33 4 0 8 88 7 86 7 86 13 • 77 11 100 
Minn.l-i+ 2h 88 15 67 23 83 21 95 13 77 20 85 8 75 8 50 
6 83 95 68 90 83 89 79 99 65 91 79 95 19 100 19 100 
7-8 hk 86 36 86 46 83 59 88 46 93 61 92 33 94 33 88 
;inued) 
Dairy products sold and Hogs sold and Beef calves sold and 
;d bought Breed.fees Vet.exp. Feed "bought Breed.fees Vet.exp. Feed hought Vet.exp. 
i Wo. ^ No. io Wo. i No, io No. io No. io No. io 
3es same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same 
33 3 67 5 i^o 10 60 7 71 10 70 
b t 0 0 3 100 2 100 3 100 
fe 75 2 50 8 75 12 92 3 67 12 92 ji 55 9 67 9 67 12 75 8 63 10 70 
12 25 7 0 13 23 18 83 11 73 19 7k 
^5 80 100 5 80 16 88 12 75 16 75 
[2 67 9 67 12 67 20 100 15 93 19 100 
[3 77 13 Ik 71 16 9  ^ 16 63 17 88 
i5 0 h 0 3 0 13 77 13 62 11 73 
5 0 3 0 5 0 7 71 50 7 71 
3 33 3 33 1+ 50 8 88 6 83 9 89 
1 0 1 0 1 0 5 60 2 50 5 60 
5 100 2 100 5 100 7 86 iv 100 7 86 
h 50 50 h 50 7 71 6 83 6 67 
LO 60 7 71 10 50 19 95 12 75 19 95 
L7 65 17 65 17 65 4 50 4 50 4 50 
^2 97 107 93 125 91 91 93 80 91 9k 89 
+9 97 220 95 21^8 9^ 250 98 224 92 250 9i+ 
)3 91 92 88 101 90 63 90 57 81+ 62 87 
39 96 75 91 89 92 69 88 62 92 68 85 
?3 98 80 95 93 96 70 99 61 97 70 96 
52 98 1I+6 97 162 95 1I+2 98 127 98 li+2 96 
15 80 12 75 
7 86 8 100 
22 68 22 68 
11 100 9 100 
18 89 18 78 
10 80 9 89 
10 100 10 100 
1I+ 93 15 87 
18 67 15 60 
11 55 11 1+5 
13 62 13 69 
6 83 6 83 
9 78 8 100 
k 100 2 100 
12 92 12 83 
1 100 1 100 
7 86 7 86 
24.14. 89 k3 93 
5 80 5 80 
7 86 7 86 
9 100 9 89 
16 100 16 100 
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Table 3a. Number of crop-share and crop-share-cash leases and percent 
with same share of corn as of selected expense 
Siate Fertilizer Seed Spray material Corn picking 
and No. No. % No. No. 
area^  cases same caseg 1 same cases same cases same 
Ind. 2b 125 97 123 90 67 49 121 6 
6 127 68 129 33 67 22 125 l4 
la. la ll4 77 l44 63 126 37 130 2 
lb 117 74 158 80 132 34 I45 1 
2a 217 85 237 75 206 45 214 1 
2b 200 88 243 88 199 4o 210 2 
3a 67 69 100 83 55 38 78 5 
313 72 51 91 76 39 56 83 2 
k 89 57 88 4o 35 52 8 
5 69 75 103 72 72 26 92 1 
6 73 73 85 64 51 37 80 1 
Kan. 1 0 0 0 0 
2a 11 55 i4 21 3 0 7 l4 
2b 4 100 i4 0 7 43 12 0 
3a 30 50 29 17 15 27 28 24 
3b lli^ - 68 115 6 56 30 71 3 
4 100 46 . 131 19 91 26 122 4 
5 106 60 107 13 94 l4 94 0 
6 195 67 202 50 118 31 173 59 
7a 109 39 113 1 88 8 99 5 
Tb 170 33 157 0 113 6 l4o 0 
Minn. 1-lj- 46 50 57 42 38 34 50 56 
6 36 64 42 38 23 30 42 45 
7-8 151 63 168 23 167 36 167 10 
Neb. 1 46 26 73 5 54 6 71 0 
2 52 21 77 i4 71 35 71 l4 
3a 94 57 159 5 75 9 I42 2 
31= 126 48 231 6 133 13 207 
107 45 212 3 128 8 196 2 
5 169 57 244 6 135 10 219 0 
6 121 45 193 l4 155 11 182 0 
7 i48 52 175 27 138 l4 165 1 
S .D. 1 13 77 30 10 22 23 24 13 
2a 7 43 61 43 22 27 42 4o 
2b 29 10 81 11 55 16 78 15 
3a 32 9 110 0 83 11 101 0 
3b 33 12 I45 1 108 12 134 0 
4a 45 29 131 5 103 18 129 13 
i|-b 96 28 213 6 177 11 198 1 
s-Wisconsin excluded because of small numbers of crop leases. 
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Table 3^ . Number of crop-share and crop-share'-cash leases and percent 
vith same share of oats as of selected expense 
State Fertilizer Seed Lime Combining 
and No. % No. No. No. 
area®" oases 8 sum cases same cases same cases same 
Ind. 2b' 75 89 73 75 66 29 74 53 
6 18 89 17 53 17 6 18 67 
la. la 110 19 135 13 60 20 135 8 
lb 102 29 125 26 53 15 126 6 
2a 212 15 207 8 101 11 219 ? 
2b 192 48 202 30 115 35 205 14 
3a 60 32 84 38 69 9 80 20 
3b 68 31 73 40 67 4 75 31 
kg 
68 
27 47 30 39 8 
16 
50 24 
5 47 93 31 82 90 13 
6 65 43 75 36 68 6 72 16 
Kan. 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
2a IQ 80 11 9 2 100 10 10 
2b 4 100 i4 0 2 100 16 0 
3a 52 60 52 8 
8 
29 28 51 8 
3"b 96 83 93 30 50 88 3 
U 64 47 64 14 26 19 66 12 
5 89 . 67 84 4 63 25 86 2 
6 152 58 153 25 104 17 151 19 
7a 92 64 86 1 80 5 88 5 
Tb 129 29 108 0 93 • 4 117 0 
Minn.1-4 90 48 121 6 15 20 109 49 
6 35 57 40 15 21 48 35 49 
7-8 i4o 58 153 16 3^ 47 150 20 
Neb. 1 28 18 56 0 16 6 53 0 
2 34 
58 
32 61 36 11 73 66 29 
3a 60 99 i4 24 67 87 16 
3b 116 4i 197 3 39 18 166 4 
4 56 57 81 2 30 13 90 1 
5 131+ 52 191 1 4i 17 193 2 
6 111 4i 164 7 20 25 158 3 
7 126 4i i48 9 80 20 137 12 
S.D. 1 12 17 24 13 6 0 22 5 
2a 11 0 82 1 9 0 85 9 
2b 26 19 83 1 10 0 78 22 
3a 25 8 74 1 17 6 70 1 
3b 31 13 131 0 i4 7 106 2 
ka k6 33 131 2 18 IT 127 23 
i+b 92 25 198 4 27 11 180 3 
Wisconsin excluded because of small numbers of crop-leases. 
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Table 3c • lumber of crop-sliare and erop-share-cash leases and percent 
with same share of wheat as of selected expense 
State Fertilizer Seed Combining Hail Ins. 
and No. I0 No. % No. No. % 
area®- cases same cases same cases same cases same 
Ind. 2b 78 97 76 86 78 58 17 82 
6 91  ^ 71 87 17 86 35 19 26 
la. la 3 33 k 25 4 0 1 ICQ 
lb 33 33 4l 29 lf-0 8 22 4l 
2a XI 18 9 41+ 11 27 8 63 
2b 3 67 3 67 4 25 2 100 
3a 5 60 7 57 7 l4 2 0 
313 10 it-0 11 45 11 36 2 50 
0 0 0 0 
5 6 67 6 16 7 14 4 75 
6 10 100 10 80 10 30 4 50 
Kan. 1 30 J+0 T6 0 80 11 69 65 
2a 58 i^ 8 98 1 101 1 96 58 
2b 9^ 61 105 0 109 3 71 82 
3a 150 53 139 1 150 3 106 67 
3b 157 80 iki 5 138 k 100 70 
il- Hit- 62 l48 9 1I+9 9 89 74 
5 137 69 125 6 129 5 93 76 
6 19^  T2 195 29 203 23 94 77 
7a 97 69 90 1 90 4 44 48 
7b 233 32 206 0 211 3 87 49 
Minn. 1-1^  77 52 87 47 87 47 4p 57 
6 7 57 8 38 5 4o 4 25 
7-8 iJ+ 57 15 13 15 27 8 25 
Neb, 1 21 33 43 5 45 2 21 24 
2 52 10 160 3 171 1 98 61 
3a 51 57 97 13 83 13 52 58 
3b 61 52 76 32 73 30 45 38 
104 50 185 2 199 1 150 4i 
5 161 52 216 - 221 1 l4i 34 
6 il-l 46 49 1+1 1+9 4i 34 53 
7 118 45 114-2 15 133 17 95 26 
S.D. 1 18 11 58 5 57 11 28 61 
2a 12 0 120 2 122 7 73 20 
2b 34 15 115 3 112 28 59 31 
3a 21 10 81 0 75 0 51 27 
3b 18 11 67 0 56 5 35 26 
i4-a 22 hi 70 1 69 23 36 28 
i+b 7 ih 15 13 16 6 7 57 
^•Wisconsin excluded because of small numbers of crop leases 
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Table i+a. Number of livestock-share leases and percent with sajne share 
of dairy products sold as of other product or livestock sold 
State Beef sold Hogs sold Poultry sold Egss sold 
and No. io No. i No. No. 
area cases same cases same cases same cases same 
Ind. 2b U8 62 66 k9 53 1+9 59 
6 12 67 20 75 13 62 16 63 
la. la k2 52 51 55 7^ 70 1+8 69 
lb hQ 29 55 35 51 88 5^  89 
2a 30 87 35 86 26 65 25 68 
2b 28 86 35 86 25 60 22 77 
3a 33 76 38 82 3^  85 33 85 
3b 25 81+ 33 88 25 76 25 80 
U 35 91 88 97 72 71 72 69 
5 3^ 1- 85 ki 83 30 87 30 83 
6 30 7^  k6 80 k2 67 1+1 71 
Kan. 1 5 20 k 50 5 100 1+ 100 
2a 12 17 12 92 12 100 IP 100 
2b 5 Uo 7 71 7 71 7 71 
3a 3 3^  ^ 1 100 3 100 3 100 
3b 12 3i+ 12 25 15 67 15 67 
1+ 10 10 10 20 12 92 18 91+ 
5 17 35 19 37 20 i+5 20 50 
6 28 57 33 61 29 52 29 52 
Ta 5 li-O 2 100 5 60 6 50 
7b 5 - 5 60 5 100 5 100 
Minn. 1-U 9 67 20 90 21 62 21 67 
6 15 93 75 96 75 37 76 1+2 
7-8 23 83 h6 83 1+1 83 1+1 83 
Neb. 1 
o 
6 17 6 100 6 100 6 83 
c, 
3a 9 56 8 50 8 88 8 88 
3b 9 56 10 3i+ 10 1+0 10 50 
U 11 27 11 91 5 80 5 80 
5 if- 50 5 60 1+ 50 1+ 75 
6 8 50 11 6h 6 17 6 50 
7 13 8 1I+ 79 13 69 1I+ 61+ 
S.D. 1 5 20 5 20 5 60 5 80 
2a 5 20 U 25 2 50 5 100 
2b U 50 3 67 3 67 3 100 
3a 1 - - 1 100 1 100 
3b 100 75 3 100 3 100 
ka. 1 100 U 75 - -
i^ b 9 56 9 67 7 86 7 86 
Wis. 1 2 100 iv 75 10 50 11 55 
2ab 12 100 88 95 103 32 106 36 
3 1^ 1+ 82 235 96 210 39 212 1+1 
4 6 83 6i+ 88 65 66 56 
5 11 82 70 89 75 1+1 79 39 
6-7 12 100 70 97 71 1+8 73 51 
8-9 17 914, 136 98 138 31 135 32 
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Table k'b. Number of livestock-share leases and percent vith same share 
of hogs sold as of other livestock sold 
State Beef cattle Sheep Poultry 
and No. % No. % No. % 
area cases same cases same cases same 
Ind. 2b 77 92 19 95 78 32 
6 20 85 1+ 50 17 70 
la. la 59 100 12 100 58 36 
lb 6i 95 8 75 58 22 
2a h'? 98 11 82 31 55 
2b 1+7 96 13 77 32 53 
3a 52 91+ 15 80 1+2 71+ 
3b 37 100 13 100 2k 67 
51 96 16 88 80 69 
5 6k 98 22 95 1+0 75 
6 1+1+ 98 10 100 1+6 54 
Kan. 1 6 83 - - 5 1+0 
2a 18 39 9 100 18 61 
2b 8 62 2 100 '1 \ i^ 3 
3a 2 50 1 100 1 100 
3b : 10 90 2 100 12 17 
1+ 17 88 1 100 17 12 
5 22 73 6 50 25 1+8 
6 32 9i+ 5 1+0 29 1I+ 
7a 3 67 1 100 5 1+0 
7b 8 62 1 100 7 57 
Minn. .1-1+ 10 90 1+ 75 17 59 
6 17 88 16 9% 69 1+0 
7-8 37 89 12 100 53 55 
Neb. 1 10 i+0 7 86 6 100 
2 1+ 75 - « 1 -
3a 13 69 5 1+0 7 i+3 
3b 12 75 5 80 9 56 
1+ l6 88 3 3^ 6 -
5 12 83 2 100 i+ 75 
6 17 100 5 100 6 17 
7 l6 100 9 11 ii+ 50 
S.D. 1 Ik 79 1+ 75 6 17 
2a 7 71 1+ 100 3 67 
2b - - 2 100 1+ 50 
3a 1+ 75 1 - 2 50 
3b 7 86 1 100 3 67 
i+a 2 100 1 -p - -
Ub l6 100 i+ 75 9 56 
Wis. 1 - - 1 100 3 -
2ab 12 100 13 85 79 1+0 
3 51 88 37 92 207 1+0 
1+ 3 100 - 1+5 53 
5 7 86 3 67 60 30 
6-7 8 88 2 100 57 51 
8-9 15 87 •9. 89 120 32 
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Table 5* Nximber of crop-share and crop-sliare-casli leases, and percent with 
.same, shares.^Qf selected crops 
Corn an.d Oats an,d 
State Oats Soybeans Wheat Soybeans Wheat 
and Wo. i No. 10 Wo. I0 No. > No. —T~~ 
area cases same cases same cases same cases same cases same 
Ind. 2b 8 100 77 97 73 90 7 100 7 100 
6 11 73 91 77 19 95 9 67 5 80 
la. la 15^  25 93 57 h 75 88 61+ 1+ 75 
lb 1^ 2 37 43 70 43 51 30 83 30 93 
2a 2k3 19 213 1+6 11 27 206 71 11 55 
2b 239 57 208 82 1+ 100 19k 71+ 1+ 100 
3a 9^  i+2 76 8 50 38 68 7 71 
3b 81 52 1+6 70 12 75 1+0 78 11 82 
U 56 38 26 5U 0 26 81 0 
5 110 57 56 86 6 83 53 79 6 83 
6 77 61 35 83 9 100 30 90 6 100 
Kan. 1 1 100 0 1 100 0 2 100 
2a 5 60 0 27 93 0 27 85 
2b 13 100 0 29 100 0 43 95 
3a 36 92 9 100 50 82 10 100 94 95 
3b 127 87 3 67 186 81+ 6 83 159 97 
111 2 100 211 58 2 100 105 93 
5 8o 73 28 71 117 69 15 80 96 86 
6 l6o 61 26 50 198 71 20 80 11+5 90 
7a 87 1+1 97 1+0 82 43 73 96 73 97 
7b 111 97 li+6 100 166 98 96 97 128 95 
Minn. 1-k 66 1+8 12 75 39 1+1 13 85 93 97 
6 82 18 83 7 71 15 80 8 88 
7-8 184 89 137 85 17 76 122 93 15 80 
Web. 1 68 88 1 0 38 87 1 0 30 93 
2 55 82 34 100 81 56 25 72 67 67 
3a 129 81+ 37 30 126 83 31 55 85 82 
3b 261+ 67 34 9 109 55 34 29 100 70 
113 92 6 17 2I+3 Sk 6 33 106 98 
5 2U2 71+ 6 67 278 77 1+ 100 237 96 
6 205 78 5U 52 57 51 1+9 i+7 7^ 45 
7 176 72 39 13 173 7I+ 38 3i+ 1I+5 86 
96 S.D. 1 2k 96 1 100 32 81+ 1 100 26 
2a 66 52 1+ 75 72 50 5 100 IOI+ 93 
2b 77 75 1+ 50 98 73 6 83 98 98 
3a 93 98 7 100 82 100 6 100 53 96 
3b 153 95 9 100 76 92 8 100 63 97 
k& 1I+2 79 19 63 T3 71+ 20 95 78 100 
1+b 229 90 1+1 85 18 9^  39 90 17 100 
Wis. 1 1 100 0 0 0 1 100 
2ab 13 77 0 1 100 0 1 100 
3 10 100 1 100 0 0 0 
k 3 67 0 0 0 0 
5 34 85 2 50 9 89 1 100 6 100 
6-7 3 100 0 0 0 1 100 
8-9 11 91 2 100 3 100 2 100 3 100 
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Table 6. Percent of leases with landlord sharing cash operating 
expenses by type of lease 
A]_l leases Percent sharing by type of lease 
State No. No. io Cash Crop- Crop- Live­ Labor- Other 
and of shar­ shar­ share share - stock share 
area leases ing ing cash share 
Ind. 2b 275 27^ 1- 99 0 100 100 100 100 100 
6 186 175 9h 18 100 90 100 - -
la. la 288 250 87 1+1+ go 96 100 - 100 
lb 268 256 96 50 98 98 97 100 67 
2a 337 317 9k 5k 89 98 100 - 100 
2b 333 322 97 56 98 99 100 _ _ 
3a l86 180 97 77 92 99 100 _ _ 
3b 165 15^^ 93 50 82 100 98 - 100 
219 19^ 89 52 88 96 99 100 _ 
5 2k3 216 89 57 96 96 98 100 100 
6 2h2 203 81+ 58 89 98 100 _ 67 
Kan. 1 269 130 1+8 50 1+1 55 100 100 
2a 300 162 51+ - ^1 61 100 _ _ 
2b 260 llt8 57 - 54 57 100 _ 
3a 271 206 76 60 76 75 100 100 100 
3b 303 231 76 20 68 83 100 - 100 
269 223 83 - 78 82 98 - -
5 2I+2 21k 88 1+0 91+ 93 100 - 100 
6 333 310 93 13 91+ 98 100 - -
7a 211 181 86 35 83 95 100 100 -
7b 339 310 91 28 95 96 89 _ 100 
Minn .1-1+ 32U 209 65 26 75 78 97 - -
6 270 181 67 36 83 83 99 - -
7-8 3^ 7 278 80 37 91 89 98 - -
Neb. 1 256 129 50 17 1+6 59 100 _ 85 
2 327 203 62 - 60 6U 100 - 86 
3a 2k0 183 76 50 71 77 100 - -
3b 311 2k2 78 - 7^  81 100 - 100 
U 335 193 58 - 1+6 62 97 - 100 
5 310 235 76 - 66 79 100 - 100 
6 298 229 77 18 T9 86 100 - 100 
7 268 192 72 - 62 77 100 - 100 
S.D. 1 155 63 1+1 8 1+2 22 88 - 73 
2a 199 1+2 21 - 19 12 86 - 36 
2b 186 57 31 - 29 25 86 100 50 
3a 167 16 10 - 10 3 75 - 25 
3b 199 20 10 - 10 7 50 - -
a^ 18U 7i+ Uo - 36 36 89 - 88 
i+b 285 59 21 - 17 13 88 - 57 
Wis. 1 171 62 36 22 75 100 90 - 38 
2ab 250 190 76 36 80 100 99 - U5 
3 331 315 95 -jk lao 71 99 - 100 
1+ 262 138 53 19 67 60 95 _ 25 
5 222 153 69 22 81 50 97 - 25 
6-7 222 133 60 20 100 67 97 - 67 
8-9 278 216 78 21+ 100 100 99 - 100 
m 
Table 7. Percent of crop-share and crop-share-cash leases with selected 
share of corn under agreements in which landlords share operating expenses 
compared with those in which landlords do not share operating expenses®' 
Landlords share operating Landlords do not share 1 Dperating 
State expense expense 
and Wo io of leases with share No. io of leases with share 
area leases 1/3 2/5 1/2 leases 1/3 2/5 1/2 
Kan. 3b * 132 60 26 li+ 3^  i+7 53 0 
U * 155 23 60 16 29 55 38 7 
Minn. 7-8* l8l 7 57 3i+ 20 35 55 10 
Web. 1 5U 90 6 k 50 80 8 8 
2 90 61 k 3 30 70 0 0 
3a 1^ 3 78 18 I1.5 87 11 0 
3b 218 19 76 5 52 27 65 6 
h 150 89 7 3 115 95 2 
5 * 209 29 71 0 68 51 0 
6 * 185 3 81 16 3i+ 0 9k 6 
7 156 k 65 31 58 3 76 19 
S.D. a^ ^  5I4. 65 6 26 93 83 10 2 
1+ b St 30 10 37 53 202 IT 78 5 
* Significantly larger share of corn in leases with landlord sharing oper­
ating expenses. 
 ^Shown for all economic areas with 20 or more cases sharing and 20 or 
more not sharing operating expenses. 
Table 8a. Landlord's share of com by type of lease 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-'Cash leases Live stock-share leases 













2/5 1/2 3/5 • 
/^5 
Ind. 2b 1 1 98 2 2 96 1 98 1 
6 * 29 33 38 5 50 20 25 5 8 8i+ 3 
la c la 5 10 85 8 92 1 99 
lb 7 93 2 98 1 96 3 
2a 3 10 87 - 6 93 - 2 96 2 
2b 100 - - 99 100 
3a 100 1 99 97 3 
3b 100 100 2 98 
h 6 94 2 4 94 3 93 4 
5 100 1 99 98 2 
6 k 4 92 2 3 95 100 
Km. 1 : 100 80 20 
2a 100 15 85 100 
2b 84 8 8 88 12 4o 60 
3 a 25 56 19 9 82 9 
to 3b * 4ii- 39 17 1 70 24 5 35 15 10 
4 50 hi 9 1 28 57 ih ko 30 30 
5 33 27 4o 50 22 26 2 24 8 64 k 
6 * 15 35 50 5 2k 69 2 7 89 k 
fa 56 38 6 35 58 7 25 33 h2 
Tb * 100 100 69 31 
Minn.1-4* 10 60 30 67 26 7 5 5 85 5 
6 * 28 8 6Q ii- 23 38 12 27 1 1 95 3 
7-8* 9 45 43 3 11 63 .25 1 2 3 93 2 
Table 8a (Continued.) 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State jo with share jo with share jo with share 
and 0 l/h- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 1/4- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 1/4- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 
area 1/3 4/5 1/3 4/5 1/3 4/5 
Feb. 1 !(• 85 6 9 3 88 6 3 18 9 73 
2 * 28 65 4 3 28 72 57 43 
3a* 2 •jk 19 5 89 11 4 36 4 52 4 
3b* 30 62 8 16 79 4 1 27 53 20 
U * 94 3 2 1 1 89 8 2 31 10 56 3 
5 * 45 54 1 31 69 21 16 63 
6 * 7 75 17 1 1 86 13 13 83 4 
T * 3 70 26 1 4 68 28 24 76 
S.D. 1 * 88 8 4 i4 86 18 18 9 37 18 
2a* 2k 64 8 4 40 58 2 10 30 60 
2b* 7 89 2 2 15 83 2 8 23 69 
3a* ICQ 100 12 38 38 12 
3b* 92 4 4 91 9 45 55 
ka.* 84 5 9 2 5 73 9 13 100 
4b* 23 63 l4 1 15 74 10 5 5 90 
Wis. 1 100 100 14 86 
2ab 25 75 50 50 1 4 2 86 6 1 
3 100 17 83 2 - 94 3 1 
k 33 67 50 50 1 2 1 91 2 3 
5 * 48 2 50 25 25 50 1 7 2 89 1 
6-7 100 1 96 3 
8-9 10 90 100 1 2 2 90 4 1 
* One or more significant difference in proportions between, lease types. 
Table 8b. Landlord's share of wheat by type of lease 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State '/o with share with share 'jo with share 
and 0 lA- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 'L/k-2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 i/k- 2/5 1/2 3/5' 
area 1/3 4/5 1/3 i+/5 1/3 I+/5 
Ind. 2b 3 5 92 13 87 2 1 97 
6 7 7 20 66 25 25 50 6 12 82 
la^  la 25 75 100 
lb * 6 35 59 56 kh 100 
2a 1+5 1+5 10 5^, 75 
2b 100 100 100 
3a 100 ih 29 h3 li+ 100 
313 100 30 70 100 h 11 89 
5 100 17 83 100 
5 25 75 100 100 
Kan. 1 * 96 97 3 57 i+3 
2a * 97 3 100 55 
2b * 89 7 97 2 1 62 38 
3a 90 9 1 89 9 2 80 20 
3b 67 22 11 83 ih 3 62 10 lit- 10 
U 80 9 10 1 68 26 . 6 71 9 20 
5 * 53 20 27 1 76 11 12 19 75 6 
6 * 19 36 i^ 3 2 21 20 59 2 91+ 2 
7a * 98 2 91 2 7 60 ho 
7b * 95 5 99 1 69 31 
Minn.l-^ * 1 56 i^ 3 56 13 81 6 
6 25 25 50 17 83 9 1+ 79 
7-8 29 i+2 29 9 18 h6 ... 27 11 89 
Table 8b (Continued) 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
















Neb. 1 * 9^  3 3 3 91 6 15 23 62 
2 * 1 95 1 2 1 100 69 31 
3a* 10 8l 8 1 11 87 1 1 10 ko 50 
3b* 37 30 30 3 23 23 k8 6 k6 27 27 
k Mr 9k 2 2 2 1 97 2 ko 12 !+!+ k 
5 * 65 3i^  1 55 1 39 61 
6 * 30 65 5 50 3 3 83 17 
7 * 6 12 73 7 2 8 9 73 9 1 21 29 50 
S .D. 1 * 77 2 21 96 k 35 50 10 5 
2a* 86 13 1 95 5 31 69 
2b* 68 1 31 83 1 16 23 77 
3a 100 98 2 40 40 20 
3b 85 5 10 88 7 5 25 75 
4a 72 2k 4 6k 2 3k 100 
kb 75 25 k2 50 8 100 
Wis. 1 100 33 33 33 
2ab 100 88 12 
3 92 8 
k 80 20 
5 55 k5 13 7 
6^ 7 100 9 82 9 
8-9 100 100 k k 88 
* One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
Table ^a. Landlord's share of fertilizer by type of lease 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State 4 with share jo with share jo with share 
and 0 l/k- 275 172 3/5 all 6 l/h- 2/5 1/2 3/5-  ^0 l/ii-- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 
area 1/3 if/5 l/3 i+/5 l/3 V5 
Ind. 2b * 3 9I4, 3 2 2 96 : 1 97 2 
6- *- 14 20 23 36 1 6 20 30 15 25 10 3 5 5 7if 5 8 
la, la * 20 7 73 7 3 83 7 2 92 6 
lb 8 73 2 17 5 78 1 16 3 78 5 lif 
2a 10 3 3 •jh 10 8 3 87 2 92 3 5 
2b 6 83 3 8 1 18 80 1 89 2 9 
3a 81 19 7 66 27 2 78 3 17 
3b * 57 5 38 7 if7 2 ifif 2 7if 2 22 k * 67 33 2 98 1 91 5 3 
5 * 67 33 6 77 17 2 87 2 9 
6 5 71 2if 9 2 2 76 11 7 75 18 
Kan. 1 81 19 11 67 22 67 33 
2a * 28 28 iflf 26 62 12 if2 29 29 
2b 29 58 13 36 60 if 100 
3a 2 if7 if if6 1 3 53 7 37 33 33 33 
3b * if 5lf 6 27 6 3 7if 9 13 3 1 28 11 39 22 
H * 9 23 17 6 9 2if 27 ifO 16 26 6 13 39 
5 * 5 ho 10 ifO 2 3 7 58 lif 21 23 if5 5 27 
6 * If 18 28 ifl 9 5 17 13 56 9 2 1+ 72 h 18 
7a * 69 5 26 lif 55 6 2if 1 21 72 7 
7b 1 32 63 if 3 28 67 2 12 23 59 6 
Mlnn.l-i)-* 22 15 39 1 23 38 2if 22 16 8 if 72 if 12 
6: * 25 12 ifif 19 30 22 9 39 1 1 1 91 if 2 
7-8* 9 29 ifO 2 20 19 5 ifl 29 1 5 ,2 2 89 2 5 
Table 9a (Continued) 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State  ^with share  ^with share  ^with share 
and ~0 1/4- 2/5 T/2 3/5- all 0 1/4- 2/5 I/S alif 0 2/5 172 3/5- all 
area 1/3 U/5 I/3 i+/5 l/3 1^-/5 
Neb. 1 * i^ 8 37 k 7 28 8 20 30 4o 30 
2 33 32 30 1 k 31 38 31 50 50 
3a * 30 32 16 Ik 6 2 37 39 18 h 2 10 80 10 
3b * 35 17 26 11 11 29 12 31+ 20 5 7 20 k6 20 7 
4 * I4.2 h3 k 2 9 36 k6 3 15 12 12 53 6 17 
5 * 25 27 27 15 3 3 28 18 hk 8 1 1 7 Ik 72 7 
6 * 2^ 6 31 31 2 6 32 1+0 23 5 10 80 10 
1 * 37 3 26 31 3 31 1 38 28 1 1 84 8 8 
S .D« 1 50 
2a 100 





2b 60 7 13 20 59 5 22 5 9 33 67 
3a 92 8 88 8 1+ 100 
3h 57 lit 29 59 15 26 33 67 
30 25 25 20 k2 21 17 3 17 100 
4b 36 18 37 9 35 1 21 21 1 21 7 6k 29 
Wis. 1 20 20 ko 20 100 16 Qk 
2ab 22 11 56 11 29 1^ 2 29 1 2 2 8D 7 8 
3 83 17 17 83 1 1 - Qk 6 8 
75 25 67 33 4 2 1 85 3 5 
5 * 12 18 3 20 50 50 1+ 3 2 77 3 11 
6-7 12 76 12 100 1 1 92 3 3 
7-8 9 9 82 83 17 1 1 1 88 5 4 
* One or iKire significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
Table ^lo. Landlord's share of lime by type of lease 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State jo vlth share jo -with share  ^vith share 
and -0 \/k- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 l/h- 2/5 l/2 3/5- all 0 1/I+- 2/5 l/2 3/5- all 
area 1/3 I+/5 l/3 /^5 l/3 H/5 
Ind. 2b * 2 8 90 33 67 1 3^ 1 55 
6 3 2 k 91 13 7 7 73 5 2h 71 
la. la 60 20 20 7 3 72 2 16 82 18 
lb 7 33 60 9 39 2 50 2 1+U 
2a 25 75 12 2 80 6 Qk 3 13 
2b 6 50 6 38 6 1 65 28 62 2 36 
3a 6 12 82 3 15 82 ki 59 
3b 19 81 7 2 87 2 ho 58 
h 11 89 3 38 59 1 29 2 68 
5 * 5 19 76 5 15 80 3 30 1 66 














3a * 1+ 20 2 11 63 3 31 38 28 50 50 
3"b 13 5h 7 13 13 5 kQ 5 16 26 12 25 50 12 
h 67 33 18 18 12 2h 28 4o 20 ko 
5 21 7 21 1^ 7 8 19 22 51 5 ho 5 50 
6 6 2 2 25 2 63 6 1 37 1 55 5 5 ho 5 1^ 5 
7a Ik h h 4 70 8 6 13 73 55 
7b-* 1 2 5 92 1 h 28 67 8 8 23 61 
Minn, .1-^  23 31 k6 50 17 33 9 6k 27 
6 * 33 1+5 22 23 23 8 23 23 3 1 1 wU 70 U 21 
7-8* 13 27 33 27 i+0 9 27 21 3 3 3 58 36 
Table 9^ (Continued) 
Crop-share leases Crop' -share -cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State '^ 0 with share i with share I0 with share 
and 0 lA- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 1/U- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 l/i+- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 
area 1/3 /^5 1/3 V5 1/3 4/5 
Neb. 1 * 100 92 8 1+0 30 30 
2 85 5 5 5 50 50 
3a 86 7 7 57 43 100 
3b k2 17 8 33 53 9 13 25 50 50 
91 6 3 86 11 3 100 
5 * 1+6 1+ U 21 25 75 6 13 3 3 17 83 
6 i^ 3 ll+ 65 15 10 10 100 
7 73 12 12 3 62 1 17 11 9 25 63 12 
S.D. 1 100 100 25 37 37 
2a 100 100 100 
2b 75 25 88 12 
3a 100 9k 6 
3b 100 77 8 15 100 
4a k6 9 1+5 56 11 22 11 
hh 100 U8 15 7 30 20 60 20 
Wis. 1 100 100 16 81+ 
2ab 3^ l4 3^ 33 67 2 2 1 51 1 43 
3 25 75 100 2 1 22 2 73 
100 100 3 1 61+ 3 29 
5 * 18 18 61+ 100 i+ 2 1 1+2 1 50 
6-7 100 1 1 88 3 7 
8-9 33 67 25 25 50 1 1 1+9 3 
* One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
Table 9c. Landlord's share of small grain seed by type of lease 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 


















Ind, 2b * 13 83 1+ 23 2 75 1 97 1 1 
6 * 6o 1 15 2k 56 6 16 22 8 63 29 
la. la * 73 7 20 81 1 1 17 1 3 93 3 
lb *k3 37 20 67 2I+ 9 1 97 1 1 
2a * 73 3 21 3 85 2 11 2 5 89 1+ 2 
2b * 57 5 38 66 32 2 5 92 3 
3a * 18 68 14 59 1 36 1+ 3 89 3 5 
3b- * 35 50 15 51 31+ 15 1+ 2 90 1+ 
k * 17 83 76 16 8 2 92 5 1 
5 * h2 k 6k 28 8 5 91 1 3 
e * 23 h 19 61 2 30 7 1 91+ 5 
Kan. 1 96 93 7 1+3 57 
2a * 90 10 100 63 1+ 33 
2b * 93 2 5 98 2 59 33 8 
3a 90 5 5 98 1 1 75 25 
3b * 80 5 5 10 91 1 2 6 1+8 5 38 9 
k * 81 8 3 8 90 1 9 57 3 1+0 
5 * 76 10 lli- 91 3 6 11 1+ 58 1+ 23 
6 * 48 1 25 26 39 1 33 1 26 3 2 70 2 23 
7a * 96 h 89 1 2 8 61+ 36 
7b * 99 1 100 69 31 
Minn.l-U* 3 2 52 i+i 6 53 7 70 1+ 19 
6 * 2Q 5 19 1+8 81+ 8 8 1 1 1 75 2 20 
7-8* 60 2 2 23 13 81+ 11 5 3 2 87 8 
Table 9c (Continued) 
Crop-share leases Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State "to with share % with share °lo with L share 
and 0 lA- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 i/k- 2/5 1/2 3/5- all 0 lA- 2/5 1/2 3/5- All 
area 1/3 /^5 1/3 U/5 1/3 V5 
Neb. 1 * 97 3 92+ 2 23 5^  23 
2 * 95 2 3 100 62 15 23 
3a* 95 5 97 1 2 20 80 
3b* 96 2 2 99 1 31 50 19 
k * 96 1 3 99 1 31 3 6 57 3 
5 * 97 3 100 18 18 64 
6 * 81+ 3 9 u 93 2 1 h h 8 8lt 
7 ^  Qh 2 7 7 90 7 2 1 13 6 75 6 
S.D. 1 * 78 7 15 95 5 31 u 26 h 35 
2a* 80 U 16 9h 1 5 17 50 33 
2b* 63 2 2 2 31 80 1 k 15 15 i+6 39 
3a 9h 3 3 99 1 50 12 12 25 
3b* 93 7 97 3 55 36 9 
ka. 69 2 29 65 1 1 1 32 50 50 
1+b* 86 2 5 7 91 1 2 6 9 5 77 9 
Wis. 1 67 33 67 33 11 83 6 
2ab 18 55 27 25 50 25 1 2 2 85 5 5 
3 25 75 17 83 1 2 87 3 7 
100 33 67 3 2 89 2 h 
5 * 1^ 6 kl 13 100 ii. 2 2 86 1 5 • 
6-7 100 50 50 1 1 91+ 3 1 
8-9 11 11 78 20 80 1 2 91 5 1 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease tj/pes. 
VJQ 
Table 10a. Percent distribution of types of lease for farms with hogs as 
a major source of income 
state Type of lease 
and No. Cash Crop- Crop-share- Livestock-









la. la 96 18 3 51 26 
lb * 62 3 - 1+7 1+7 
2a 109 10 2 66 21 
.2b * 79 4 1 71 21+ 
3a * 69 7 3 14-9 1+1 
3b * 38 3 » 50 1+7 
k * 85 20 - 15 65 
5 * 76 17 1 3^ + k^ 













3 - - 100 -
5 U 25 50 « 25 
6 11 9 9 1+5 36 
Ta 6 - 17 67 17 
7b 1+ 25 - 75 -
Minn. 1-1+ 6 83 - 17 
6 27 26 7 15 52 
7-8- * 87 29 2 39 30 
Neb. 1 * 15 20 13 60 7 
2 1 - 100 - -
3a 18 - 22 67 11 
3b * 36 - 17 83 -
1+ 10 - 30 70 -
5 9 - 22 56 11 
6- * 50 12 12 62 li+ 
T •X- 23 13 9 70 9 
S .D • 1 0 
2a 3 - 100 -
2b 7 14 57 li+ 1I+ 
3a 8 - - 63 13 
3b * 16 - 100 -
l+a 17 12 76 12 -
J+b * 6k 5 3 78 11 
Wis. 1 0 
2ab 9 33 - - 67 
3 52 19 2 - 79 
k 2 - 100 
5 5 ivo - - 1+0 
6-7 9 33 - 67 
8-9 1!+ 29 „ 71 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
J- ,4-4 
in 
Table 10b. Percent distribution of types of lease for farms with cash 
grain as a major source of income 
State Type of lease 
and No. Cash Crop- Crop-share- Livestock-
area cases share cash share 
Ind. 2b h2 19 17 Sk 
6 * l6 6 38 12 kk 
la. la 3^  12 12 59 17 
lb * 33 - 15 6U 21 
2a * 68 1 12 75 11 
2b 67 3 9 70 18 
3a 15 - - 67 33 
3b- * lii- - - 93 7 
1|.^  * 13 15 15 54 15 
5- * 21 29 10 U8 li^  
6- * 13 38 15 k6 -
Kan. 1 35 - 7U 17 9 
2a 36 - 50 50 -
2b 22 - 50 I1.5 5 
3a * 3h - 26 62 9 
3b * 31 - 29 1^ 8 19 
1+ 31 - 26 65 10 
5 l6 6 19 69 6 
6 32 3 22 53 22 
Ta 8 - 38 50 13 
7b 19 11 37 53 -
Minn. 1-4 * 30 7 7^ k7 -
6 13 38 31 8 23 
7-8 * 52 8 19 56 17 
Neb. 1 39 18 31 33 5 
2 - 67 19 11 
3a kk - 36 52 9 
3b - 22 70 k 
k * 7U 1 26 59 12 
5 76 - 28 63 9 
6 * 37 3 11 76 -
7 61 5 21 57 8 
S.D. 1 2k 13 29 17 29 
2a 39 - 28 k9 13 
2b 35 - l+O ko Ik 
3a 26 1+ 19 58 8 
3b 37 - 2k 68 5 
ii-a * 43 - 9 79 5 
1+b 7^ 13 72 6 
Wis. 1 0 
2ab 2 50 - - 50 
3 2 - - 100 
3 33 - - 67 
5 1 - - 100 -
6-7 5 60 - - 4o 
8-9 7 Ik 29 - 57 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
percent distribution of all leases. 
1?2 
Table 10c. Percent distribution of types of lease for farms with 
beef as a major source of income 
State Type of lease 
and No. Cash Crop- Crop-share- Live si 
area cases share cash share 
Ind. 2b 7 Ik 86 
6 ii- 25 - 75 
la. la 53 17 - k5 38 
lb * 3^ + 3 - 38 56 
2a * 2lf 8 29 58 
2b' * 31 3 10 48 39 
Sa * 19 - - 21 79 
3b 19 5 - 37 53 
k 13 15 - 15 69 
5 * ii-O 20 - 23 58 
6 32 38 6 25 31 
Kan. 1 5 - 20 4o 4o 
2a k . 25 - 50 25 
2b 2 - - 50 50 
3a 3 - - 33 33 
3b * 15 20 13 33 27 
5 - - 40 60 
5- * i6 13 19 13 50 
6 * ih 7 - 36 57 
Ta * 11 - 9 55 27 
7b h 25 - 50 25 
Minn. 1-k k - 50 50 -
6 3 - - - 100 
7-8 19 5 5 58 32 
Reb. 1 ko 30 10 15 38 
2 10 10 20 30 4o 
3a 20 5 20 30 45 
3b 2k - 13 67 17 
1+ 20 5 20 30 45 
5 13 - - 69 31 
6 33 15 - 64 15 
7 15 20 - 33 27 
S.D. 1 10 4o - 30 
2a 8 - - 50 25 
2b 7 - - 86 l4 
3a 13 - 15 69 15 
3b 10 - 20 60 20 
ka i6 6 19 63 13 
4b 27 7 7 63 22 
Wis. 1 0 
2ab 2 - - - 100 
3 12 25 - - 75 
173 
Table 11. Number of leases and percent with one-year term by major 
product sold; full tenants, one landlord 
State Cash grain Dairy Beef Hogs 
and No. io No. fo No. 70 No. io 
area* leases 1-year leases l-yisar leases 1-year leases 1-year 
Ind. 2b 37 57 75 5 20 37 51 
6 15 73 U 50 1+ 25 8 38 
la. la 33 70 9 78 52 62 92 6k 
lb 32 72 6 83 31 65 58 69 
2a 62 71 12 50 23 1+8 103 60 
2b 6h 59 11 13 30 63 78 67 
3a Ik 57 5 80 18 56 63 71 
3b Ik 86 11 6k 19 1+7 34 65 
13 69 29 59 13 1+6 85 6k 
5 21 it.8 3 100 37 51 71 62 
6 13 85 23 65 32 59 88 68 
Kan. 1 33 67 - - 5 60 1 -
2a 28 50 - 1+ 25 - -
2b 19 68 - - 2 50 _ -
3a 31 58 1 _ 3 100 - -
3b 26 50 3 67 li+ i+3 3 67 
1+ 25 72 3 67 1+ 50 3 67 
5 15 60 3 67 1I+ 71 1+ 50 
6 29 76 10 1+0 Ik 61+ 10 70 
Ta 7 86 11 73 9 56 5 i+0 
Tb 18 78 U 75 3 67 i+ 100 
Minn.l-i4- 27 3k 68 1+ 50 6 67 
6 * 13 85 77 1^ 8 2 50 26 50 
T-8 1+7 62 23 i^ 3 17 1+1 8ii- 60 
Neb. 1 37 62 8 100 39 i+1 13 69 
2 k3 1+7 - 9 56 1 100 
3a 37 81 75 18 61 17 76 
3b * 50 86 16 81 20 50 35 83 
60 68 - ' _ 16 63 8 88 
5 65 63 3 67 10 70 6 33 
6 36 83 2 50 30 87 1+6 76 
7 56 73 9 100 13 5k 19 63 
S.D. 1 23 3^ 50 9 56 - -
2a 35 Ik 1 100 8 75 3 33 
2b 31 71 - - 7 71 6 67 
3a 22 82 2 - 13 62 7 i^ 3 
3b 35 86 8 100 8 50 12 75 
ka 1+1 68 7 57 13 5U 16 69 
4b 45 78 7 29 2k 71 59 78 
Wis. 1 - - kk 1+1 - - - «. 
2ab 2 100 13k 60 2 100 9 67 
3 2 100 191 61 12 50 1+7 6i+ 
U 2 50 123 50 - - 2 50 
5 1 - 78 53 2 50 U 50 
6-7 5 60 98 1+5 - - 8 13 
8-9 5 80 127 1+1 3 67 12 33 
*One significant difference in proportions between products. 
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Table 12. Number of leases and percent with 1 to ^4- and 11 or more months 
termination notice by major product soldj full-tenants, one landlord 
State ' Cash grain Dairy products Beef Hogs 
I ^0  ^ ^ 
No. 1-4 11 or No. 1-k 11 or No. 1-k 11. or No-. l-i+ 11 or 
leases mo. over leases mo. over leases mo. over leases mo. over 
2b 26 35 15 2 50 0 1+ 50 0 25 1+0 1+ 
6 ii+ 79 7 3 33 0 1+ 25 0 1+ 100 0 
la 26 3^ + 7 0 0 38 16 8 71 32 1+ 
lb 25 5U 0 6 33 17 23 1+8 0 1+6 37 2 
2a 31 If 9 0 1I+ 21 0 71+ 22 8 
2b h6 20 u 8 25 0 21 21+ 10 59 22 5 
3a 12 58 0 3 0 0 17 1+7 6 1+8 51+ 1+ 
3b 12 58 0 8 25 0 17 1+7 0 29 66 0 
J+ 10 50 0 23 17 0 8 25 0 65 32 2 
5 * 13 31 0 2 100 0 23 30 1+ 1+9 59 2 
6 9 0 19 26 11 21+ 29 8 71 35 7 
1 25 5i+ . k 0 - - 3 66 0 1 0 0 
2a 20 U5 10 0 - - 1+ 25 0 0 - -
2b 15 20 7 0 - - 1 0 100 0 _ -
3a 20 50 5 1 100 0 3 33 0 0 - -
3b i6 25 19 2 0 50 7 28 0 3 33 0 
if 21 U8 5 2 50 0 0 - - 3 67 33 
5 9 89 0 1 100 0 8 37 25 3 67 0 
6 20 ho 0 7 k3 11+ 11 9 27 10 30 0 
Ta k 50 0 8 50 12 6 50 0 2 50 0 
7b 13 31 8 5 1+0 20 1 100 0 2 0 100 
i,l-i| 19 1+2 5 23 52 13 2 100 0 3 100 0 
6 7 85 0 54 1+8 2 2 50 0 18 1+1+ 0 
7-8 29 2k 10 15 20 13 13 15 15 60 18 8 
, 1 25 0 0 2 50 0 23 9 1+ 10 30 0 
2 31 19 3 0 - - 6 0 0 1 0 0 
3a 30 10 10 1+ 25 0 1I+ 7 7 15 26 7 
3b 37 29 5 10 20 0 15 0 7 27 15 1+ 
39 18 10 0 - - 11 10 0 6 0 17 
5 37 11 19 2 0 100 9 0 22 1+ 0 0 
6 22 111 1I+ 1 0 0 19 16 0 33 21 6 
7 39 18 3 6 50 17 11 9 0 17 6 0 
. 1 13 31 15 3 100 0 7 29 0 0 - -
2a 21 28 10 1 100 0 6 67 17 1 100 0 
2b 21 52 5 1 0 0 3 100 0 1+ 50 0 
3a Ik 57 0 1 0 0 9 1+1+ 0 i+ 25 0 
3b 23 39 13 6 33 0 5 20 0 6 83 0 
Ua 23 39 0 h 25 0 7 II+ li+ 5 1+0 20 
1+b 25 2li- 8 2 50 0 15 1+0 0 33 27 9 
. 1 0 - - 35 60 6 0 - - 0 - -
2ab 1 0 0 115 61 1 2 50 0 8 52 0 
3 2 0 0 159 31^  3 10 70 0 34 -38' ' 6 
ii- 1 100 0 99 71 2 0 - - 1 0 0 
5 0 _ 58 66 3 1 0 0 1+ 50 0 
6-7 3 67 0 86 53 3 0 - - 6 33 0 
8-9 6 17 0 112 52 3 3 67 0 10 60 20 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between products. 
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Table 13. Percent of leases beginning in given months by major product 
sold; full tenants, one landlord 
State Cash grain Dairy products Beef Hogs 
and --Percent of leases beginning--
area Jan. May Sept. Jan. May Sept.. Jan. May Sept. Jan. May Sept. 
Apr. Aug. Dec. Apr. Aug. Dec. Apr. Aug. Dec. Apr. Aug. Dec. 
Ind. 2b 77 5 8 100 0 0 100 0 0 82 0 8 
6 67 20 13 100 0 0 33 0 33 87 0 13 
la. la 100 0 0 100 0 0 92 6 0 98 0 1 
lb 97 0 3 100 0 0 9k 3 0 93 3 2 
2a 87 6 5 61 8 23 96 0 9k 2 2 
2b 87 5 5 90 0 10 97 3 • 0 92 5 1 
3a 100 0 0 100 0 0 9^  0 0 97 0 0 
3b 100 0 0 82 9 9 95 0 5 97 0 0 
U 92 0 8 96 0 92 0 0 93 2 
5 95 0 5 100 0 0 92 3 5 9k 0 3 
6 92 8 0 86 5 5 97 0 0 96 1 0 
Kan. 1 53 kl 3 - - - 50 50 0 - -
2a 33 30 6 - - - 50 50 0 - -
2b 33 67 0 - - - 100 0 0 - - -
3a 23 70 3 - - - 33 67 0 - _ -
3b 85 8 67 33 0 77 8 8 67 33 0 
4 76 20 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 
5 73 27 0 60 0 20 100 0 0 100 0 0 
6 93 3 0 90 10 0 100 0 0 91 0 9 
7a 71 0 lu 100 0 0 90 0 0 100 0 0 
7b 83 11 6 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 
Minn. 1-k 50 0 k2 58 3 39 33 0 67 83 17 0 
6 69 0 21 56 2 ko 33 33 3^  59 0 Hi 
7-8 76 9 11 78 ,1+ 13 83 0 6 83 5 8 
Neb. 1 91 0 9 86 ik 0 68 18 8 100 0 0 
2 88 0 2 - - - 89 0 11 100 0 0 
3a 97 0 0 50 "0 50 90 5 5 9U 6 0 
3b 9k 2 100 0 0 91 1+ 0 100 0 0 
U 87 3 5 - - - 100 0 0 100 0 0 
5 85 7 2 67 33 0 92 8 0 88 12 0 
6 100 0 0 100 0 0 93 0 7 92 k 2 
7 93 7 0 89 0 0 100 0 0 83 k 0 
S.D. 1 76 0 2k 50 ' 0 50 89 0 11 - - -
2a 56 1+ 4o 0 0 100 k3 11+ it3 100 0 0 
2b 60 0 4o 0 0 100 ks 0 57 72 111- 11+ 
3a 95 5 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 
3b 92 3 5 100 0 0 100 0 0 100 0 0 
ij-a U8 7 i+5 k3 0 57 58 8 3^  ^ 53 1+7 
1+b 93 2 2 100 0 0 96 0 k 91 0 2 
Wis. 1 - » 61 Ik 25 - - - - - -
2ab 50 0 50 Ik 3 22 100 0 0 89 0 11 
3 100 0 0 96 1 2 92 0 8 96 0 1+ 
U 100 0 0 Qk 5 8 50 50 0 - - -
5 100 0 0 dk 1 Ik 0 0 100 1+0 0 60 
6-7 100 0 0 63 f 27 - - - kk 11 1+5 
8-9 72 0 lit- 73 3 23 67 0 33 69 0 31 
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Table ih. Nimiber of leases and percent with one-year tenii by type of lease 
State Cash Crop--share Crop-• share-cash Livestock-share 
and i I0 io I0 
area ,Efo. 1-year Wo. 1-year No. 1-year No. 1-year 
Ind. 2b 1 0 59 68 52 69 120 53 
6 11 73 103 68 19 63 38 50 
la. la * 57 70 20 TO 133 73 71 53 
lb * 12 75 55 67 118 75 72 58 
2a * 21 57 36 78 210 65 52 56 
2b * 18 6l 5^ 78 205 67 61 1+9 
3a Ik 93 25 68 83 76 57 56 
3b * 10 80 27 78 72 83 50 ho 
* h3 79 16 87 1+8 79 109 h9 
5 * 80 26 65 86 69 76 h3 
6 * Bo 71+ 28 59 78 70 57 
Kan. 1 * 100 187 56 68 72 13 23 
2a * 1 0 157 52 11)+ 51 23 13 
2b * 5 100 118 58 118 62 14 21 
3a 6 50 ll+O 61 111 65 5 60 
3b 15 60 113 56 155 63 1I+ 57 k * 75 91 73 11+1+ 65 28 36 
5 * 3i^  94 59 68 125 62 23 57 
6 * 19 63 96 69 lito 78 56 50 
Ta * 19 90 82 77 92 87 12 58 
7b -X- 20 85 182 73 119 71 11 5^ 
Minn. 1-h 8it 70 130 55 61 67 23 52 
6 * 115 63 29 97 29 69 78 1+1 
7-8 71 59 65 66 133 5^  61 1+8 
Neb. 1 * 8i^  h2 56 75 81+ 73 21 • 1+8 
2 7 86 200 61 55 67 15 1+7 
3a * 11 73 93 76 112 83 2i+ 37 
3b 9 100 83 75 187 82 li+ 86 
1+ 8 87 121 68 11+2 73 22 59 
5 * - 10^ 4- 60 153 75 18 hh 
6 * ho 55 88 77 135 83 21 71 
7 * 10 80 62 76 13^ + 77 II+ i+3 
S.D. 1 35 37 66 52 27 56 22 50 
2a 5 60 76 68 lOlt 72 13 77 
2b 8 50 71 80 82 78 13 62 
3a 10 70 1+8 75 100 78 7 57 
3b 2 50 51 76 13^  81 8 87 
i+a 2 100 7^ 77 112 66 6 50 
ij-b 9 89 53 75 190 7I+ 19 71+ 
Wis. 1 121 Gk 6 83 3 67 18 50 
2ab 7^  76 15 80 9 78 131 57 
3 )-!-l 71 6 50 7 100 256 61 
* 125 78 6 83 5 100 10I+ 1+1 
5 "X" 83 1^ -0 75 50 9I+ 5^ 
6-7 100 56 7 86 3 33 85 i+2 
8-9 -Jh 10 60 5 100 151+ 1+7 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types * 
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Table 15. Percent distribution of one -year leases by type of lease 
State Crop-share- Livestock-
and area Cash Crop-share cash share 
Ind. 2b 0 28 26 
6 7 61^  11 17 
la. la 21 7 51 20 
lb 5 20 k9 23 
2a 6 13 65 !•'+ 
2b 5 16 6k 11+ 
3a 10 Ik 50 26 
3b * 7 19 55 18 
1+ * 2h 10 27 38 
5 * 26 11 ko 22 
6 36 11 28 2k 
Kan. 1 * 2 65 30 2 
2a 0 57 Ul 2 
2b 3 k6 if8 2 
3a 2 52 l|.l+ 2 
St 5 35 55 1.,, 
i+ * 2 38 5^  6 
5 * 20 2k if8 8 
6 6 31 51 13 
7a 10 38 k8 it 
7b 7 55 35 2 
Minn. 1-^ 4- 32 39 22 7 
6 * i^ 8 18 13 21 
7-8 23 23 39 15 
Neb. 1 23 27 39 6 
2 3 70 22 U 
3a U 39 51  ^ 5 
3b k 26 65 5 
3 ifO ll-O 6 
5 0 33 62 1+ 
6 10 31 51 7 
7 5 27 59 3 
S.D. 1 17 19 Ik 
2a 2 35 51 7 
2b 3 h2 1+7 6 
3a 5 28 60 3 
3b 1 25 69 it 
i+a 2 30 62 3 kl) k 19 68 7 
Wis. 1 80 5 2 9 
2ab 36 8 1+ k9 
3 15 1 3 80 
U * 62 3 3 27 
5 * 35 2k . 2 33 
6-7 5h 6 1 35 
8-9 32 5 1+ 58 
*On.e or more significmt differeaee in proportions when tested against 














































Percent distribution of leases by length of lease 
None 2 or 3 1+ or 5 
named 1 year years years Indefinite 
60 2 16 
1 6k 2 5 10 
67 6 7 2 
70 6 4 2 
65 5 9 6 
- 65 1+ 6 6 
- 70 7 6 
- 68 9 2 7 
* 65 7 6 3 
62 6 3 11 
69 5 5 
- 59 19 
- 1+8 5 2 29 
- 59 7 19 
- 62 3 5 li+ 
1+ 6o k 3 16 
3 65 8 3 12 
3 68 5 - 10 
2 69 3 U 13 
2 81 1 3 8 
- 72 2 5 13 
1 62 15 8 8 
3 61 16 7 7 
1 56 15 9 11 
1 59 15 8 2 
61 9 10 7 
- 76 2 6 3 
3 81 3 
2 70 T 1 6 
2 66 5 6 6 
1 76 8 3 1 
1 7^  3 5 
- 1+8 25 5 12 
71 9 2 13 
- 76 6 7 
- 75 8 2 10 
- 79 3 10 
69 7 6 12 
- 75 k 3 11 
58 Ik 8 5 
1 65 9 5 
1 63 11 3 6 
1 63 11 6 5 
1 62 7 7 5 
- 50 19 8 10 






























Percent distribution of leases by type of lease 
No. Crop- Crop-share- Livestock- Labor' 
leases Cash share cash share share 
275 27 20 52 
l86 6 62 11 21 -
297 20 ,7 1+8 21+ -
272 5 1^ 1+1+ 29 -
339 7 11 6k 17 -
3^ 2 5 ik 62 19 -
189 8 Ik i+5 33 -
167 6 17 1+5 31 -
221 19 7 22 51 1 
252 21 11 36 32 -
2I4-5 3^  11 25 29 -
31^  1 71 23 1+ -
- 56 36 8 . 
303 1 i+8 1+6 5 -
303 1 53 1+2 2 1 
352 1+ 39 50 6 -
31^  1 35 51 13 -
277 13 26 51 10 -
3^ +3 6 32 5^ 17 „ 
223 9 ho 1+5 6 -
361 6 53 35 5 -
329 26 5^ 20 9 -
275 U5 11 11 33 -
352 21 . 20 1+0 19 -
28U 31 22 31 9 -
362 2 73 18 5 -
269 U !+l 1+1+ 11 -
328 3 29 62 5 -
360 2 1+2 1+6 9 -
33i^  - 37 55 6 -
315 13 32 1+5 8 -
271 )+ 29 55 6 -
172 21 1+2 16 15 -
222 2 37 50 6 -
203 i+ 1+0 1+6 7 1 
183 6 31 55 1+ -
219 1 26 67 5 -
193 1 27 63 5 -
296 )+ 19 67 8 -
179 68 5 1 12 -
25U 31 7 3 51+ -
332 13 1 2 83 -
263 1+9 2 2 1+2 -
230 25 21 2 1+1+ -
227 i+7 3 1 1+1+ -
278 29 1+ 2 6k -
180 




Percent of cash leases 
with acres 
Percent crop-share leases 
with acres 
Under 50- 100 l80 260 Over Under 50 100 180 260 Ovei 
50 99 179 259 499 500 50 99 179 259 499 500 
2b * 100 20 3^  24 14 8 
6 * 6if 18 9 9 27 30 27 8 8 
la * 7 23 3^ 13 i4 10 20 60 5 5^ 
lb * 6 15 62 15 6 31 44 12 5 2 
2a * 25 63 4 8 11 36 39 3 11 
2b * 6 l6 39 33 6 11 50 33 2 4 
3a i^ 6 27 20 7 24 38 26 12 
3b * 10 30 10 30 10 10 11 52 33 4 
4 7 IT J+7 17 12 37 25 32 6 
5 * 19 52 21 8 19 44 30 7 
6 * 6 l6 52 19 7 32 32 18 11 7 
1 * 50 50 44 4 30 22 
2a * 100 9 45 8 30 8 
2b * 67 33 5 20 31 23 17 4 
3a * 17 33 50 6 34 39 7 l4 
3b * 12 50 32 6 7 29 46 9 7 2 
it. * 25 50 25 8 35 35 10 8 4 
5 * 10 10 32 3 21 24 22 30 35 8 5 
6 * 22 6 28 33 11 26 31 28 l4 1 
7a * 11 21 21 37 32 10 9 2 1 
7b * 5 28 57 10 - 29 33 28 4 4 2 
l_li* 13 29 7 6 1 9 25 35 7 17 7 
6 * 6 37 37 15 3 2 l6 48 26 10 
7-8* 2 24 i^ 8 19 7 4 45 36 9 6 
1 * 2 4 8 2 24 60 7 19 32 25 13 4 
2 * 12 12 25 50 2 12 35 8 29 i4 
3a * l8 9 64 9 10 29 43 10 6 2 
3b * 30 30 20 20 7 30 52 7 4 
i|, * 12 12 25 50 3 29 42 8 17 1 
5 * 3 38 35 16 8 
6 * 32 17 39 5 7 17 38 35 8 2 
7 * 31 46 8 15 15 45 33 4 3 
1 * 6 9 23 3 l4 45 2 9 51 4 22 12 
2a * 20 20 60 1 5 59 9 21 5 
2b 11 67 22 2 6 68 6 17 1 
3a * 11 i+5 11 11 22 4 6 56 6 24 4 
3b * 33 33 33 12 21 48 6 11 2 
Ua * 50 50 6 l4 62 6 12 
kh * 27 46 9 9 9 11 4i 34 9 5 
1 51 22 24 3 33 34 22 11 
2ab* 19 26 29 l6 10 35 35 24 6 
3 * 5 26 30 26 9 4 50 17 17 17 
k * 3^  37 20 6 2 1 83 17 
5 * 26 27 29 9 9 30 37 19 12 2 
6-7* kj i6 30 7 37 25 38 




Table l8 (Continued) 
State Percent crop-share-cash leases Percent livestock-share leaiei" 
and with acres with acres 
area Under 50 100 180 260 Over Under 50 100 180 260 Over 
50 99 179 259 1+99 500 50 99 179 259 1+99 500 
Ind. 2b * 6 22 31 11 30 1 13 38 27 20 1 
6 * 5 10 25 10 ' 5 23 36 10 26 5 
la. la * 13 56 20 11 3 1+7 17 33 
lb * 12 i)-6 26 15 1 5 1+1 28 26 
2a * 8 50 22 20 2 36 33 29 
2b * 1 12 1+9 23 15 5 1+1 27 27 
3a 16 1+6 20 18 5 27 36 21 11 
3b * 1 1+ 50 28 17 8 30 25 37 
1+ 15 53 19 11 2 1 8 5^ 30 15 1 
5 * 1 21 1+2 21+ 11 1 6 37 3^  22 1 
6 * 2 ll4- 51 26 7 12 39 31 18 
Kan. 1 * 38 0 27 35 36 61+ 
2a * 9 15 7 1+1 28 50 50 
2b * 1^ 3 17 32 8 8 33 59 
3a * il- 50 20 21 5 1+0 60 
3b * 10 13 38 20 18 1 27 11+ 27 32 
!(. * 2 8 53 11 22 1+ 2 15 8 39 36 
5 * 2 36 23 37 2 11 18 25 1+6 
6 * 7 15 3^ 16 19 35 21+ 35 6 
7a * h 12 1+1 25 16 2 21 15 21 36 7 
Tb * 1 21 1+5 15 15 3 6 35 1+7 12 
Minn. 1-1+* 2 22 25 1I+ 33 1+ 57 8 31 1+ 
6 * 15 55 11 15 1+ 10 51+ 22 13 1 
7-8* 1 5 52 21+ 17 1 1 1+1+ 33 16 6 
Neb. 1 * 1+ 21 1+ 29 1+2 5 21+ 71 
2 * 5 16 8 1+1+ 27 6 6 6 6 76 
3a * 10 31+ 16 31 9 2h 19 21+ 33 
3h * 12 1+7 23 ii+ 1+ 13 13 1+0 27 7 
h * 1+0 17 30 9 6 12 1+7 35 
5 * 1 13 1+7 20 18 1 21 21 53 5 
6 * 1 7 50 25 17 2I+ 28 36 12 
7 * 3 9 52 26 9 1 11 22 22 39 6 
S.D. 1 * 3 19 19 26 33 1+ 1+ 16 76 
2a * 2 35 5 37 21 11+ 29 57 
2b 1 5 31 12 1+0 11 7 3^ 50 
3a * 1 3 33 11 38 1I+ 12 38 50 
3b * 1 it 1+8 16 30 1 8 17 8 3i+ 33 
i^ -a * 1 3 38 21 3^  3 11 22 56 11 
kh * 1 11 51 17 19 1 8 8 1+2 31+ 8 
Wis. 1 67 33 5 15 60 10 10 
2ab* 11 22 22 1 12 1+5 23 18 1 
3 * 1+2 29 29 9 1+1+ 30 15 2 
1+ * 20 20 60 1 20 1+9 25 5 
5 * 50 25 25 1 17 1+9 26 6 1 
6-7* 33 67 3 25 55 12 5 
8-9* 17 50 33 2 21 I1.9 21 7 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
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TalDle 19- Percent male landlords by tjrpe of lease 
State 
and ' All Crop-share- Lirestock-
area leases Cash Crop-share cash share 
2b * 65 58 56 72 
6 72 73 71 68 7I+ 
la * T5 56 82 75 86 
lb *• 71 75 60 63 89 
2a 76 75 82 73 81 
2b * 67 56 66 62 88 
3a 7i^  53 77 70 82 
3b 73 78 67 69 81 
1^  72 67 80 72 72 
5 * 69 57 71 60 83 
5 * 72 6k 81+ 61 86 
1 * •Jk 50 81+ 1+3 50 
2 a * 78 8i+ 70 76 
2b 76 100 74 76 86 
3a •X- 63 75 55 71 100 
3b 73 50 76 69 85 
ii- 73 67 77 72 68 
5 * 72 65 67 71 96 
6 •x- 75 78 80 68 85 
7a 73 80 71+ 69 79 
7b 81 81 80 83 65 
1. 1-1^  76 66 81 75 71 
6 75 69 87 69 79 
7-8 79 87 75 75 82 
. 1 75 68 81 79 67 
2 76 50 76 79 71 
3a 78 60 75 81 92 
3b 7i^  80 73 72 100 
72 50 69 72 81 
5 76 » 80 71 89 
6 73 69 83 63 83 
7 * 69 56 71+ 61+ 91+ 
. 1 79 6k 80 75 87 
2a 77 67 79 76 57 
2b 78 100 76 77 86 
3a 78 50 87 76 100 
3b 82 100 81+ 80 92 
Ua 81 78 82 100 
kh 74 50 75 75 82 
. 1 71 67 56 100 76 
2ab * 81 71 75 100 89 
3 79 69 80 57 81 
k 7it 67 100 100 76 
5 74 71 76 75 . 78 
6-7 71 66 63 100 78 
8-9 75 68 61+ 100 78 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
percent for all leases. 
m 
Table 20. Percent written leases by type of lease 
State 
and 





Ind. 2b * 100 i+O 29 
6 * 18 13 37 1+6 
la. la 1+7 38 55 1+2 
lb * 38 ho 59 1+2 
2a * 33 32 60 1+1+ 
2b * 28 32 56 50 
3a * 33 55 1+6 
3b * 33 25 60 1+8 
k * 51 25 62 1+9 
5 kQ 29 kk 1+1 
6 * hi xh 63 50 
Kan. 1 * 100 2k 1+8 11+ 
2a - 13 23 15 
2b 9 17 7 
3a 50 10 19 20 
3b * 31 6 Ik 9 
* 25 13 2k 7 
5 * 50 10 21 39 
6 * 5 5 2k 1I+ 
Ta * 37 5 28 1I+ 
To * . 38 3 33 37 
Minn. 1-k * 46 25 34 3^  ^
6 * h3 16 k3 36 
T-8 * 50 25 kl 1+2 
Web. 1 * 6U 30 55 1+8 
2 * 50 36 55 18 
3a * 18 21 1+5 3k 
3b * 27 27 52 19 
¥r 38 16 38 31 
5 * - 2h 36 37 
6 * 56 39 61+ 1+2 
7 * 50 18 1+1 1+7 
S.D. 1 * 72 in 52 33 
2a * 80 28 37 29 
2b * 67 22 1+1 3^ 
3a * 80 19 1+1+ 38 
3b * 33 16 30 17 
il-a * 50 22 1+1 33 
1+b * 27 II+ 1+0 21 
Wis. 1 ho 33 33 1+5 
2ab kh 12 22 1+6 
3 50 20 29 1+6 
1+ * 36 17 • 50 
5 33 13 25 1+0 
6-7 * 51 - 33 1+6 
8-9 * 55 9 17 1+0 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
percent for all leases. 
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Table 21. Percent distribution of number of years rented this land by 
type of lease 
State Cash Crop-share Crop - share - cash Live sto ck- share 
and Number of years rented 
area 1 2-h p-9 10» 1 2-k 5-9 1 2-^  5-9 10«- 1 2i~k $-9 10» 
Ind. 2b 100 10 28 3^  28 1+ 25 31 1+0 12 29 25 31+ 
6 18 k6 9 27 9 30 29 32 10 - 5 25 60 5 1+5 37 13 
la. la * 5 32 30 33 II+ 57 19 10 11 30 3^  25 5 31 1+3 21 
lb •X- 0 31 31 38 16 36 23 25 13 29 32 26 15 35 1+0 10 
2a 20 38 38 18 26 1+0 16 9 29 38 21+ 10 33 1+1 16 
2b * 0 18 18 61+ 6 ko 28 26 10 27 32 31 9 1+0 1+0 11 
3a 13 20 27 1+0 8 50 23 19 18 3^  ^ 26 22 12 3i+ 3^  20 
3b 30 1+0 30 7 25 36 32 17 kl 30 12 13 39 25 23 
1+ * 19 33 31 17 25 38 31 6 1+ 1+1+ 1I+ 38 9 37 37 17 
5 * 2 25 h2 31 7 1+0 25 28 .3 27 38 32 17 33 28 22 
6 6 25 25 ii+ 29 25 32 5 37 3^ 15 17 22 39 22 
Kan. 1 * 100 31 28 1+1 1 1I+ 59 26 21 29 50 
2a * 100 1 17 37 1+5 29 35 36 1+6 50 k 
2b 20 8o 35 31 3^  ^ 23 i+3 3^ 50 29 21 
3a * 100 3^ 26 1+0 1 28 1+1+ 27 1+0 1+0 20 
3b 19 19 62 2 26 28 1+1+ 27 37 36 39 35 26 
U 50 25 25 1+1 3i+ 25 1+0 33 27 39 39 22 
5 * 53 15 32 1 39 1+0 20 30 1+0 30 57 32 11 
6 5 15 30 50 1 33 38 28 1 1+2 33 21+ 1+ 1+0 33 23 
7a 10 32 53 5 1 36 29 3^  1+ 33 i+5 18 21 i+3 36 
Tb * k6 21 33 1 1+8 31 20 3 29 1+0 28 38 50 12 
Minn. .1-!+ * 21 31 26 22 Ik 37 25 21+ 6 39 36 19 5^ 1+1 11+ 
6 * 12 33 26 29 13 37 37 13 13 30 1+0 17 7 1+8 26 19 
7-8 * 9 29 1+0 22 17 38 28 17 9 22 1+1+ 25 1+ 31 1+1+ 21 
Neb. 1 6 25 28 i+1 11 35 33 21 7 30 32 31 5 3^ 38 Ik 
2 111- ll+ 72 6 23 3^  37 9 19 36 36 6 18 i+1 35 
3a 18 73 9 10 32 35 23 16 33 25 26 7 50 36 7 
3b 28 36 36 i4 36 27 23 1I+ 36 35 15 12 38 25 25 
U 25 12 25 38 6 39 29 26 1+ 29 38 29 9 38 3^  19 
5 2 25 1+2 31 7 2I+ 32 37 39 56 5 
6 -x- 10 22 21+ 1+1+ 19 39 29 13 11 37 29 23 8 i+6 38 8 
7 8 23 15 51+ 11 3i^ - 36 19 i+ 28 35 33 6 33 50 11 
S.D. 1 * 9 20 17 5^ 6 1+1 32 21 1+ 55 26 15 8 1+6 38 8 
2a 20 1+0 1+0 6 37 33 2i+ 11 33 35 21 23 31 38 8 
2b 12 38 50 5 39 30 26 8 28 ko 21+ 1I+ 50 29 7 
3a 20 10 1+0 30 5 39 31 25 8 39 30 23 25 50 25 
3b * 33 33 3^  16 i+7 20 17 12 39 35 Ik 59 33 8 
Ua 50 50 k i+5 22 29 11 3^ + 36 19 1+1+ 1+5 11 
Ub 9 27 1+6 18 16 37 26 21 8 31 3i^ 27 12 33 38 17 
Wis. 1 19 Ul 30 10 h5 22 11 22 67 33 21 1+2 32 5 
2ab * 10 7^ 26 IT 25 75 11 78 11 16 33 35 16 
3 19 33 2l+ 21+ 20 60 20 29 ^3 1I+ li+ 10 1+0 32 18 
U 10 38 37 15 66 17 17 20 80 11+ 38 33 15 
5 * 21 26 3i+ 19 22 50 15 13 75 25 12 3^ 28 26 
6-7, 11 33 3^ + 22 12 25 38 25 67 33 8 38 32 22 
8-9 20 39 2k 17 9 36 37 18 1+0 1+0 20 11 28 36 25 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
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Table 22. Percent of leases with landlord sharing ownership of 





All types Cash Crop-share cash share 
2b * 3i^  0 9 13 56 
6 * 15 0 3 5 62 
la * 20 4 19 21 61 
lb * 30 8 9 17 68 
2 a * 27 13 22 18 72 
2b * 31 17 17 21 77 
3a * k2 8 23 28 76 
3h * 10 18 32 83 
U * 51 12 25 26 79 
5 * 35 10 26 Ik 75 
6 * 35 Ik 21 18 79 
1 •X- 7 - 6 - 50 
2a * ID - 9 3 52 
2b * 7 - - 5 71 
3a * 11 - 5 13 80 
3h * 19 20 10 18 70 
U -X- 19 - 7 17 59 
5 * 20 9 18 12 68 
6 * 28 33 18 19 67 
Ta * i4 - 3 18 62 
7b 13 6 11 15 26 
1-h * i6 5 12 11 79 
6 * 26 2 10 ik 67 
7-8 * 19 3 l6 15 50 
1 * l6 3 6 12 58 
2 12 - 12 27 
3a * 23 10 l6 19 69 
9k 3h * 17 - 15 12 
U * 18 - 13 12 69 
5 * 22 - li+ 20 89 
6 * Ik - 6 10 77 
7 * 22 8 11 i6 82 
1 * 19 6 12 9 52 
2a * Ik - 15 7 57 
2b * 13 - 11 8 50 
3a 7 - 10 2 25 
3h * 18 - 15 15 58 
Ua 13 - ik 12 22 
kh * 15 9 13 10 55 
1 * 19 5 38 33 76 
2ab * 36 9 7 25 57 
3 * 1^ 8 7 17 ll+ 56 
1+ * 37 . 5 17 - 77 
5 * 30 7 11 25 53 
6-7 * 1+0 10 13 - 75 








*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
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Table 23. Percent distribution of length of termination notices, by type of 
lease®' 
State Cash "" Crop-share C rop-share ^ cash liivestock-share 
and Number of months of notice 
area 1-U 5-8 9-12 1-1^  5-8 9-12 1-1+ '5-8 « 5-12 1-4 5-5 9-12 
Ind. 2b * 1+0 21 5 29 31+ 7 38 37 3 
6 25 0 13 1+7 12 12 1+7 20 13 52 23 3 
la. la * 17 36 11+ 38 k6 8 37 33 6 11 51 2 
lb * 29 29 0 31 31+ 6 50 38 2 27 1+5 ' 3 
2a * 31 23 8 32 27 0 21+ 1+2 9 27 1+7 10 
2b 36 27 0 3h 3k 3 30 1+1 6 18 57 5 
3a * hz lu Ik kk 6 0 51+ 25 3 1+2 38 2 
3b 60 0 0 i+l ik 0 57 31 0 51 36 0 
k 23 1+0 0 33 22 0 36 36 6 29 51+ 1 
5 50 36 3 23 0 0 1+0 1+2 5 36 51 2 
6 33 33 9 33 2k 0 35 39 1+ 35 27 9 
Kan. 1 0 0 0 53 17 6 1+5 9 7 25 0 0 
2a 100 0 0 k3 18 15 32 26 1I+ 25 10 20 
2b * 0 40 0 Ul 13 2 22 30 12 25 0 25 
3a 33 67 0 51 10 0 57 5 8 75 25 0 
3b lU 0 29 35 17 1 38 10 19 33 33 17 
k * 0 0 0 58 11 2 1+2 38 7 28 11 33 
5 * 35 10 29 38 3 18 1+1+ 23 11 1+0 7 1+7 
6 * 50 12 12 19 15 10 1+0 25 9 29 29 1I+ 
Ta * 33 0 0 12 3 3 55 22 1 25 12 25 
Tb 70 0 20 Uo 13 10 35 23 9 0 22 0 
Minn. 1-!+ * 33 7 8 22 7 10 1+2 2i+ 3 1+1+ 19 0 
6 38 16 7 31 12 12 1+2 33 8 51 16 8 
7-8 * 29 17 10 17 2k 5 15 27 1I+ 1I+ 1+8 2 
Neb. 1 16 ll-o 7 15 55 3 15 1+8 8 0 1+7 7 
2 ko ko 0 19 1+8 8 29 56 2 12 75 12 
3a 0 75 0 17 59 5 10 60 7 0 50 10 
3b * 0 67 0 20 28 9 13 56 1+ 20 30 0 
U 0 25 0 12 52 6 12 60 8 10 57 19 
5 0 0 0 17 33 11 15 38 21 0 1+0 10 
6 15 15 7 Ik l+O 9 16 51 1+ 31 1+6 8 
7 Ik k3 0 23 1+1+ 13 10 50 6 23 1+6 0 
S.D. 1 26 26 5 38 5 7 56 22 6 29 29 7 
2a 33 33 0 28 2 1+ 1+1+ 6 7 33 22 0 
2b 0 li^  49 0 5 37 9 9 31 31 8 
3a 33 17 0 in 23 0 51 15 2 29 11+ 0 
3b 0 50 0 50 8 1+ 1+2 22 2 33 67 0 
k& 0 0 0 35 12 8 1+5 22 3 0 33 33 
kb J+0 20 0 2k 20 12 30 31 8 27 36 9 
Wis. 1 28 8 20 50 0 0 67 0 0 53 7 7 
2ab 51 li^  27 9 9 38 12 0 61 ID 1 
3 1+5 29 10 20 0 20 50 0 0 37 1+7 1 
k * 10 7 50 0 0 0 0 0 71 6 1+ 
5 1^ 7 8 6 37 3 3 50 0 0 60 7 6 
6-7 39 7 11 75 0 0 0 0 0 51 23 5 
6-9 -3a_ 22 
—5— 12 25 „ Q l+O 0 0 52 29 3 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
-^Data excluded for notices over 1 year, instant, by agreement, and not in 
lease. 
1§7 
Table 2h. Percent distribution of age of renters by type of lease 
Cash leases Crop-share leases 
State Percent of renters, age Percent of renters, age 
and Under 25- 35- i+5- 55- 65 + Under 25- 35- 1+5- 55- 65^  
area 25 3^  1+1+ 5I+ 61+ 25 31+ kk 51+ 6k 
Ind. 2b * 3 20 ho 23 1I+ 0 
6 * 0 37 18 18 9 18 6 26 23 26 15 1+ 
la. la 0 35 37 18 10 0 1I+ 1+1 23 18 1+ 0 
lb 8 31 38 23 0 0 9 27 31 23 5 5 
2a * i+ 38 25 33 0 0 3 31^  29 23 8 3 
2b * 6 22 28 1+1+ 0 0 6 27 25 17 21 1+ 
3a 0 38 31 8 15 8 i+ 36 28 32 0 0 
3b 0 22 33 33 0 11 7 29 29 25 10 0 
U * 9 35 35 li+ 7 0 13 25 31 25 6 0 
5 * 0 36 38 18 8 0 0 18 18 1+6 18 0 
6 2 30 18 5 1 0 36 25 28 11 0 
Kan. 1 * 0 0 50 50 0 0 6 30 31^  19 10 1 
2a * 2 30 35 21 10 2 
2b * 0 0 1+0 20 1+0 0 8 3^  15 28 10 5 
3a * 0 0 50 0 50 0 3 28 3!^  17 13 5 
3b * 0 12 25 12 6 1+ 22 21 35 13 5 
1+ * 0 0 0 75 25 0 , 9 23 31 20 13 1+ 
5 * 0 9 56 18 1I+ 3 3 29 25 19 13 11 
6 * 0 1+0 15 25 0 20 5 22 1+1 17 12 3 
7a * 0 22 50 16 6 6 2 ll+ 21+ 1+2 11+ 1+ 
Tb 0 21 25 38 12 1+ 5 21+ 31+ 27 6 1+ 
Minn. l_i^  * 5 35 36 12 8 u 6 29 27 28 7 3 
6 * 4 36 29 18 10 3 0 21 29 21 25 1+ 
7-8 2 38 29 23 6 2 11 30 22 25 9 3 
Neb. 1 0 26 35 16 16 7 5 30 21 33 11 0 
2 0 12 0 25 50 12 3 29 1^ 3 1I+ 8 3 
3a * 0 18 55 18 0 9 2 26 35 23 13 1 
3b 0 27 37 9 18 9 11 23 29 21 1I+ 2 
U * 0 12 12 38 38 0 7 26 31 21+ 9 3 
5 7 37 26 22 6 2 
6 * 0 20 21+ 15 31^  7 1I+ 32 22 17 13 2 
7 * 0 23 38 23 8 8 1+ 29 23 26 12 6 
S.D. 1 * 0 11 23 35 20 11 3 32 33 21 10 1 
2a * 20 20 0 1+0 0 20 7 27 31 13 18 1+ 
2b * 0 33 11 11 33 11 11+ 2I+ 31 11 16 1+ 
3a * 0 10 60 10 10 10 5 33 39 11 7 5 
3b * 16 25 30 20 7 2 
Ua 0 0 50 50 0 0 10 32 28 20 10 0 
1+b 9 18 1+6 18 9 0 10 28 30 18 11 3 
Wis. 1 6 31 31+ 19 7 3 0 22 67 11 0 0 
2ab 3 38 29 21 9 0 0 31 38 12 12 6 
3 3 1+3 30 16 8 0 0 60 20 20 0 0 h * 5 31 31 18 10 5 0 50 0 50 0 0 
5 * T 13 1+5 20 10 5 0 22 26 31 17 1+ 
6-7 * 0 27 32 22 1I+ 5 0 12 12 50 25 0 
8-9 * 3 23 38 23 12 1 0 0 1+1+ 22 22 11 
I8g 
Table 2h (Continued) 
Crop-share-cash leases Livestock-share leases 
State Percent of renters, age Percent of renters, age 
and Under 25- 35- 1+5- 55- 65+ Under 25- 35- 1+5- 55- 65+ 
area 25 3^  U1+ 51+ 61+ 25 3^  1+1+ 5I+ 61+ 
Ind. 2b * 0 23 1+0 22 11 1+ 6 37 29 18 8 2 
6 * 5 5 U5 20 20 5 • 10 1+6 31 10 0 3 
la. la U 38 30 17 9 2 3 1+3 36 1I+ 3 1 
lb 5 35 30 18 9 3 6 1+9 33 8 1+ 0 
2a * 3 33 32 2I+ 7 - 0 66 21 10 3 0 
2b * 3 28 1+1 17 10 1 3 60 28 6 3 0 
3a 8 k6 23 18 5 0 3 1+9 35 10 3 0 
3b 7 3^ 38 16 5 0 8 37 29 15 11 0 
If * 2 35 33 17 11 2 ii+ 1+8 29 5 1+ 0 
5 * 2 29 1+1 18 6 i+ ' 1 55 2h 1I+ 5 1 
6 0 39 1+1+ 1I+ 3 D 6 1+7 29 li+ 3 1 
Kan. 1 * 0 37 28 6 29 0 0 36 29 7 21 7 
2a * 2 2h 30 29' 11 1+ 3 66 17 1I+ 0 0 
2b * 3 30 31 30 5 1 U 57 29 7 7 0 
3a * 7 25 1+6 10 8 h 0 50 50 0 0 0 
3h * 2 32 1+1 8 1I+ 3 0 61 18 13 1+ 1+ 
1+ * 1+ 21 1+1 19 1I+ 1 19 31 25 25 0 0 
5 * 0 32 33 21 11 3 11 51+ 1I+ 18 3 0 
6 * 1+ 33 29 22 9 3 18 39 26 11+ 3 0 
Ta * 2 30 30 22 13 3 T 21 21 i+3 7 0 
7b 5 26 3^ + 17 16 2 0 32 37 21 10 0 
Minn. 1-k * 3 1+6 25 20 5 1 11 58 27 1+ 0 0 
6 * 0 1+8 28 2I+ 0 0 7 1+7 39 1+ 2 1 
7-8 3 1+1 31 17 8 0 5 1+2 31 16 5 1 
Neb. 1 U 32 3^  II+ 11 5 0 1+2 1+6 8 1+ 0 
2 1 30 36 19 9 5 0 i+l 1+1 12 6 0 
3a * 6 32 33 16 13 0 1+ 50 29 17 0 0 
3b h 1+1 32 10 11 2 19 31 1+1+ 6 0 0 
1+ * 7 33 29 17 10 1+ 3 53 1+1+ 0 0 0 
5 5 25 38 23 8 1 0 53 37 5 0 5 
6 * 5 35 31 19 9 1 12 57 X5 12 0 1+ 
7 * 3 28 36 22 8 3 6 38 50 6 0 0 
S.D. 1 * 7 1+1 22 22 7 0 12 61+ 8 12 1+ 0 
2a * h 39 28 19 10 0 22 57 7 II+ 0 0 
2b * k 1^ 3 27 15 11 0 II+ 21 3^ 21 0 0 
3a * 5 26 19 12 1+ 0 72 1I+ II+ 0 0 
3b * 6 3^ 31 II+ 1+ 2 17 1+2 33 8 0 0 
Ua 6 37 26 21 8 2 12 50 38 0 0 0 
kl) * 3 35 30 18 10 i+ 0 63 21 1+ 8 i+ 
Wis. 1 0 67 33 0 0 0 5 66 19 5 0 5 
2ab 0 1+5 22 33 0 0 9 1+2 33 10 1+ 2 
3 0 3^ U3 li+ 0 0 6 1+3 30 15 6 -
1+ * 0 25 50 0 25 0 12 1+2 33 10 3 0 
5 * 0 0 25 25 25 25 8 1+9 20 15 8 0 
6-7 * 0 0 67 33 0 0 6 1+7 3^  10 2 1 
8-9 * G 33 33 17 0 17 5 39 3^  II+ 7 1 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease types. 
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Table 25. Percent distribution of age of renters by number of years 
rented this land 
Tracts rented 'Z'-k ye'ars' 




Tracts rented 1 year 
Under 25- 35- 45- 55- 65 + Under 25- 35- ii-5- 55- 65f 
25 3i^  44 54 64 25 34 44 54 64 
2b * 15 i^ 3 15 15 12 0 9 55 22 12 2 
6 * 31 38 19 12 9 4o 28 16 5 2 
la * k 56 16 24 7 58 27 7 1 
lb * Ik U6 20 l4 6 9 54 21 11 4 1 
2a * 3 55 21 18 3 9 58 21 11 1 
2b * 3 1+7 30 7 10 3 10 55 22 9 2 2 
3a 16 52 32 8 55 18 17 2 
3b * 0 U8 26 22 4 17 37 25 13 8 
k * 32 32 24 4 8 15 54 22 4 4 1 
5 * 5 65 20 5 5 3 51 25 15 6 
6 * 13 h6 33 8 5 55 27 12 1 
1 * 100 10 38 35 14 2 1 
2a * 100 5 48 22 20 5 
2b * 16 4l 21 15 5 2 
3a * 100 14 4o 35 2 8 1 
3t * 100 7 43 28 12 10 
k * 14 26 38 12 10 
5 * 100 6 i^ 3 32 10 4 5 . 
6 * i}.0 20 20 20 16 37 26 18 3 
7a * 57 29 14 3 30 27 29 10 1 
7b' * Uo 4o 20 6 28 36 28 2 
1-U* 8 39 31 8 8 6 12 46 23 12 5 2 
6 * 10 49 17 21 3 7 49 31 7 4 2 
7-8* 17 1+0 23 17 3 10 50 25 11 2 2 
1 * 13 52 17 9 9 4 51 17 20 7 1 
2 * 18 61 13 4 4 5 32 45 11 7 
3a * 12 27 34 18 9 7 36 33 16 8 
3l3 * 17 ki 19 14 7 2 11 43 25 10 10 1 
U * 10 38 28 19 5 13 46 26 13 2 
5 * 33 il0 20 7 12 53 21 13 1 
6 * lit- hi 20 20 5 13 42 24 10 11 
7 * 18 23 23 18 18 10 4o 28 13 7 2 
1 * 17 50 17 8 8 4 49 18 22 7 
2a * 14 l4 l4 l4 14 45 25 8 7 1 
2b * 29 29 29 13 16 49 22 9 3 1 
3a * 6 Gh 18 12 10 4o 39 7 4 
313 * 22 37 30 11 13 52 19 14 2 
ka * 18 hi 18 23 11 52 21 13 3 
kh * 13 37 37 3 7 3 7 45 31 12 4 1 
1 * 10 53 30 7 10 39 31 12 4 4 
2ab* ll; U7 31 8 6 44 29 l4 6 1 
3 * 8 k9 30 8 5 10 53 23 11 3 
h * 2h 50 13 10 3 i4 47 26 7 3 3 
5 * 12 41 20 18 6 3 12 36 26 16 7 3 
6-7* 12 47 29 6 6 6 47 31 12 1 3 












Tracts rented 5-9 yea^ rs 







Tracts rented 10 or more years 
Percent of renters^  age 
Under 25-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 26. Percent written leases and one-year leases by mimber of years 
rented this land 
State Number years rented Nianber years i rented 
and 1 2-h 5-9 10+ 1 2-1+ 5-9 104 
area '^ 0 written fo one-year leases 
Ind. 2b * 29 19 20 52 67 58 58 
6 * 63 27 17 Ik * 69 68 73 52 
la. la * 8U 55 33 72 65 68 66 
lb * 59 61 45 26 76 76 61+ 61+ 
2a * 76 62 50 3U 82 66 63 58 
2b * 83 58 45 36 73 72 61+ 56 
3a * 77 U7 3^  ^ 29 81 76 60 65 
3b * 67 56 3^ 28 65 70 75 57 
k * 8U 58 1+2 35 * 81+ 66 62 53 
5 * 75 l^ •6 26 68 60 60 66 
6 * 58 59 1+6 32 83 73 67 61 
Kan. 1 * 39 1+0 15 * 50 63 68 1+6 
2a 21 16 20 52 1+1 50 
2b * 2h 8 8 * 1+7 73 57 
3a * 18 20 6 * 100 61 71 53 
3b * 19 12 6 61 59 62 
k * 22 19 9 * 79 i+5 67 
5 * 33 18 19 * 70 75 58 
6 * 60 22 11 9 * 80 79 58 6k 
7a * Ik 29 ll+ 12" 100 79 86 73 
Tb * ho 19 21 8 * 20 81 66 68 
Minn. 1-4 * kk 38 29 22 67 61 62 60 
6 * 59 35 22 * 82 59 55 61 
7-8 * 68 i+7 39 33 * 76 55 56 1+9 
Neb. 1 * 57 51+ 50, 1+1+ * 77 63 63 1+6 
2 * 65 1+9 3^ 23 * 50 78 59 55 
3a * 6U 39 26 20 77 80 73 70 
3b * 70 1+9 28 83 85 81 71 
U 33 31 30 21+ * 95 78 59 68 
5 * 73 37 36 15 79 65 61 71 
6 * 80 55 1+2 1+6 * 100 83 67 60 
7 * 65 37 3^  ^ 29 81 75 71+ 70 
S .D. 1 75 1+7 38 58 33 52 kk 1+9 
2a * 62 28 29 31 86 75 65 61+ 
2b * h3 i+5 31 21 77 82 76 67 
3a * 82 1+0 29 27 * 76 78 81+ 59 
3b * l|8 21+ 20 22 * 75 82 85 62 
Ua * 65 39 32 21+ 82 61 67 79 
Ub * h3 1+0 3U 2D * 73 81+ 73 70 
Wis, 1 * 56 1+2 28 26 65 53 •58 61 
2ab * 53 1+9 32 25 * 78 68 61+ 1+1+ 
3 * T6 51+ 39 19 76 66 62 52 
1+ 53 1+0 1+0 33 67 61+ 62 61 
5 * 50 33 21+ 16 72 •65 63 50 
6-7 * 75 59 43 16 63 45 1+9 - 56 
8-9 * 59 54 1+1+ 15 66 51 1+6 1+7 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between classes. 
in 
Table 27. Percent written leases by sex of landlord and by selected 
practices in sharing 
State 
and 
All leases Landlord 
Ivlale Female 
Does landlord share 




Yes No Yes No 
Ind. 2b 2h 27 17 28 20 * 33 20 21+ 100 
6 23 2h 17 * h6 17 * 1+8 19 23 20 
la. la * 60 hi 51 1+2 52 51 38 
lb k9 kQ 50 hi 52 i+3 51 1+9 42 
2a 52 50 58 h6 5h h6 55 53 40 
2b 50 U7 53 51 50 50 50 50 36 
3a 3^ k2 h6 h2 hi 1+1+ 1+1+ 17 
3b 1^ 9 i+7 5U hd h9 h9 1+8 51 
U 51 53 hh h9 52 hi 56 51 48 
5 h2 UO h3 hi h3 h9 37 42 37 
6 kQ 1^ 6 52 50 hi h3 50 50 36 
Kan. 1 30 * 2h h6 24 32 11 32 38 27 
2a 17 * 21 6 15 16 19 17 1I+ 18 
2b 13 11 16 7 13 16 16 12 
3a li^  * 8 21 11 15 7 16  ^18 6 
3b 11 10 0 7 10 11 12 * 13 1 
U 18 15 20 7 21 7 18 16 20 
5 23 21 17 38 22 17 27 22 39 
6 15 12 17 Ih 16 9 18 16 4 
Ta 18 16 IT 13 20 ih 22 19 20 
Tb 18 17 16 * 1+3 16 21 18 * 16 34 
Minn. 1-k 33 29 37 31 33 35 33 32 35 
6 38 * ho 25 36 39 30 1+1 37 39 
7-8 k2 !+l 39 it-0 h3 35 1+1+ 43 40 
Neb. 1 50 1^ 7 h6 hi 52 i^ 3 50 52 52 
2 39 37 39 26 14-0 1+9 1+0 42 38 
3a 33 35 29 37 33 36 33 34 33 
3b h2 39 in 25 h3 36 1+1+ 4i 46 
28 31 19 32 28 32 27 * 34 18 
5 31 29 33 28 31 33 32 33 ,27 
6 53 U7 52 39 54 55 53 53 59 
7 35 32 36 hd 33 1+2 35 * 4i 20 
S.D. 1 k9 h6 3^  h2 52 * 32 55 * 4l 57 
2 a 33 31 35 22 35 * 1I+ 33 20 33 
2b 3^  31 3^  h2 3h 29 35 30 35 
3a 38 33 32 36 38 1+2 37 * 63 35 
3b 25 23 35 11+ 26 18 28 35 25 
Ua 36 37 23 35 36 30 37 30 39 
iib 33 3^  3^  27 35 27 3i^  26 35 
Wis. 1 39 38 35 52 37 50 38 * 50 33 
2ab i+l 3^ 30 h5 37 i+2 1+2 42 39 
3 k6 * 1+7 33 h6 U5 i^ 5 1+7 47 25 
U ho 37 hh * i+9 33 1+6 37 * 50 29 
5 30 33 20 * 38 2h * 1+9 23 34' 25 
6-7 i^ 3 h5 i^ 5 hi 1+8 i+5 44 49 
8-9 k2 * 1+5 29 39 hi 1+0 1+5 4o 50 
*Significant difference between proportions. 
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1 year 2-3 years 4-5 years Indefinite other 
Ind. 2b X- 35 60 70 3 14 
6 2^ + 75 75 - 19 
I a • la * 53 88 65 17 27 
lb * 53 93 82 - 28 
2a * 56 9h 87 21 31 
2b * 5^  83 90 24 31 
5a * 48 86 83 - 17 
3h 51 64 67 27 3^ 
U * 52 9U 75 - 33 
5 * 1+7 93 57 12 39 
6 5^  83 64 17 18 
Kan. 1 * 37 73 92 16 24 
2a * 29 57 29 1 6 
2b * 11 44 78 4 -
3a * 19 67 42 3 -
3h * 12 50 44 2 13 
U * 2k 4l 13 - 16 
5 -jf 32 38 - 13 r-0 
6 * 18 56 36 5 -
7a -:<• 20 - 50 13 18 
7b *• 18 88 50 i4 -
Minn. 1-1^  * 30 80 59 - 18 
6 * 37 74 83 12 7 
7-8 * 1^ 1+ 86 59 12 12 
Neb. 1 * )+U 85 89 14 37 
2 * h9 81^  81 5 23 
3a * 37 80 73 - 23 
Sh * it8 100 67 - 7 
k * 3^ + 86 50 12 15 
5 * 36 92 75 6 15 
6 * 59 95 100 - 9 
7 * 39 50 89 - 4l 
S.D. 1 * 85 56 21 47 
2a * 36 72 50 4 36 
2b * 36 91 86 15 17 
3a * 37 93 100 - 38 
3h 26 86 67 10 29 
ij-a * 37 71 90 16 18 
i^ -b •if 31+ 91 89 4 4o 
Wis, 1 33 75 69 11 32 
2ab * ki 95 85 ' 11 21 
3 * kj 79 82 28 37 
1+ * ho 78 56 17 • 26 
5 32 67 64 - 20 
6-7 * 39 84 81 30 31 
8-9 * 40 93 75 25 18 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between lease lengths. 
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Table 29. Percent distribution of length of termination notices, written 
and oral leases 

















2b 5 75 9 9 2 12 63 6 7 10 
6 * 89 11 24 53 9 9 5 
la * 3 62 20 15 Ik 55 7 2I+ 
lb * 5 7U 17 k 10 61 9 20 
2a * 8 66 19 7 15 39 18 28 
2b * 5 67 18 10 12 56 10 22 
3a * 6 86 6 2 19 1+6 17 18 
3b * 3 88 6 3 23 61 5 11 
U * 7 58 29 1 5 13 51+ 11 22 
5 * 3 91 6 21 56 12 11 
6 * 5 71 15 1 8 17 1^ 3 15 25 
1 * 23 57 9 11 2 67 6 3 22 
2a * 2 70 28 12 52 1I+ 3 19 
2b * 17 76 7 20 1+7 9 2k 
3a * 2h 61+ 6 6 9 61+ 3 1 23 
3b * 3 67 17 13 22 1+5 13 1 19 
9 76 12 3 12 61 16 1 10 
5 17 58 21 k 17 50 22 11 
6 * 75 11 3 11 23 1+6 II+ 1 16 
Ta * lii- 73 3 10 25 1+8 6 21 
Tb 17 55 22 3 3 25 51 10 1I+ 
1-lf * 25 58 7 6 37 33 7 6 17 
6 * Ih 71+ 8 1 3 22 1+8 10 1+ 16 
7-8 * 16 57 11 5 11 30 32 15 6 17 
1 19 60 7 lit 13 66 i+ 1 16 
2 22 69 6 1 2 15 73 8 1+ 
3a * 21 68 7 H 20 70 9 1 
3b 21 62 10 7 25 60 3 12 
10 68 13 1 8 15 60 12 13 
5 * 11 59 26 k 27 30 27 2 li+ 
6 33 3k 8 2 3 22 59 12 1 6 
7 # 6 78 8 2 6 10 1+9 12 2 27 
1 31 it9 8 6 6 25 53 12 2 8 
2a * 29 63 6 2 9^ 31 6 11+ 
2b 31 57 10 2 1+8 1+1 8 3 
3a 2k 61 2 9 h 2k 66 2 8 
3b 19 69 9 3 27 58 1+ 1 10 
23 75 2 Ul 1+1+ 9 6 
1+b # 18 67 8 7 22 1+9 12 17 
1 * 17 60 15 & 1+9 28 16 7 
2ab * Ik 82 2 2 1+1+ 1+7 2 3 1+ 
3 * 8 83 7 1 1 21 71 1+ 1+ 
* 11 82 6 1 36 1+6 1+ 1 13-
5 * 19 73 6 2 1+8 1+1+ 5 3 
6-7 * 23 69 7 1 39 1+9 9 3 
8-9 * 9 60 5 1 5 27 59 7 3 1+ 
*Gne or more significant difference in proportions between written and 
oral leases. 
m 
Table 30. Percent written leases, percent one-year leases and percent 
of leases with cash rental for buildings, renters dealing with landlord 
and those dealing with agent. 
State With landlord With agent 
and Written One-year Cash bldg. Written One-year Cash bldg, 
area leases leases rental leases leases rental 
Ind. 2b * 21 58 3 52 81 
6 * 21 63 6 83 80 
la. la * 5^ 66 5 88 75 10 
lb * * 67 7 78 82 1+ 
2a * k9 * 62 5 76 79 13 
2b * h6 65 6 79 65 18 
3a * ho * 67 3 78 100 
3b * hh 66 7 76 76 23 
1+ * hi 65 7 69 62 10 
5 * 39 61 5 70 78 
6 * hh 69 6 70 73 
Kan. 1 * 25 58 5 71 66 8 
2a * 1'+ 1+6 17 31 61 6 
2b * 11 * 56 12 28 86 17 
3a * 12 61 32 30 61+ 30 
3b * 9 * 57 20 27 77 15 
4 19 62 7 12 78 6 
5 * 20 67 7 1+2 69 12 
6 * 11 * 66 12 1+6 89 8 
Ta * l6 81 37 1+1+ 80 18 
7b •X- 17 73 1+5 28 65 38 
Minn. 1-h * 28 59 5 65 73 11 
6 * 37 61 3 1+1+ 65 
7-8 * Uo 56 1+ 65 56 9 
Web. 1 * h6 61 8 82 1+1+ 
2 * 33 * 58 5 71 79 5 
3a * 31 75 22 50 71+ 17 
3b * 39 80 23 70 79 33 
U * 2h 68 11 56 80 11 
5 * 26 65 21 55 81 19 
6 ,*  U6 77 13 87 76 22 
7 * 27 * 71 * 9 73 88 53 
S.D. 1 * h2 50 1+ 92 30 
2 * 2h 72 ih 7I+ 66 5 
2b * 27 78 Ih 69 71 
3a •X- 32 76 9 67 71 17 
3b 25 81 20 h3 67 50 
ha, * 31 67 19 73 72 21 
Ub * 31 7I+ 12 58 83 30 
Wis. 1 37 56 71 86 
2ab hi 6h 9 50 60 
3 1+6 63 57 67 
39 61 63 75 
5 29 61 11 50 61+ 
6-7 1+1+ •'s- 48 63 76 
8-q * 1+0 51 9 72 53 
*Significant difference in proportions between groups. 
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Table 31. Percent distribution of types of leases by relation of landlord 
Non-relative ~ Parent "" 
State No. fo with type lease °jo with type lease 
and leases Cash Crop- Crop- Live- leases Cash Crop- Crop- Live-
area share share- stock share share- stock 
cash cash 
Ind. 2b * 170 - 30 25 i+5 5« - 19 9 71 
6 122 1+ 66 10 20 18 - 55 6 39 
la. la * 151 13 7 60 19 78 31 6 23 38 
1+9 lb * 163 2 21 51+ 21 57 5 19 23 
2a * 208 3 13 76 8 73 18 5 3^ + Uo 
2b * 198 1+ 1I+ 68 11+ 76 8 12 i+5 35 
3a 110 6 15 52 27 35 11 3 3i^  51 
3b * iii^  k 20 51 25 26 12 12 19 51+ 
* 119 19 10 30 1+0 59 15 - 3 81 
5 * 125 19 II+ 1+1 26 75 20 7 23 1+9 
6 * 119 27 II+ 31 28 83 36 5 17 Uo 
Kan. 1 * 205 1 71 25 2 1+2 - 79 2 19 
2a * 153 - 58 1+2 - 63 - 35 37 28 
2b * 113 1 51+ i+3 2 63 6 33 1+1+ li+ 
3a 162 2 53 1+1 2 52 - 54 1+0 k 
3b * l8i+ 2 1+1+ 52 2 88 6 2I+ 52 17 
* 180 2 38 55 5 53 - 15 1+3 1+2 
5 * li^ o 16 34 1+1+ 6 1+8 8 17 50 23 
6 * 187 5 1+0 1+1+ 11 63 11 6 1+6 37 
Ta * 11+8 7 1+9 i+3 1 20 5 20 35 1+0 
7b * 249 5 51+ 35 5 34 12 29 kh 15 
Minn. I'k * 187 28 1+9 20 2 65 25 35 1I+ 26 
6 * 119 kh 16 16 2h 83 1+0 2 6 52 
7-8 * 181 22 21 1+6 11 9I+ 19 17 30 34 
Neb. 1 * 158 31 27 35 1+ 61 23 10 21 26 
2 * 220 1 75 20 1 63 2 68 10 17 
3a * 163 6 37 51 6 1+7 U 1+7 31^  15 
3b * 181 2 31 65 2 71 6 20 58 1I+ 
h * 195 2 37 56 I4. 96 - kk 35 21 
5 * 173 34 62 3 92 - 39 1+6 11 
6 * 189 13 36 1+1+ 6 65 15 20 43 18 
T * 155 3 32 58 3 65 5 26 1+5 15 
S.D. 1 * 110 2i+ 1+6 20 6 25 8 32 1+ 36 
2a * 139 1 i^ O 52 1+ 31 3 1+2 26 16 
2b 119 1 i+3 1+8 8 33 - 33 52 9 
3a * 116 2 30 62 14. 29 3 i^ 5 38 3 
3b * 123 2 32 61+ 2 1+3 - 19 60 19 
i+a 133 1 21+ TO 1+ 29 _ 31 55 7 
l^ b * 181+ 3 16 72 7 62 8 23 52 15 
Wis. 1 * 103 82 7 3 3 38 1+2 5 - 34 
2ab 128 30 11 5 53 79 29 1 61 
3 163 12 3 3 82 110 15 - 1 •85 
li. * 116 62 5 2 28 96 31 2 63 
5 * 10i+ 28 29 1+ 37 75 17 5 - 68 
6-7 * 96 57 T 3 32 85 34 - - 56 
8-9 * li+8 35 6 3 51+ 93 16 - - 83 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
in 
Table 32. Percent of full tenants and part-owners by relation of landlord 
" Won-relative Parent 
State Full tenants Part-owners Full tenants Fart-owners 









Ind. 2b : 35 33 15 16 kl 26 19 14 
6 19 25 20 36 22 33 22 22 
la. la 6k 2k 8 k 63 22 10 5 
lb 56 22 lU 8 53 26 16 5 
2a 66 16 13 5 7U ll^ - 11 1 
2b 60 23 10 7 52 33 8 7 
3a 62 22 12 1+ 68 17 6 9 
3b 53 18 19 10 k2 19 35 4 
U * 61 19 13 7 79 17 2 2 , 
5 58 18 11 13 59 27 9 5 
6 63 17 13 7 69 Ik 16 1 
Kan. 1 * 7 25 5 63 19 10 7 64 
2a 10 36 8 k6 17 37 9 37 
2b 10 3^ 13 3k 6 43 11 4o 
3a 10 36 Ik 39 21 25 19 35 
313 * 11 3^  13 k2 2k 1+7 9 20 
U * 12 35 10 k3 23 i+5 17 15 
5 16 31 15 38 21 23 12 44 
6 22 3^  ik 30 lit Ul 1I+ 30 
7a * IT 27 18 38 - 25 35 
7b * 10 3^ 10 U6 18 12 23 47 
Minn. 1-14- * 22 10 3^  3^  45 23 18 14 
6 * 5^ 18 22 14 55 28 l4 2 
7-8 * 50 21 22 7 66 20 7 6 
16 Neb. 1 39 27 18 16 k6 21 16 
2 * 30 26 10 33 38 28 24 10 
3a 3^  26 17 23 3^  ^ 19 21 26 
3b * Uo 27 21 12 U9 35 13 3 
* 26 33 16 25 38 38 13 11 
5 31 10 Ik 33 39 19 9 
6 * 35 32 15 17 k9 26 15 9 
7 * 3^ 21 16 20 kS 31 ik 9 
S.D. 1 * 23 16 29 32 I4.l1 12 28 16 
2a 2k 18 19 39 29 25 23 23 
2b 28 2k 19 29 39 2k 9 27 
3a 28 2k 18 29 31 2k 21 24 
3b * 3^  31 17 18 k2 30 26 2 
ka 5^ 21 21 13 k6 21 29 4 
1+b 56 26 11 7 53 26 15 6 
Wis. 1 * 20 3 1+8 29 52 11 26 11 
2ab 68 6 19 7 67 13 16 4 
3 85 7 7 1 80 12 7 1 
1+ * 38 9 ko 13 73 5 19 3 
5 * 38 12 31 19 57 12 28 3 
6-7 * 1^ 5 8 28 19 76 12 7 5 
8-9 * 61 12 1I+ 12 68 21 8 3 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Table 33* Percent distribution of size of tracts rented by relation of 
landlord 
State 
and Under 100- 180- 260- 500 Under 100- 180- 260- 500 
area 100 179 259 i^ 99 + 100 179 259 i+99 + 
Ind. 2b 27 29 22 21 1 SI 1+1 21 17 
6 * 27 11 li+ 1 33 1+9 6 6 6 
la. la Ik 1+8 19 19 0 10 56 17 17 
lb * li4- 1+0 25 20 1 13 63 12 12 
2a 11 1+8 17 23 1 6 51 21 22 
2b 17 1+1 21+ 17 1 13 51+ 19 II+ 
3a * 23 36 18 18 5 11 3^  1+6 9 
3b * 17 1^ 3 23 17 19 19 23 35 
1+ 17 U6 25 10 2 12 3^ 28 17 
5 * 30 32 23 15 10 1+7 31 11 1 
6 * 22 1+6 19 13 20 38 35 7 
Kan. 1 1+5 1+ 29 22 1+0 26 31+ 
2a * 10 39 39 12 12 5 1+2 1+1 
2b * 19 39 10 28 1+ 5 16 34 23 22 
3a * 25 1+6 12 1I+ 3 13 1+2 16 27 2 
313 * 38 38 13 9 2 7 3^ 27 12 11 
U * 2k 1+0 11 18 7 1+ 1^ 3 12 20 21 
5 * 20 35 16 20 9 10 10 23 kk 13 
6 * 33 37 15 Ik 1 11 31+ 32 19 1+ 
Ta * 5k 2k II+ 7 1 35 20 15 30 
7b * k2 1+2 6 7 3 22 26 23 29 
Minn. 1-1+ * ko 33 7 16 k 18 3^  ^ 16 30 2 
6 * 3^ + 1I+ 8 1 15 20 10 1 
7-8 * 22 1+7 15 15 1 7 51 30 11 1 
Neb. 1 * 13 17 9 23 38 6 10 1+ 27 53 
2 * 11+ 29 7 36 Ik 10 18 2 28 1+2 
3a 25 3^  Ik 20 7 13 3i+ 19 28 6 
3b 21+ 1+1+ 18 11 3 13 51 19 10 7 
k 15 l^ •3 10 26 6 12 30 19 25 Ik 
5 25 1+1 16 17 1 10 1+6 21+ 18 2 
6 * 33 1+1 12 12 2 10 1+6 21+ 20 
T * 31 1+2 16 10 1 13 39 33 13 2 
S.D. 1 * 11 31+ 6 20 29 8 12 21 59 
2a * 2 1+8 1+ 28 18 13 13 1+0 3^  
2b * 3 53 6 28 10 3 22 12 1+1 22 
3a 6 3^ 5 35 11 28 17 1+8 7 
3b ll+ 50 11 23 7 35 Ik 35 9 
ka. 9 1+5 17 26 3 1+ 36 21 32 7 
kh 17 1^ 3 18 20 2 16 1+2 23 19 
Wis. 1 * 76 23 ,1 1+7 1+7 6 
2ab 33 32 21 II+ 23 1^ 3 16 15 3 
3 13 1+2 26 15 k 12 >5 29 12 2 
1+ * 60 29 7 3 1 32 1+3 21 1+ 
5 * i+7 35 13 U 1 25 38 27 9 1 
6-7 * 61+ 32 3 1 33 53 13 1 
8-9 35 39 18 8 33 3^ 20 A 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
in 
Table 3^ - Percent comparison of selected characteristics of leases by 
relation of landlord 
Non-relative Parent 
State Deal Written 1-6 One- Deal Written 1-6 One-
and with leases mos. year with leases mos. year 
area landlord notice leases landlord notice leases 
Ind. 2b * 86 * 33 * 73 * 70 98 5 50 35 
6 96 * 32 * 66 * 70 100 6 1+0 i+3 
la. la * 88 •X- 61+ * 61 * 71+ 97 29 1+lf 
lb * 80 * 59 * 7I+ * 72 98 33 55 59 
2a * 76 * 61+ 57 * 69 100 25 53 1+7 
2b * 82 * 62 60 68 99 22 61 1+7 
3a 87 * 56 * 75 T7 91+ 26 1+5 67 
3b 82 * 58 79 * 76 100 12 60 36 
* 83 * 67 56 * 75 100 22 1+2 i+9 
5 * 85 * 52 79 61+ 99 2k 66 57 
6 87 * 67 61 * T5 91+ 22 51+ 60 
Kan. 1 95 * 32 66 * 66 100 5 61+ 32 
2a 9h * 27 * 69 * 56 98 • 11 • 2I+ 19 
2b * 91 22 * 63 61 100 11 39 1+6 
3a 91 * 20 * 67 * 69 91+ 0 1+2 1+1+ 
313 9 k * 13 * 50 60 98 3 33 52 
4 95 * 25 * 66 * 68 100 8 1+6 52 
5 91 * 28 53 79 100 2 53 68 
6 * 92 * 18 * 55 * 71+ 100 0 29 61 
7a 95 20 * 63 * 89 100 5 11 60 
7b 93 19 1+8 * 77 100 18 57 32 
Minn. 1-1+ * 91 35 1+0 * 67 100 25 35 1+2 
6 95 * 50 * 68 * 70 100 21+ 38 1+7 
7-8 * 88 * 51 * 1+6 61 99 25 29 1+9 
Neb. 1 * 92 * 56 65 * 68 100 31+ 52 1+6 
2 * 85 * 1+6 76 * 67 100 2I+ 67 i+l+ 
3a 89 * 1+2 * 72 * 80 96 9 52 58 
3b * 87 * 1+9 67 83 100 31 56 80 
k * 81+ * 31+ * 67 * 81 99 19 56 1+5 
5 * 82 * 37 * 1+2 * 80 100 2I+ 28 1+1+ 
6 * 86 * 62 56 76 100 28 52 76 
7 * 77 38 * 61+ 80 98 3I+ 1+7 59 
S.D. 1 81+ * 56 * 51 52 100 2k 36 38 
2a * 77 * 1+7 * 53 71 100 3 11+ 68 
2b * 81+ * 1^+ 1+7 * 80 100 6 55 52 
3a 88 * 1+8 61 78 100 0 67 62 
3b 92 * 36 * 66 83 100 5 1+6 75 
1+a * 81+ * 1+2 60 * 75 100 2i+ 50 5^ 
ht * 86 * 1+6 57 77 100 13 1+5 66 
Wis. 1 93 1+1 * 39 * 66 100 1+9 63 1+1 
2ab 96 * 51 * 73 * 71+ 100 28 1+6 1+1+ 
3 * 93 * 60 * 81 * 68 100 25 72 55 
k * 90 * 1+6 * 69 * 77 100 33 56 3^ 
5 98 * 39 * 61+ * 73 100 25 1+9 1+1 
6-7 9h * 60 * 67 51+ 99 29 52 1+1+ 
8-9 * 93 * 56 71+ * 57 98 21 70 3^  
Table 3^ (Continued) 
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Non-relative Parent 
State Share Share Share Share Share Share 
and livestock cash machinery livestock cash machi: 
area expense expense 
Ind. 2b * i+5 100 * 29 72 100 1+8 
6 * 20 96 15 39 100 33 
la. la * 20 * 91 * 25 itO 80 1+0 
lb * 22 97 -x- 25 53 95 1+9 
2a * 8 95 * 18 k2 92 1+9 
2b * ll+ 98 * 2k 36 93 50 
3a * 27 99 * 33 51 97 66 
3b * 25 93 * ifO 58 92 73 
k * i^ -O 91 * H5 81 90 71 
5 * 26 92 * 32 51 92 49 
6 * 28 * 90 * 29 ki 78 1+1+ 
Kan. 1 * 5i^  6 23 59 15 
2a * 0 * 1+7 * 3 29 72 16 
2b * 2 60 * 1 15 5I+ 21 
3a U 81 * 10 6 83 21 
3b * 2 76 * 6 2i+ 81 1+1 
* 5 79 * 11 i^ 3 92 60 
5 * 7 86 * 12 25 95 3^ 
6 * 11 92 * 25 38 93 52 
Ta * 1 88 * 9 1+0 100 1+0 
7b 6 91 * 11 15 85 26 
Minn. 1-lt- * it * 61 * 8 29 78 39 
6 * 2k * 59 * 15 52 7^  3^ 
7-8 * 11 81 * 15 38 79 29 
Neb. 1 * 7 50 * 11 1+7 63 35 
2 * 3 61 * 7 21 66 33 
3a * 6 72 * 21 15 85 36 
3b * 2 77 * 11 17 83 36 
U * 5 58 * 10 21 62 29 
5 * it 78 * 17 15 83 33 
6 * 7 76 * 10 22 73 27 
7 * 8 76 * 16 26 71 38 
S.D. 1 * 12 * 32 * 9 5i+ 71 55 
2a * 7 * 18 * 5 29 37 1+1 
2b 9 * 27 12 16 k5 20 
3a 6 13 * 5 11 k 19 
3b * 2 9 10 21 18 1+6 
Ua 6 * 38 * 9 Ik 62 26 
Ub * 9 20 12 18 30 19 
Wis. 1 * 6 33 * 11 1+2 1+1+ 32 
2ab 56 78 * 30 69 73 1+6 
3 83 97 ItU 85 90 55 
U * 29 * kk * 20 6k 67 60 
5 * 38 70 * 22 69 77 1+8 
6-7 * 33 52 * 27 65 7I+ 57 
8-9 * 55 * 7^  * 1^ 5 81+ 87 71+ 
•^Significant difference between proportions. 
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Table 35. Percent comparison of selected characteristics of crop-share-





fi with hay land 
rental per acre 
.$ $ $ 





fo with hayland 
rental per acre 









2b 11 33 56 5 67 33 
6 1+2 
la 2 61+ 23 9 6 63 31 
lb 1 63 17 8 77 15 8 
2a 1 8i 10 6 1+ 7I+ 22 1+ 
2b 1 71 17 10 71 2I+ 3 
3a 5 56 2 9 1+5 9 
3b 15 5 11 25 
U 3 89 6 9 100 
5 2 68 10 1+ 65 2ii 
6 78 19 8 6^ 38 
1 k 1+ 
2a 6 3 25 17 
2b k 2 12 30 15 18 
3a 2 13 3i+ 20 1+5 
3b 5 11 18 13 2 21+ 
ll4- 1 7 5 13 
5 39 3 11 23 
6 19 10 11 
Ta 2k 35 25 1I+ 
7b 3 * 3 1+1+ 33 62 
1-k 3 38 6 8 1+1+ 11 
6 6 6 6 50 
7-8 10 59 21 5 1+ 75 11 
1 33 7 7 50 10 
2 10 10 9 
3a 13 3 25 1+0 10 58 
3b 3 5 30 10 22 18 50 18 11+ 
15 19 12 9 21 ii+ 8 
5 1 22 k2 6 * 17 22 37 11 5 
6 2 5 73 7 13 10 1+7 33 1+ 
7 10 59 10 13 21 68 5 
1 50 5 
2a 59 13 17 
2b 58 * 6 2 2 15 38 38 8 
3a 1+7 8 2 8 22 11 11 22 
3b 7 30 13 3 23 13 kk 13 23 
Ua 8 k2 * 20 18 25 56 19 
kh Ik k2 9 13 16 58 3 13 
*Significant difference between proportions. 
-^Wisconsin areas deleted; too few cases. 
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Table 36. Percent distrltration of age of renters by relation of landlord 
State Nori-*relatlve Parent 
and I0 of renters , age 70 or renters , age 
area Under 25- 35- 45- 55- 65 + Under 25- 35- 45- 55- 65+ 
25 4^ 44 54 64 25 3^  k>4- 54 64 
Ind. 2b 2 28 36 19 13 2 5 40 28 22 5 
6 * 5 27 30 18 16 4 5 56 22 17 
la. la * 1 31 34 22 9 3 7 50 34 9 
lb * 6 33 32 19 8 2 11 46 30 9 4 
2a * 1 32 29 28 9 1 6 63 20 11 
2b 4 32 38 17 8 1 5 38 32 18 5 1 
3a 5 44 28 17 5 6 50 29 12 3 
3b 5 31 33 21 9 1 15 42 31 12 
U * 6 39 36 12 6 1 17 56 22 3 2 
5 * 2 25 35 25 13 1 3 59 25 l4 
6 * 2 35 4l 16 5 1 2 57 23 16 2 
Kan. 1 •X- 2 32 30 17 18 1 2 3^  49 10 5 
2a * 1 26 32 30 8 3 3 48 32 16 1 
2b 4 33 30 22 8 3 l4 38 21 19 8 
3a 8 25 35 13 15 4 4 36 43 13 2 2 
3b * 1 28 33 20 12 6 3 43 4o 13 1 
* 12 14 34 25 13 2 2 52 27 6 13 
5 * 1 28 30 25 10 6 9 53 23 15 
6 * 7 23 29 24 12 5 3 ,46 3^  12 3 2 
7a 3 17 28 36 11 5 5 15 4o 25 15 
Tb 3 27 34 23 10 3 9 32 18 32 9 
Minn. 1-4 * 3 31 32 23 8 3 15 48 29 8 
6 * 2 35 31 19 10 3 10 51 31 5 3 
7-8 * 4 34 28 22 10 2 6 48 31 15 
Neb. 1 * 2 35 25 20 12 6 3 36 48 5 7 
2 * 2 23 47 l4 11 4 5 59 30 6 
3a * 5 28 39 l4 12 1 53 23 21 2 
3b * 8 33 26 i4 16 3 6 49 36 3 6 
U * 7 26 30 23 11 3 5 38 4l 12 4 
5 * 6 26 31 26 8 3 6 42 35 14 3 
6 * 8 25 27 20 17 3 9 52 23 i4 2 
7 * 4 23 33 24 11 5 11 49 25 11 5 
S.D. 1 * 4 29 25 28 10 4 8 52 36 4 
2a * 6 26 29 22 16 1 10 61 23 3 3 
2b * 8 31 31 l4 14 2 12 49 24 6 9 
3a * 6 28 35 15 11 5 3 55 28 10 3 
3b •X- 10 32 33 16 7 2 12 53 28 7 
4a * 7 34 27 22 8 2 11 64 14 7 4 
4b * 4 29 31 18 11 7 6 53 24 15 2 
Wis. 1 * 7 27 4o 15 7 4 11 56 19 8 6 
2ab * 4 35 33 18 7 3 7 54 29 7 4 
3 * 2 44 28 18 8 7 44 35 11 3 
4 * 2 34 32 21 6 5 15 44 31 10 
5 * 5 30 29 18 12 6 10 4l 25 20 4 
6-7 * 2 27 32 23 10 6 6 51 33 9 1 
8-9 * 1 29 36 21 12 1 11 5^ 34 9 1 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between age groups. 
Table 37- Percent distribution of types of landlord by relation of landlord 
State Non-relative Parent 
and f) of landlords Jo of landlords 
area Active Retired Bus.or Farm Non-farm Other Active Retired Bus.or Farm Non-farm Other 
farmer farmer prof, wido-w vidov farmer fanner prof, vidov vidov 
2b * 5 21 35 12 13 ik 9 3^ 5 31 3 9 
6 * 7 19 48 12 7 7 18 2k 12 35 0 12 
la * 8 26 32 8 13 13 17 59 0 17 1 6 
lb * 17 21 26 10 9 17 21 i+9 4 19 2 5 
2a * 10 20 i^ 3 9 9 9 12 63 u 18 0 3 
2b * 7 27 31 13 10 12 17 53 3 21 3 1+ 
3a * 11 22 3^ 9 5 10 9 57 6 20 0 9 
3b * 13 2h 29 9 11 15 27 kS i+ 15 
k * 10 2k 35 9 9 lU 17 56 0 25 2 0 
5 * 7 31 21 11 13 i6 12 67 1 17 1 1 
6 * 7 25 3^  9 8- 17 7 6k 4 20 2 2 
1 * 10 25 3^ k 11+ 5. 5 68 5 22 0 0 
2a * 20 32 25 10 U 10 l6 35 13 33 3 0 
2b * 5 hk 21 li+ 5 11 11 59 7 18 5 0 
3a * 7 32 21 i6 l6 8 15 l+U k 29 6 2 
3b * 6 31 33 13 6 11 lU 55 1 23 5 2 
k * li^ - 3^  26 10 11 6 25 38 0 37 0 0 
5 * • 10 29 32 17 8 17 57 0 23 0 2 
6 * 13 32 3^  7 6 8 25 0 27 0 3 
7a * 8 19 3^ 11 10 9 5 70 0 25 0 0 
7b * 6 33 31 9 7 13 12 53 0 35 0 0 
l-i^  * 11 27 25 5 7 25 Ik 51 0 28 2 6 
6 * 8 3^ + 25 9 8 l6 Ik 54 0 25 U 2 
7-8 * 15 28 27 7 9 Ik 12 67 0 19 1 1 
Table 37- I. Continuedj 
State Mon-relatlve Parent 
and % of landlords f of landlords 
area Active Eetired Bus.or Farm Non-farm other Active Retired Bus,or Farm Non-farm other 
farmer farmer prof. widow widow farmer farmer prof • widow widow 
Neb, 1 * 22 19 27 12 7 13 25 kk 0 23 2 7 
2 * 13 21 1+1 5 9 10 16 50 3 26 0 5 
3a * 18 25 39 5 6 7 26 36 13 19 I4- 2 
313 * 17 25 28 12 5 ill- 16 57 19 1 3 
k * 18 20 28 9 12 13 Ik k8 k 26 2 5 
5 * 9 27 36 5 10 Ik 17 63 0 13 3 3 
6 * ill- 27 25 8 7 19 26 k6 2 18 3 5 
7 * 15 22 29 10 12 12 17 kd 8 23 0 3 
3 eZ) • 1 * 22 18 31 5 7 16 17 63 1+ 17 0 0 
2a * 12 22 37 1+ 13 12 23 63 3 10 0 0 
2b * lii- 25 39 6 10 6 9 69 6 12 3 0 
3a * 11 32 35 11 8 2k 0 21+ 0 3 
3b * li4- 20 39 6 11 11 23 65 5 7 0 0 
a^ * 22 26 31 6 8 7 29 h3 7 7 7 7 
kh * 13 29 33 5 7 13 13 56 5 21 0 5 
¥1 s. 1 * 6 2h 27 10 6 27 8 1+1 11 27 3 11 
2ab * 10 29 33 7 2 17 12 69 3 16 0 1 
3 * 11 37 29 9 k 10 9 6k 3 20 1 3 
it- * 8 35 2k 11 7 15 12 53 1+ 20 3 7 
5 * 15 2k 3k 13 3 12 12 1+5 9 2i+ 3 7 
6-7 * 8 27 23 16 8 17 17 51 2 2k 0 6 
8-9 *• 13 26 35 13 3 10 9 63 2 20 0 5 
*One or more significant difference i-n proportions between types. 
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Table 38- Percent distribution of age of landlords by relation of landlord 
State " Non-relative 
and 
area Under 25 25-3^  ^
> of landlords 
k3-3^ 
> age 
55-61+ 65-7^  75-81+ 85^  
Ind- 2b * 1 20 28 28 11 7 
6 1 5 20 27 28 15 1+ 
la, la * 1 h T 16 30 27 13 2 
lb * 2 8 20 29 27 10 1+ 
2a * 1 1 9 21 29 21+ 11+ 2 
2b * 1 2 3 22 30 25 13 1+ 
3a * 1 2 13 13 28 26 11+ 3 
3b 1 2 20 30 21+ 15 1+ 
1+ 1 3 11 16 32 21 Ih 2 
5 * 1 6 15 17 38 17 5 
6 5 l4 36 25 17 1+ 
Kan. 1 * 1 10 16 1+1 1I+ ih 5 
2a * 2 5 9 31+ 31 9 10 
2b * 1 7 16 12 1+0 21 3 
3a 2 10 30 38 15 5 
3b * 1 19 25 31 18 1 
* 1 1 5 16 27 37 12 1 
5 * 1 1 15 37 28 .13 5 
6 * 5 15 37 26 16 1 
7a 3 4 11 31 31+ II+ 3 
7b * 1+ 9 15 28 30 11 3 
Minn. 1-1^  * 1 IM 18 29 2I+ 12 2 
6 * k V 12 21 38 15 1 
7-8 * 1 11 20 29 25 10 1+ 
Neb. 1 * 2 8 29 22 II+ 
2 * 1 2 8 23 26 22 15 2 
3a * 6 T 26 23 21 13 3 
3b * 1 11 W7 23 27 10 1 
1 3 16 28 30 17 1+ 
5 * 6 11 28 29 22 1+ 
6 * 1 7 20 26 29 13 1+ 
7 1 1+ 15 31 32 16 2 
S.D. 1 4 10 23 21 31 10 1 
2a 1 10 19 35 25 7 1+ 
2b 1 1 k 18 26 30 15 5 
3a 2 2 li+ 33 35 11 2 
3b 1 11 16 36 2I+ 10 2 
ii-a 1 8 22 28 27 8 6 
l^ b * 1 8 18 26 32 15 1 
Wis. 1 * k 15 16 33 19 10 1+ 
Sab * 3 15 23 21+ 20 11+ 2 
3 * 10 22 26 26 15 2 
k 1 3 11 Ik 26 28 11+ 3 
5 * 2 10 15 33 26 11+ 
6-7 5 2 X7 36 21+ 11+ 2 
8t9 1 8 20 31^  21+ 10 3 
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Table 38 (Continued) 




Under 25 25-3'+ 35'-44 
landlords, age 
45,514. 55-64 65-74 75-84 85-
Ind. 2b * 10 29 26 29 5 
6 5 11 39 33 11 
la. la * 8 34 4o 18 
lb * 14 29 39 l4 4 
2a * l4 39 26 21 
2b * 8 24 49 12 7 
3a * 15 35 21 23 6 
3b 19 19 35 27 
1+ 2 15 39 32 12 
5 * 1 13 37 28 17 3 
6 7 38 27 28 
Kan. 1 * 10 67 l4 10 
2a * 8 49 20 20 3 
2b * 8 40 32 17 3 
3a 6 25 48 19 2 
3b * 9 23 36 31 1 
1+ * 4 h3 26 15 11 
5 * 4 27 53 16 
6 * 25 16 38 17 3 
Ta 15 4o 20 25 
Tt * 12 • 26 18 4l 3 
Minn. 1-k * 9 38 32 18 2 
6 * 7 34 43 i4 1 
7-8 * 1 7 35 34 17 5 
Neb. 1 * 2 12 15 45 25 2 
2 * 6 39 42 13 
3a * 4 42 36 18 
3b * 4 4l 46 9 
4 1 9 27 32 27 4 
5 * 1 39 38 15 6 
6 * 8 46 31 l4 2 
7 19 33 30 11 6 
S.D. 1 4 36 52 8 
2a 10 40 40 7 3 
2b 15 33 33 18 
3a 7 31 45 17 
3b 12 42 28 19 
j+a 7 34 34 24 
i+b * 7 39 43 10 2 
Wis. 1 * 16 21 50 5 • 8 
2ab * 8 32 38 18 4 
3 * 6 35 36 18 6 
1+ 1 l4 33 36 l4 3 
5 * 7 31 30 23 9 
6-7 8 40 36 l4 1 
8-9 10 34 35 17 4 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
201 
Table 39- Percent distribution of n-qmber of years rented this land by 
relation of landlord 
State Non-relative Parent 
and  ^rented for  ^rented for 
area 1 2-k 5-9 10+ 1 2-4 5-9 10+ 
Ind. 2b 12 28 27 33 7 23 30 40 
6 11 30 31 28 12 12 4l 35 
la. la 9 31 35 25 3 38 40 19 
lb * 15 36 29 20 5 23 49 23 
2a * 12 26 39 23 4 33 4l 22 
2b 10 32 32 26 4 26 37 33 
3a * 20 39 25 16 26 4l 33 
3b * 13 38 34 15 12 35 15 38 
ij. l6 2^  15 2 28 47 23 
1+ 9 31 35 25 5 28 38 29 
6 13 29 37 21 6 28 43 23 
Kan. 1 * 1 19 37 43 55 17 28 
2a * 26 26 48 29 56 15 
2b 32 37 31 32 38 30 
3a * kl 31 28 25 40 35 
3b 2 29 35 3^  25 34 4l 
k * i^ 3 30 27 27 45 28 
5 kl 40 19 36 47 17 
6 * 2 k3 33 22 26 35 39 
Ta * 5 33 39' 23 5 58 37 
7b * 1 k6 33 20 6 9 49 36 
Minn. 1-1^  ik 39 25 22 11 33 34 22 
6 * li^  40 32 l4 6 4o 25 29 
7-8 * ll^  23 42 21 1 32 44 23 
Neb. 1 * 8 37 30 25 9 21 43 27 
2 5 22 37 36 7 20 k9 24 
3a * 15 35 28 22 28 46 26 
3b * 17 37 29 17 7 33 45 15 
4 * 7 37 27 29 3 22 50 25 
5 6 25 37 32 3 25 37 35 
6 * l6 33 30 21 5 4i 31 23 
7 8 3U 32 26 6 30 42 22 
S .D. 1 * 9 ko 22 29 4 36 56 4 
2a * 10 3^  32 24 6 39 i^ 9 6 
2b 8 37 35 20 12 27- 34 27 
3a 8 40 28 24 3 38 42 17 
3b 15 .43 27 15 7 42 37 l4 
4a 12 36 3P 22 52 31 17 
1+b 11 3^  33 22 12 21 4l 26 
Wis. 1 2k k2 25 9 14 39 30 17 
2ab * 19 52 21 8 6 25 46 23 
3 * l6 48 29 7 4 25 37 3^  
1+ i6 4l 31 12 11 3k 3^ 12 
5 * 2k 4i Bk 11 9 31 27 33 
6-7 * Ik 4l 32 13 2 31 39 28 
8-9 * l6 40 30 l4 8 23 38 31 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between groups. 
Table ko. Percent distribution, of full-tenants and part-owners by age of 
renter 
State Under 25 , 25-3^  35-hk I+5-5I+ 55-61+ 65> 
and F.T. P.O. F.T. P.O. F.T. P.O. F.T. P.O. F.T. P.O. F.T. P.o 
area 
Ind. 2b * 100 0 85 15 55 h5 68 32 1+7 53 60 1+0 
6 * 8U 16 53 1+7 i+0 60 35 65 32 68 33 67 
la. la * 100 0 91+ 6 86 1I+ 73 27 76 2I+ 100 0 
lb * 100 0 90 10 71+ 26 .1+9 51 69 31 57 3^ 
2a * 90 10 93 7 80 20 70 30 75 30 50 50 
2b * 100 0 91 9 .81 19 7I+ 26 58 1+2 60 1+0 
3a * 90 10 91 9 68 32 67 33 75 25 0 100 
3b * 75 25 85 15 65 35 50 50 1+6 51+ 100 0 
k * 96 4 93 7 81+ 16 51+ 1+6 5I+ 1+6 0 100 
5 * 100 0 92 8 79 21 58 1+2 61 39 0 100 
6 * 83 17 86 11+ 87 13 61+ 36 36 6k 50 50 
Kan. 1 * 93 7 39 61 32 68 1+2 58 1I+ 86 33 67 
2a * 100 0 70 30 36 61+ 51 1+9 21 79 50 50 
2b * 70 30 76 21+ 1+0 60 32 68 8 92 33 67 
3a * 87 13 57 3^ 60 1+0 18 82 12 88 31 69 
3b * 78 22 76 21+ 1+8 52 26 71+ 21+ 76 38 62 
k * 74 26 69 31 53 hi 2i+ 76 30 70 0 100 
5 * 100 0 59 i+i 1+8 52 32 68 37 63 31 69 
6 * 91 9 76. 2i+ 1+8 52 51+ 1+6 38 62 20 80 
Ta * 100 0 3^ 57 &5 55 36 61+ 33 67 63 37 
7b * 31 69 57 3^ 1+7 53 33 67 21+ 76 30 70 
Minn.l-i}-* 76 2k 53 1+7 36 61+ 21+ 76 22 78 0 100 
6 * 82 18 89 11 61+ 36 52 1+8 25 75 33 67 
7-8* 100 0 . 91 9 76 2I+ 63 37 1+8 52 33 67 
Neb. 1 * 100 0 90 10 61 39 1+1+ 56 32 68 50 50 
2 * 80 20 76 21+ 52 1+8 1+7 53 1+8 52 1+1+ 56 
3a * 100 0 70 30 59 1+1 1+0 60 1+1 59 50 50 
3b * 100 0 87 13 67 33 33 67 52 1+8 66 3^ + 
U * 92 8 81+ 16 56 1+1+ 1+9 51 1+1 59 37 63 
5 * 95 5 87 13 71 29 51 i+9 52 1+8 75 25 
6 * 92 8 86 11+ 80 20 3^ 57 32 68 63 37 
7 * 100 0 82 18 65 35 53 hi 1+7 53 50 50 
S.D. 1 * 72 28 57 3^ 1+0 60 32 68 0 100 20 80 
2a * 86 Ih 61 39 33 67 26 71+ 18 82 25 75 
2b * 96 k 58 ,1+2 50 50 18 82 1+0 60 0 100 
3a * 75 25 73 27 35 65 1+8 52 36 61+ 33 67 
3b * 95 5 79 21 63 37 38 62 50 50 0 100 
ka * 100 0 78 22 58 1+2 50 50 28 72 50 50 
kl) * 100 0 87 13 76 21+ 61+ 36 59 1+1 83 17 
Wis. 1 * 1+5 55 61 39 28 72 18 82 9 91 20 80 
2ab* 81 19 83 17 72 28 62 38 73 30 67 33 
3 * 100 0 91+ 6 93 7 96 1+ 9h 6 100 0 
U * 81 19 73 27 58 1+2 57 18 82 0 100 
5 * 57 i^ 3 78 22 1+8 52 51 9^ 38 62 33 67 
6-7* 100 0 81 19 76 2i+ 39 61 35 65 17 83 
8-9* 100 0 91 9 78 22 75 25 52 1+8 50 50 
*Significant difference between proportions within two or more age groups. 
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Table kl. Percent distribution of size of tracts rented by age of renter 
State "~~Under 2^  years 25-3^  years 35-^  year's 
and tracts •with acres tracts with acres % tracts with acres 
area 0- 100- 260- 500 0- 100- 260- 500 0- 100- 260-• 500 
93 259 1+99 + 99 259 1+99 - 99 259 1+99 + 
Ind. 2b 36 36 27 0 18 60 22 0 30 57 13 0 
6 58 33 8 0 1+5 1+7 6 2 1+2 1+0 16 2 
la. la 30 70 0 0 12 73 15 0 18 62 20 0 
lb 17 72 11 0 ii+ 75 10 1 ii+ 67 18 1 
2a * 20 80 0 0 8 71 21 0 15 67 17 1 
2b * 33 50 17 12 71 17 0 20 61+ 15 1 
3a * 10 70 10 10 11 68 19 2 25 51 17 7 
3b 9 45 lv5 0 9 63 28 0 15 72 11 2 
k Ik 77 9 0 16 70 1I+ 0 12 69 16 3 
5 * 0 75 25 0 11+ 73 12 1 17 70 13 0 
6 *• 17 50 33 0 16 75 9 0 23 68 9 0 
KkQ. 1 * 0 72 ll+ Ik 0 50 36 Ik 0 28 31 1+1 
2a * IT 17 50 17 8 32 32 28 3 1+3 31+ 20 
2b * 1+7 35 18 0 12 50 3k 1+ 0 57 30 13 
3 a * 33 53 13 0 li+ 62 18 6 22 57 20 1 
3b * 0 100 0 0 23 53 15 9 25 63 19 3 
k 5 3^ li+ 38 25 i+3 ,21+ 8 19 61 15 5 
5 * 0 83 0 17 13 kk 32 11 21 38 3i+ 7 
6 * 5 56 39 0 18 70 11 1 36 52 12 0 
7a * 1+0 1+0 20 0 31 55 8 6 39 39 20 2 
7b * 77 0 0 23 33 52 15 0 1+9 1+0 9 2 
Minn. 1-ii* 38 56 6 0 28 1+0 29 3 39 1+1 18 2 
6 9 82 9 a 2I+ 66 9 1 32 59 8 1 
7-8 13 73 13 V 17 67 15 1 18 72 9 1 
Neb. 1 * 17 17 33 33 12 29 30 29 7 13 23 57 
2 * 1+0 10 20 3U li+ 33 30 23 10 1+0 35 15 
3a 20 60 20 0 15 51 29 5 15 53 21 11 
3b * 1+1 50 9 0 13 67 13 7 13 77 9 1 
k * 17 58 21 1+ 9 1+9 30 12 21 52 ' 21 6 
5 * 12 i+7 3^  6 21 60 17 2 20 62 18 0 
6 * .21 71 8 0 17 67 16 0 17 67 12 1+ 
7 * 38 31 31 u 17 73 8 2 20 59 20 1 
S .D * 1 * 0 57 0 k3 7 19 22 52 9 1+0 23 28 
2a 0 1+0 27 33 3 37 38 22 1+ 53 23 ,20 
2b 6 70 12 12 6 1+2 37 15 1+ 1+9 i+0 7 
3a 12 75 12 0 2 39 1+1 18 6 60 27 7 
3b * 6 78 16 0 12 55 31 2 8 63 23 6 
4a 7 6k li+ II+ 7 58 33 2 12 55 31 2 
i+b 25 58 IT 0 18 63 19 0 23 56 19 2 
Wis. 1 * i+i+ 55 0 0 58 38 1+ 0 69 29 2 0 
2ab* 6 69 19 6 26 61 12 1 31 55 II+ 0 
3 6 75 19 0 1I+ 73 11 2 12 69 18 1 
k * 38 57 5 0 1+1 56 3 0 1+7 51 2 0 
5 * 1^ 3 50 7 0 29 67 3 1 53 1+2 5 0 
6-7* ll+ 86 0 0 3^ 52 5 0 36 63 1 0 
8-9 1+5 55 0 0 35 59 6 0 36 60 1+ 0 
ZIQ 
Table l+l (Continued) 
State 5^-5^  years 55-61+ years 65-74 years 
and  ^tracts with acres 'fo tracts with acres % tracts with acres 
area 0- 100- 260-• 500 0.^  100- 260-• 500 0- 100- 260- 500 
99 259 k99 99 259 1^ 99 - 99 259 U99 f 
Ind. 2b 33 H8 19 0 25 50 18 7 1+0 20 1+0 0 
6 50 35 13 2 1+6 36 18 0 56 1+1+ 0 0 
la. la 13 74 13 0 10 65 25 0 0 75 25 0 
lb 22 59 19 0 25 56 19 0 0 57 43 0 
2a * 15 65 20 0 10 53 37 0 50 50 0 0 
2b * 15 72 13 0 30 58 9 3 60 20 20 0 
3a * i^ O 60 0 0 25 37 37 0 100 0 0 0 
3b 1+0 50 10 0 15 62 23 0 100 0 0 0 
1^  26 70 1+ 0 38 62 0 0 100 0 0 0 
5 * 37 50 13 0 33 50 11 6 33 67 0 0 
6 * 3^  51 15 0 55 36 9 0 0 100 0 0 
Kan. 1 * 0 53 11+ 33 0 58 27 15 0 33 67 0 
2a * 15 27 i+8 10 10 1+5 35 10 0 50 50 0 
2b * 12 60 19 9 13 61 13 13 50 33 17 0 
3a * 3^ + 37 21 8 39 58 3 0 33 67 0 0 
3b * 3^ + 56 10 0 38 1+1+ 18 0 0 100 0 0 
31 1+0 27 2 23 63 11 3 0 100 0 0 
5 * 111 67 5 1I+ 17 53 27 3 38 1+6 8 8 
6 * 32 k-j 18 3 61+ 20 16 0 30 70 0 0 
Ta * 58 36 6 0 1+8 1+5 7 0 50 50 0 0 
7b * 39 1+9 8 1+ 1^ 5 1+8 7 0 90 10 0 0 
Minn. 1-1+* 39 Uli 12 5 ?5 33 6 6 38 72 0 0 
6 5^ 49 3 3 55 1+5 0 0 33 33 33 0 
T-8 24 61 13 2 9 78 9 1+ 0 67 0 33 
Web. 1 * 17 37 17 29 1+ 32 1I+ 50 12 38 25 25 
2 * 7 1+5 22 26 21 3^ + 30 15 11 33 33 22 
3a 3^  1+7 13 6 33 1+2 12 12 100 0 0 0 
3b * 14-0 35 23 2 3'^  58 5 3 50 50 0 0 
* l6 52 30 2 21 36 29 11+ 25 50 25 0 
5 * 2h 61 15 0 39 52 9 0 50 75 0 0 
6 * 35 11 0 70 20 10 0 11+ 72 11+ 0 
7 * k6 50 1+ 0 32 59 9 0 50 50 0 0 
S.D. 1 * 6 50 1I+ 30 21+ 35 21+ 17 20 60 0 20 
2a 3 1+9 35 13 8 62 19 11 25 75 0 0 
2b 8 59 22 11 15 69 15 0 33 67 0 0 
3a 8 1+0 32 20 12 1+1 1+1 6 22 45 22 11 
3b ¥- 19 55 23 3 38 37 25 0 33 67 0 0 
ii-a 10 60 25 5 7 72 21 0 0 50 50 0 
i^ b 12 67 21 0 31 62 7 0 8 50 25 17 
Wis. 1 *• 75 18 7 0 91 9 0 0 80 20 0 0 
2ab* 1+1 9 3 20 60 20 0 60 1+0 0 0 
3 15 72 13 0 11 78 6 6 0 0 100 0 
k * 6i 33 3 3 76 2I+ 0 0 100 0 0 0 
5 * 32 61 7 0 62 28 5 5 50 50 0 0 
6-7* 69 31 0 0 65 35 0 0 83 17 0 0 
8-9 25 70 5 0 39 1+1+ 17 0 25 50 25 0 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
distribution of all tracts by size groups. 
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Under 25 25-3^  35-1+1+ I+5-5I+ 55-61+ 65-74 
Ind. 2b 36 28 18 22 36 20 
6 h5 21 31 15 18 11 
la. la ho 53 1+6 1+7 38 50 
lb 50 5T 1+8 1+0 31 71 
2a 6o 53 51 58 33 0 
2b 50 60 1+2 51 i+5 1+0 
3a 50 1+9 i+3 30 50 0 
313 25 5T 56 33 31 0 
i+ 52 56 1+7 1+6 33 0 
5 50 1+8 1+2 33 33 50 
6 50 1+5 56 37 55 50 
Kan. 1 lU 38 i+2 1+0 9 33 
2a 0 13 18 21 23 50 
2b 0 1I+ 19 12 1+ 0 
3a * 7 13 2I+ 3 0 15 
3b * 0 20 38 12 13 8 
1+ * IT 26 2 32 0 
5 17 24 23 13 38 31 
6 9 IB 10 25 li+ 0 
7a * i^ O 19 27 7 20 12 
7b 0 28 18 Ih 17 0 
Minn. l-'k hi 36 33 25 35 25 
6 27 1+8 27 37 20 33 
7-8 6o 1+1+ 36 1+1+ 39 33 
Neb. 1 50 53 50 38 58 60 
2 * 30 51 38 30 21 33 
3a * 70 38 35 22 28 0 
313 * hi 52 30 1+9 35 50 
* 8 1+1 27 25 12 38 
5 * h5 27 17 22 0 
6 * 75 55 1+9 1+6 1+9 63 
7 * 23 1+9 31 25 35 30 
S.D. 1 33 i+6 1+8 56 56 60 
2a 29 27 28 1+7 35 75 
2b 28 39 33 37 33 25 
3a * 75 38 32 1+8 35 12 
3b 26 25 26 21 33 50 
ka 36 39 33 38 36 50 
to 25 1+2 26 35 21 1+2 
Wis. 1 36 51 1+0 18 30 1+0 
2ab * 38 5i+ 35 26 1+0 33 
3 * 69 55 3^  ^ 33 56 100 
k 35 53 37 30 25 0 
5 * 21 52 18 23 21+ 12 
6-7 3^ 5D 51 32 38 33 
8-9 36 50 37 37 h3 25 
*One or more significant difference between proportion for age group 
and proportion for all leases. 
2X2 
Table ^ 4-3,. Percent of leases with 50-50 share: corn; lime; hired labor; 
fiill-tenants and part-owners 
State Corn Lime Hired labor 
and Full Part Full Part Full Part 
area tenants owners tenants owners tenants owners 
Ind. 2b 95 99 35 26 7 4 
6 53 39 12 6 8 2 
la., la 9k 8U 67 62 7 0 
lb 97 93 kz 43 3 4 
2a 93 88 76 80 5 8 
2b 100 98 * 6k . 42 5 7 
3a 97 97 2k 23 7 7 
3b 98 98 23 13 12 8 
1^  93 96 28 28 8 5 
5 95 100 21 l4 7 0 
6 91 91 15 l4 10 3 
Kan. 1 50 0 0 0 2 4 
2a 8 0 0 0 6 0 
2b 12 11 0 0 1 0 
3a 0 0 13 29 4 0 
3b 11 13 33 5 2 3 
h 2k If 30 24 13 0 
5 k2 26 27 22 8 6 
6 * 714. 57 36 31 7 7 
7a 12 6 12 12 1 1 
Tb 2 2 17 l4 4 3 
Minn.1-4 36 28 29 31 8 5 
6 * 81 59 48 39 8 3 
7-8 * 50 31 37 29 5 0 
Neb. 1 16 5 9 0 12 0 
2 6 3 8 0 3 0 
3a 10 3 :5 0 3 0 
3b 11 1 2S 0 1 0 
9 3 7 0 4 2 
5 6 0 21 6 4 2 
6 * 26 12 28 12 3 .5 
7 * 39 21 14 14 6 2 
S.D. 1 26 11 8 8 6 
2 a 15 5 29 0 3 5 
2b * 15 k 11 0 4 0 
3a 6 0 0 0 5 0 
3b 5 2 13 0 1 0 
il-a 21 6 0 17 3 0 
l+b 19 12 16 0 2 0 
Wis. 1 61 71 60 26 31 8 
2ab 83 68 k3 27 16 15 
3 9i^  88 19 20 11 7 
90 80 57 38 27 25 
5 * 83 64 35 25 21 20 
6-7 95 100 72 64 21 25 
8-9 92 83 43 35 l4 18 
*Signlfleant difference between proportions. 
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Table Percent distribution of types of owner 
State No. of Individual Estate Partnership Corporation Government Other 
and leases 
area 
Ind. 2b 275 90 5 4 1 - -
6 185 91 5 2 1 0 1 
la. la 296 90 8 2 0 0 -
lb 272 87 8 5 - 0 0 
2a 338 87 8 4 - 0 
2b 341 85 10 4 1 0 0 
3a 189 88 7 5 0 0 -
3b 167 87 11 2 0 0 0 
k 221 86 8 5 - 0 -
5 252 90 7 2 0 -
6 245 87 8 3 1 - 1 
Kan. 1 31i+ 89 9 1 0 0 1 
2a 3^ 1 88 8 2 0 0 2 
2b 302 92 7 0 - 0 
3a 302 92 7 1 0 0 0 
3b 352 91 8 0 1 0 -
313 91 6 1 1 0 -
5 276 87 8 2 1 1 0 
6 3^ +1 93 5 1 1 0 0 
Ta 219 94 4 0 1 0 0 
7b 356 92 5 2 - 0 1 
Minn.1-4 329 84 10 2 -2 1 1 
6 274 81 16 2 -
T-8 352 87 10 2 0 1 
Neb. 1 281 85 5 2 3 4 -
2 362 90 6 2 1 1 -
3a 264 90 6 2 0 1 -
3b 327 91 4 2 1 1 
h 356 90 7 2 0 - 1 
5 333 93 6 1 0 0 0 
6 312 86 7 2 1 0 4 
7 269 87 8 3 0 1 1 
S.D. 1 171 81 6 2 2 8 0 
2a 221 93 4 1 0 1 0 
2b 203 85 7 2 2 3 m 
3a 182 85 7 4 0 4 •m 
3b 219 89 6 ,4 0 - -
Ua 192 91 4 3 2 - 0 
4b 293 86 10 3 - 0 0 
Wis. 1 179 97 2 1 0 0 0 
2ab 254 96 2 2 - 0 0 
3 332 92 4 4 0 0 0 
k 263 96 2 0 1 0 * 
5 230 95 2 1 2 0 0 
6-7 227 9^ + 4 - 1 0 0 
8-9 278 97 2 - 0 0 0 
zu 
Table ^ 5. Percent distribution, of types of landlord 
State Active Betired Bus. or Panji Non-farm Other 
and fanner farmer prof. widow widow 
area 
Ind. 2b 7 28 26 17 10 12 
6 10 22 36 Ik 7 11 
la. la 13 i4-0 19 10 8 
6 
10 
lb 17 29 21 13 Ik 
2a 12 33 30 12 6 7 
2b 10 35 22 16 7 10 
3a 13 30 28 13 5 11 
3b 17 26 25 11 8 13 
4 12 33 21 15 6 13 
5 10 i^ 3 13 15 8 11 
6 8 39 20 15 6 12 
Kan. 1 9 29 31 7 9 15 
2 a l6 33 17 13 3 18 
2b 11 i^ O 16 13 3 17 
3a 13 32 li+ 15 12 Ik 
3b 9 19 15 6 17 
16 31 17 15 6 15 
5 11 28 19 17 6 19 
6 12 29 2k 16 > 15 
Ta 7 2k 33 15 7 1I+ 
Tb 8 30 25 11 5 21 
Minn.l»-i4- 12 29 16 11 6 26 
6 10 39 12 16 5 18 
T-8 ih kl 16 10 5 Ik 
Neb. 1 23 26 17 13 5 16 
2 13 27 29 12 6 13 
3a 19 28 29 11 5 8 
3b 17 30 21 15 k 13 
k i6 29 20 15 8 12 
5 13 37 22 8 7 13 
6 l6 32 17 11 6 18 
7 Ik 33 20 13 7 13 
S,D. 1 19 26 2k 8 5 18 
2a i6 28 30 5 9 12 
2b 15 31 27 7 7 13 
3a 17 32 25 8 7 11 
3b 17 33 27 8 7 8 
ka. 21 31 25 7 7 9 
ij-b 15 33 26 9 5 12 
Wis. 1 8 2T 25 13 23 
2ab 11 19 13 2 11 
3 11 1^ 9 17 13 3 7 
iv 9 4o 15 15 6 15 
5 11 29 23 17 16 
6-7 11 36 16 18 15 
8-9 11 1+0 21 17 2 9 




Active farmer® Retired farmer" Business or pi^ of 
1 2 3 1+ 1 2 3 k 1 2 3 1+ 
Ind, 2b * 0 ~~2S~' 16 58 0 29 15 53 0 15 19 65 
6 11 6i 6 22 2 71 12 15 6 60 9 25 
la. la * l4 2k 38 22 16 7 1+2 35 9 1+ 6k 21 
. lb * 7 20 39 30 6 15 33 k5 0 21 50 26 
2a * 7 18 60 15 11 10 52 26 2 10 7»t 13 
2b 3 18 53 26 1+ 16 51 28 5 9 ^ 66 20 
3a * 2k 36 36 5 11+ k3 38 6 10 1+6 38 
3b 7 Ik 50 29 5 18 39 36 7 12 38 1+0 k 19 7 22 52 18 k 10 68 9 11 38 1+0 
5 * 12 12 .53 38 21 7 28 1+1+ 9 25 3k 31 
6 * 15 30 20 35 37 7 18 35 16 16 30 36 
Kan. 1 * 0 78 15 7 2 77 18 2 2 81+ 8 3 
2a 0 71 23 6 0 58 35 7 0 57 33 9 
2b 0 1+1 53 3 3 1+6 1+2 9 2 50 1+8 0 
3a * 0 69 31 0 0 1+0 51+ 3 7 53 35 5 
3b 0 27 66 7 3 1+1 1+5 9 2 k5 i+7 6 
* 0 35 35 29 2 38 1+7 12 0 29 67 1+ 
5 20 23 50 7 11 22 53 13 12 28 38 22 
6 * 0 39 37 21+ 5 29 1+7 19 12 1+1 28 19 
7a * 20 27 2+0 13 8 29 k9 II+ 1+ 59 3 
7b * 0 71 25 k 7 1+8 1+0 5 7 55 29 6 
Mlnn.l-H * 7 68 18 1 22 1+1 22 15 20 59 17 1+ 
6 * 30 7 11 52 1+0 15 9 36 38 21 15 26 
7-8 * l6 2k 1+2 18 25 20 31 23 18 Ik 55 12 
Neb. 1 * 27 13 1+1+ 8 21 30 23 1I+ 19 36 38 0 
2 0 80 20 0 1 72 13 10 1 71 22 3 
3a 0 k9 39 12 5 1+2 1+1 11 1 32 56 11 
313 * k 30 57 5 3 22 63 12 1 36 60 1 
k -* 3 1+6 1+6 5 0 1+2 1+1 17 0 38 52 7 
5 * 0 58 37 5 0 38 1+9 9 0 30 63 1+ 
6 * 2 51 37 1+ 1I+ 28 1+1 Ik 6 1+7 1+0 6 
7 5 32 1+1 8 2 30 52 11 1+ 29 58 6 
S.D. 1 * l6 kl 22 16 9 36 13 29 15 56 12 7 
2a 0 k6 ko 9 2 32 52 5 0 1+1 53 3 
2b 3 37 43 13 D 39 53 6 2 1+6 1+1 7 
3a * 3 1+2 k8 3 0 1+0 50 10 2 18 lb 2 
3b * 0 1+6 51 3 0 11 75 11 3 3k 59 3 
ifa 0 33 65 0 0 22 68 5 0 21 65 10 
4b 7 2k 55 1I+ 1 17 71 8 1 22 72 1+ 
Wis. 1 50 7 0 29 65 2 0 15 65 7 2 7 
2ab 19 7 7 67 28 3 2 63 35 : 10 1+ 1+9 
3 8 6 3 81 10 0 1 88 11 1+ k 81 
1+ h3 9 k 39 1+2 3 i+ 1+5 1+5 3 0 1+7 
5 28 20 0 52 20 23 2 53 30 16 k 1+0 
6-7 * 29 k 0 63 1+8 3 1 i+5 1+1 6 3 1+1+ 
8-9 23 10 7 57 26 1 1 71 26 5 1+ 65 
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Table k6 (Continued) 
State Farm widow Non-farm widows' Others' 
and 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
area 
Ind. 2b * 0 >5 8 47 0 l4 39 46 0 31 38 28 
6 0 52 12 36 8 77 8 8 i4 62 19 5 
la. la * 39 3 39 16 33 8 46 12 31 0 59 10 
lb * 6 24 59 12 0 29 71 0 8 28. 38 26 
2a * 10 7 63 2D 5 10 86 0 9 22 61 9 
2b 5 15 70 8 17 75 0 9 9 77 5 
3a * 17 12 46 25 0 22 56 22 19 5 52 24 
3b 0 33 39 28 8 15 62 15 9 14 59 18 
28 0 12 59 8 25 25 42 32 T 36 25 
5 * 29 11 34 26 38 5 52 5 14 l4 57 11 
6 * k2 6 28 25 57 7 29 7 43 13 30 13 
Kan. 1 * 0 74 5 21 0 30 70 0 0 71 29 0 
2a 0 40 48 12 D 64 36 0 2 5^ 45 8 
2b 0 45 53 3 0 80 10 10 0 45 55 0 
3a * 2 51 47 0 0 83 l4 0 5 51 44 0 
3b 8 33 55 4 5 36 55 4 11 43 45 2 
* 0 15 60 23 0 55 45 0 ,4 48 48 0 
5 Ik 34 50 2 18 35 47 0 12 18 62 8 
6 * 2 27 61 10 8 25 67 0 4 27 53 .16 
Ta * 6 18 64 9 19 63 19 0 13 40 43 ,0 
7b * 3 58 28 11 6 50 33 11 8 51 38 3 
Minn.1-4 * 31 36 i4 19 28 39 28 6 42 36 21 1 
6 * 58 7 12 23 40 0 13 47 59 6 10 24 
7-8 * 22 25 36 17 5 22 56 17 24 18 4o 18 
Web. 1 * 37 17 23 14 46 8 31 8 47 21 26 7 
2 5 71 12 12 0 82 18 0 7 78 15 0 
3a 11 57 21 T D 29 71 0 l4 33 52 0 
313 * 4 40 55 0 0 23 77 0 0 17 83 0 
k * 4 43 ID 0 33 .67 0 10 45 43 2 
5 * 0 15 81 4 0 32 64 4 0 44 56 0 
6 * 12 26 59 3 12 12 70 6 29 18 45 7 
7 6 24 64 0 0 22 72 0 12 27 58 0 
S.D. 1 * 8 62 23 8 38 38 25 0 52 23 13 10 
2a 0 8 67 25 0 4o 45 15 15 42 38 0 
2b 0 47 4o 7 0 50 50 0 28 28 40 4 
3a * 7 l4 57 0 0 42 58 0 35 15 4o 0 
3b * 0 18 76 6 0 13 87 0 6 24 71 0 
ka 0 31 69 0 0 23 77 0 11 44 28 6 
kt 12 19 62 8 6 6 81 6 6 25 64 3 
Wis. 1 83 4 0 9 75 0 0 25 73 7 5 2 
2ab 4l 9 9 28 25 0 0 75 39 14 0 43 
3 20 0 7 73 ,11 0 0 89 17 8 0 75 
4 6i 0 0 39 53 0 0 47 63 0 0 29 
5 2k 24 3 38 20 10 0 50 25 25 0 36 
6-7 * 56 0 0 31 56 11 0 22 52 6 3 39 
8-9 30 4 0 61 57 0 0 43 44 4 4 48 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types of landlord. 
®'Type of lease: 1-cash; 2*crop-share; S-crpp-share-cash; if-livestock-share. 
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Table U7. Percent one-year leases^ by type of laridlord 
State All Active Retired Business Farm Non~fa;rm Other 
and leases farmer farmer or prof. widow widow 
area 
Ind. 2b * 60 39 Tl 60 45 59 63 
6 * 6h 67 72 TO 46 k2 60 
la. la * 67 68 62 TT 52 71 T9 
lb * 70 87 69 TO 63 59 59 
2a * 65 85 56 6ii 53 74 81 
2b * 65 72 58 TO 66 Tl 62 
3a TO 67 TO 6T 81 6T T5 
3b 68 7k 63 60 63 85 82 
k 65 65 56 Tl 60 58 T5 
5 62 50 62 50 66 T5 T4 
6 * 69 T5 62 80 69 69 6T 
Kan. 1 * 59 63 59 k9 27 85 51 
2a U8 36 51 5T ko 56 54 
2b * 59 85 52 TO 35 50 T3 
3a * 62 53 56 68 69 84 46 
3b 60 60 5^ 59 82 TO 66 
1+ 65 62 62 68 66 TO 65 
5 * 68 60 79 5T 68 100 61 
6 * 69 88 68 72 60 100 58 
Ta * 81 93 TT 91 k6 88 86 
7b 72 63 Tl T5 66 6k 82 
Minn.1-4 62 63 66 61 45 k7 66 
6 61 56 59 6T 61 67 62 
7-8 56 65 56 58 50 l+T 5i+ 
Neb. 1 * 59 58 63 T2 5T TT 45 
2 * 61 62 56 TO 5k 42 Tl 
3a 76 T3 T9 68 80 86 T^  
3b 81 69 8ii. T8 86 90 82 
h TO 71 59 T5 T4 84 69 
5 * 66 67 60 82 45 68 T3 
6 T6 72 82 T8 86 93 59 
7 T4 jk 72 80 68 73 T4 
S.D. 1 * 1+8 kd 52 60 50 5T 21 
2a n 68 T^  T5 82 60 61 
2a T6 85 72 T6 6T 92 68 
3a T5 79 83 80 69 58 58 
3b 79 79 82 T8 T3 T9 81 
ii-a 69 65 63 Tl 83 T3 Tl 
1+b T5 TO T9 T6 7k 60 T3 
Wis. 1 58 Tl 63 k9 k3 T5 63 
2ab * 65 TO 60 T3 k7 100 T6 
3 63 60 61 62 69 63 63 
1+ 63 67 59 55 T6 53 67 
5 62 65 5k 63 5T 60 76 
6-7 50 ki ki UT 60 63 65 
8-9 * 51 68 39 59 58 50 43 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Under 25 25-3^ 35J+i^ k'y~3k 55-61+ 65-7^ 75-81+ 85+ 
Ind. 2b 100 6^ 56 59 60 87 
6 50 75 63 61+ 61+ 63 67 
la. la 50 8o 69 71 70 62 62 71 
lb 67 80 65 70 71 51+ 83 
2a 100 100 79 71 62 65 1+0 
2b 100 100 89 65 66 57 73 51+ 
3a * 83 83 5C 55 76 81 88 
3b 100 50 60 65 67 70 63 75 
4 100 100 65 68 58 63 68 33 
5 * 100 6h 66 68 65 67 
6 100 81 68 62 69 1+0 
Kan. 1 * 67 8U hi 79 1+6 1+6 91 
2a * ho 12 in 55 1+5 19 61+ 
2b * 100 71 ii-T 67 58 37 1+6 
3a * 100 59 73 1+9 88 1+1+ 
3b 1+5 1+1 61 56 66 67 
)+ 100 63 i+T 61 73 71 33 
5 100 50 53 66 70 6h 100 
6 * 100 80 80" 59 73 71 100 
Ta 100 100 69"' 81 83 69 78 
7b * 75 62 61 86 65 68 71 
Minn.l-U 83 59 53 62 61+ 58 100 
6 * 80 80 59 1+8 60 75 50 
7-8 50 52 6Z 1+8 61 53 75 
Neb. 1 * 60 29 70 67 53 59 100 
2 * 100 29 60 69 55 66 100 
3a 89 78 68 73 75 68 100 
3b 100 100 72 82 77 96 50 
100 67 68 71 61 70 100 
5 * 85' 86 59 58 80 63 
6 100 89 19 73 83 7I+ 88 
7 100 75 69 69 70 76 80 
S.D. 1 100 75 80 6T 1+1 1+0 1+7 
2a 75 83 6^ 71 72 55 100 
2b 50 100 86 72 77 76 62 86 
3a 100 75 70 71+ 80 7I+ 67 
3b 100 100 58 79 81+ 85 75 
l4^a 100 67 69 66 67 72 83 
Ub 67 65 63 75 77 85 67 
Wis. 1 * 60 kr kh 51 73 69 33 
2ab 100 59' 6T 65 62 58 50 
3 78 59 65 62 58 1+0 
U * 100 . 80 62 1^9 59 6k 73 60 
5 100 67 82 69 58 67 i+5 1+0 
6-7 25 1+2 hk 52 60 67 
8-9 50 83 60 h3 1+0 58 75 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between age groups. 
Table Percent distribution of types of landlord by age of landlord 
State Landlords 2^-3^^ Landlords 33-^^^ Landlords 
and 
area 
1 2 3 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 1+ 5 6 
Ind. 2b 50 50 17 8 50 0 8 17 7 II+ 1+9 1I+ 9 7 
6 * 25 75 12 0 50 12 12 12 12 3 59 3 3 19 
la. la * 75 25 23 8 38 8 8 15 26 21 31 5 3 15 
lb * 67 33 ifO 53 7 27 18 29 8 1+ 1I+ 
2a * 100 32 53 5 11 19 19 39 ii+ 2 8 
2b * 33 67 22 67 11 18 16 k3 5 1+ li+ 
3a * 33 17 50 25 50 25 25 11 29 1+ Ik 18 
3b * 100 20 J+0 ii-0 38 3 38 9 3 9 
I4- * 33 33 33 35 12 35 12 6 Ik 21 1+8 10 7 
5 * ^5 18 9 9 18 23 30 30 10 7 
6 100 33 67 19 11 1+1 11 19 
Kan. 1 33 67 18 18 36 5 23 9 18 73 
2a * 50 50 11 78 11 30 26 19 15 k 7 
2b * 100 7 27 53 7 7 18 18 35 2 7 20 
3a * 100 67 33 28 6 22 9 3 31 
313 * h3 57 10 2k 29 20 10 7 
k * 50 50 50 50 53 16 16 5 11 
5 * 50 50 6 16 56 12 9 
6 * 100 33 7 13 27 20 2I+ 20 1+ 1+ 
Ta * 100 100 22 61 6 6 6 
7b * 33 17 50 77 23 10 19 25 6 1+0 
Minn .l"»4 * 33 17 17 33 18 29 k 50 16 9 30 9 7 28 
6 * 20 80 8 50 8 33 30 22 26 13 k k 
7-8 * 50 50 1+2 4 21 8 25 31 .18 35 6 k 6 
Tatle k9 (Continued) 
State Landlords 55-6^1-®' Landlords 65-7^®" Landlords 
and 
area 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ind. 2 b 12 30 30 6 7 15 5 32 l6 26 8 12 5 33 9 33 i4 7 
6 * 10 1^ 47 12 2 i4 10 37 23 17 12 2 4 36 24 20 12 4 
la. Is * 15 48 19 6 6 6 7 48 10 i4 13 8 5 43 7 23 13 10 
IS * 25 30 23 5 3 l4 8 45 l4 17 8 8 11 43 36 7 4 
aa » 12 36 35 9 1 7 7 46 19 i6 9 3 2 49 13 17 17 2 
213 * 11 il-0 22 6 9 13 8 46 l4 23 5 4 2 4o 7 38 7 5 
3a. * 20 29 29 8 6 8 3 46 26 23 3 4 57 l4 21 4 
3b it 19 30 30 5 7 9 11 21 21 21 16 11 4 69 15 4 4 4 
* 11 38 23 11 6 11 15 4i 13 20 2 9 ' 4 60 20 16 
; 5-. * 9 U8 12 l4 9 9 1 53 10 i4 13 9 5 45 5 31 7 7 
6 11 40 19 8 5 17 5 48 19 22 2 3 60 4 24 11 
Kaa% 1 18 i+0 28 5 6 3 9 52 12 11 7 9 27 38 19 16 
2a * 25 22 26 19 6 2 18 58 1 i6 3 4 3 55 15 24 3 
2b * 29 Ui 7 10 i4 5 53 11 20 11 59 9 23 9 
3® * i6 36 22 8 4 i4 11 35 12 22 20 1 48 24 27 
3b * 19 30 21 i6 3 .10 5 59 20 6 5 4 2 4i 10 29 i4 5 
U * 22 26 26 11 4 12 5 45 13 17 15 5 59 32 3 5 
5 * 19 35 22 12 3 9 7 35 14 28 11 5 18 50 18 9 5 
6 * 11 28 38 10 4 10 12 37 18 18 5 11 9 60 9 21 2 
7a * 8 15 36 20 6 13 3 42 25 10 10 10 4 25 21 39 11 
7b * 12 25 22 19 7 15 8 49 19 12 5 7 2 47 9 27 13 2 
Mlnn.l-i+ * Ik 29 19 l6 6 l6 15 53 8 11 4 9 60 6 20 11 3 
6 * 17 kh l4 9 5 11 3 51 9 22 10 6 5 49 7 26 5 9 
7-8 * 18 k3 15 10 4 6 4 58 8 11 10 9 3 56 18 21 3 
Table (CdatlEtaei.) 
State Laadlords 25-3^^ 









































































Landlords Laadlords 35 
1 2 3 ¥ 5 5" T 2 3 5 5 ^ 
50 21 29 kk 15 37 2 2 
11 11 39 11 17 11 18 10 kj 10 h 10 
ii-0 50 10 18 7 58 2 5 10 
33 54 13 38 12 35 2 2 12 
8 38 54 31 7 38 10 2 12 
14 57 29 30 4 kl 26 
2J 27 18 27 33 27 2k h 4 7 
38 50 12 23 13 32 13 6 13 
4o 50 10 38 15 31 h 12 
21 5 k2 5 26 17 11 h3 9 6 Ik 
50 25 25 23 12 5Q k 12 
50 50 45 27 5 23 
18 59 6 18 ki 19 22 4 11 4 
50 8 33 8 23 19 32 3 6 16 
59 29 12 2k 17 29 7 22 
Xx 6 33 6 6 39 7 l4 29 4 k 43 
2h 59 6 12 24 15 36 6 5 15 
22 11 56 6 6 22 28 5 12 
33 8 33 25 15 15 21 13 36 
"9 9 36 27 9 9 9 3 53 3 9 22 
50 50 7 19 52 7 15 
25 8 58 8 16 16 39 8 21 
Table U9 (Continued) 
State Landlords 55 Landlords 65-7^^ Landlords 75-8^^ 
and 1 2 3 U 5 6 1 ^ 3 5 5 5" 12 3^56 
area 
1 * 2k 2k 17 16 3 16 17 48 3 23 5 5 3 45 16 11 13 13 
2 * 21 31 29 9 5 5 10 45 17 19 4 5 7 37 32 12 10 2 
3a * 30 22 4o 2 3 3 8 4i 15 30 5 2 3 70 17 3 7 
3b * 22 37 15 11 1 l4 6 49 13 17 3 11 9 63 25 3 
* 36 20 Ik 14 7 9 5 51 16 17 6 6 2 56 5 19 12 5 
5 * 25 35 25 7 5 4 4 52 20 7 8 9 2 47 19 17 11 4 
6 * 22 30 2k 8 7 9 13 39 12 20 7 9 , 56 6 19 6 14 
7 * 19 29 23 l4 7 9 13 53 12 9 6 7 9 4i 16 19 16 
1 21 39 15 9 6 9 12 ^9 22 12 2 2 7 4o 7 20 27 
2a * 26 26 26 6 6 9 10 5i^ l4 4 l4 4 73 18 9 
2b * 21 23 30 11 13 2 10 56 21 6 6 4 57 22 17 
3a * 11 36 31 9 11 2 7 55 22 7 7 2 16 37 11 32 5 
3b * 20 37 30 3 8 3 9 48 15 19 4 6 4 52 22 13 9 
il-a * 2k 33 31 2 6 4 l4 42 .16 l4 9 5 14 54 5 14 l4 
kh * 16 28 33 7 2 13 6 51 19 12 7 6 3 58 12 15 9 3 
1 * 11 2k 35 9 4 17 8 44 8 28 6 6 77 8 15 
2ab * T 5k 16 7 2 l4 10 59 13 16 1 7 66 22 2 2 
3 * 10 l+T 20 13 10 7 62 3 23 2 2 7 67 5 12 5 5 
* k 37 21 21 7 10 11 5^ 9 l4 7 5 70 18 12 
5 * 19 24 36 8 2 12 12 45 8 27 8 3 50 3 33 6 6 
6-T ik k2 15 l4 1 14 13 50 5 23 5 4 ^3 7 29 11 11 
8-9 10 1+8 2k 12 1 5 13 45 7 27 6 3 3 61 .8 21 3 5 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between age groups. 
®Code for type of; landlord; 1-actiTe farmer; 2-retired farmer; 3-business or professional; 
4-farm widow; 5-no^i-fa'rm widow; 6-other. 
223 













Ind. 2b * 11 20 3T 6 30 31+ 
6 IT 20 31 21 8 
63 
19 
la. la * 27 38 T1 53 57 
lb 50 i+l 50 1+1 59 63 
2a * 38 35 72 1+9 76 57 
2b * 29 i+i+ 63 1+8 63 51 
3a ho it-1 1+8 29 67 1+8 
S'b 37 1+3 57 1+1+ 69 50 
U * 52 1+6 73 39 73 36 
5 38 i+8 3T i+5 57 
6 * 30 1+1 63 50 57 50 
Kan. 1 * 19 23 3i^ 5 7I+ 1+3 
2a * 12 l6 1+0 2 55 11 
2b * 3 15 9 21+ 0 13 
3a * 3 2 26 19 28 23 
3fc IT 5 1I+ 0 0 25 
U * 6 ll+ 27 12 1+0 17 
5 * 0 21 30 II+ 21+ 38 
6 * T 9 21 6 50 27 
7a 20 12 16 12 31 22 
Tb 11 23 15 IT 17 23 
Minn. l^k * 25 28 21 33 39 1+9 
6 * 35 31+ 59 21 i+7 1+5 
7-8 * 28 35 61 3I+ 50 60 
Web. 1 * 1+1+ 51 50 77 53 
2 * 33 2T 1+1+ 38 ^5 56 
3a 33 30 39 21 1+3 1+8 
3t * 3i+ 29 5T 1+0 31 66 
U * 1+9 18 36 16 29 2I+ 
5 * 15 31 3T 38 32 33 
6 * 31 54 53 1+7 79 
T 21+ 33 1+0 36 39 38 
S.D. 1 * k2 1+0 55 23 38 7!+ 
2a 26 26 1+0 25 1+5 35 
2b * 23 21 50 33 1+3 1+8 
3a * 19 32 1+8 36 33 60 
3b * 11 21 32 18 60 29 
ii-a 33 2T 55 15 38 39 
h-b * 2k 28 1+T 2T 56 23 
Wis. 1 ^3 28 1+3 35 50 1+6 
2ab * 3T 39 61 23 50 1+2 
3 ,* k2 39 72 33 33 57 
k hi 3T 1+2 1+5 1+7 1+1 
5 k2 30 35 19 30 35 
6-7 1+1 i+T 1+T 1+9 1+1+ 39 
8-9 * li-8 39 51+ 2I+ 1+3 56 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Table 51. Percent of landlords receiving a casb payment for use of 
buildings by type of landlord 
State Active Retired Pusiness Farm Noni-farm other 
and farmer farmer or prof. widow widow 
area 
Ind. 2b 3 
6 6 7 9 5 
la. la 7 12 7 8 6 
lb 11 8 6 5 9 
2a h 4^- 5 8 2k 7 
2b 6 5 15 7 6 k 
3a 8 
3b IT 6 6 25 9 
1+ 12 17 9 
5 6 10 6 
6 k 12 17 
8 Kan. 1 50 10 
2a 15 6 17 25 26 
2b 10 13 15 100 15 
3a 33 7 71 20 26 
3b 36 18 20 15 17 17 
12 6- 15 7 k 
5 9 2h 11 
6 5 .8 31 12 12 
Ta It-i). 9 1^ 6 62 33 7 
7b 50 59 55 20 67 31 
Minn. l-k 17 16 
6 17 
7-8 9 10 9 
Neb. 1 11 20 25 
2 8 8 12 
3 a 39 15 21 18 33 8 
3b 25 18 31 25 17 32 
9 11 15 18 25 
5 29 8 30 20 57 10 
6 12 11 21 8 30 19 
7 25 3 25 12 10 k6 
S.D. 1 lii-
2a 20 19 6 10 8 
2b h6 7 5 10 
3a 15 7 6 29 Ik 
3b 29 20 2k 17 4o 
Ik ii-a 25 19 23 10 









Table 52. Percent of tenants mailing specific suggestions among tenants 
offering suggestions to increase income. 
State Share Increase 
expense length 
of lease 
Ind. 25 12 
la. 22 17 
Kan. 27 19 
Minn. 25 l6 
Neb. 25 11 
S.D. 21 12 
Wis. 23 10 
Increase Improve Landlord 
termination practices furnish 
notice more 
facilities 
1 30 12 
1 37 10 
1 52 3 
3i+ 12 
1 55 T 
53 
2h 10 
Table 53- Percent of tenants making specific suggestion among tenants 
offering suggestions to increase conservation 
State Increase Share Change Educate Increase 
length costs rotation, landlord government 
of lease improve 
practices 
payments 
Ind. 10 26 29 11 
la. 15 ih 55 7 2 
Kan, l!+ 25 61^ 19 -
Minn. 11 22 53 U 1 
Neb. 10 22 57 10 1 
S.D. 13 22 53 10 1 
Wis. 9 26 57 5 -
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Table 5U. Percent of tenants making specific suggestion among tenants 
offering suggestions to increase number of livestock 
State More live­ Increase Eliminate Landlord Decrease 
stock-share length cash-crop provide cash rent 
leases of lease system of more on hay and 
farming facilities pasture 
Ind. 15 5 8 51 2 
la. 13 5 1 ^5 14 
Kan. 15 4 59 20 6 
Minn. 8 2 6 38 12 
Neb. 12 k 15 51 11 
S .D. 7 k 36 24 5 
Wis. 6 3 20 -
Table 55. Percent of tenants making specific suggestion among tenants 
offering suggestions to encourage farm improvements. 
State Increase More live­ Landlord Landlord furnish 
length stock-share provide materials and ten­
of lease leases more ant. do the work 
facilities 
Ind. 11 7 46 6 
la. 15 5 47 l4 
Kan. 12 3 16 17 
Minn. 12 2 58 10 
Neb. 15 3 46 10 
S.D. I k  3 48 10 
Wis. 1  64 8 
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Table 56. Percent of tenants making specific suggestion among tenants 
expressing dissatisfaction with their lease 
State Lease No or poor Landlord Expenses Cash rent No opportunity 
too improve­ not inter­ not on hay or for Joint 
short ments ested in shared pasture planning 
conserving fairly too high 
or improv­
ing 
Ind. 7 12 21 31 3 
la. 10 2k 16 k3 6 5 
Kan. 22 21 39 27 3 k 
Minn. Ik 16 Ik 31 1 
Neb. 13 23 32 2k 5 3 
S .D. 12 16 23 33 7 k 
Wis. 6 18 13 lj.14. - 2 
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Table 57. Percent of tenants dealing with landlord in making the agreement 










Ind. 2b - 96 95 91 
6 100 96 95 100 
la- la * 95 100 86 99 
lb * 85 86 77 95 
2a * 92 Qh 81 97 
2b * 89 92 86 9k 
3a * 8o 100 8k 98 
3b 90 93 80 90 
ij. 79 100 83 88 
5 87 93 89 95 
6 • 83 89 87 91+ 
Kan. 1 100 90 83 100 
2a - 91 85 81 
2b 100 9^ 83 100 
3a 50 90 82 100 
3t 69 85 89 87 
k 100 81+ 90 100 
5 91 89 80 86 
6 * 75 95 84 98 
7a 81^ 91+ 90 100 
7b 92 9k 81 100 
Minn. l~h 81 90 85 97 
6 83 100 93 93 
7-8 89 92 81+ 90 
Neb. 1 79 97 92 96 
2 50 88 81 100 
3a 100 92 81+ 92 
3b 100 93 87 100 
50 93 82 97 
5 89 85 95 
6 83 92 81 88 
7 62 92 78 100 
S.D. 1 67 89 89 96 
2a 20 88 80 93 
2b 33 80 86 100 
3a 50 93 88 88 
3b 33 96 93 100 
50 86 88 88 
kh 100 95 90 96 
Wis. 1 95 89 100 100 
2ab 99 9U 100 99 
3 91 100 100 9k 
1+ 92 100 100 95 
5 93 98 100 95 
6-7 90 100 100 91 
8-9 9h 100 100 93 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
proportion for all leases. 
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Ind. 2b * 84 67 
6 ^5 57 63 53 
la. la * 93 81+ 91 76 
lb * 83 Qh 91 76 
2a * 91 83 87 68 
2b 53 81 87 82 
3a 80 77 90 84 
3b * 80 72 96 75 
4 77 71 87 83 
5 * 90 79 91 72 
6 * 87 73 88 71 
Kan. 1 100 h3 31 11 
2a * 100 2k 7 26 
2b ko 29 38 46 
3a * 2 15 3^+ 20 
3"b 23 ^3 46 38 
* » 60 88 62 
5 * Ik 65 70 50 
6 * 50 57 89 64 
7a * 68 71 91 73 
Tb * 95 50 78 6.9 
Minn.l-il- h9 38 39 38 
6 37 kl 1+1 4l 
7-8 62 65 77 65 
Neb. 1 * 51+ 9k 89 45 
2 50 76 84 33 
3a 100 8k 86 92 
3b 67 91 88 81 
* 86 71 92 78 
5 * 61^ 83 59 
6 * 89 94 91 67 
7 91 68 80 64 
S.D, 1 * 71 73 81 i^3 
2a 20 60 51 55 
2b 25 39 50 29 
3a * 8 10 86 71 
Sb 100 78 82 90 
100 49 13 
i|-b 63 80 88 62 
Wis. 1 33 67 28 
2ab 59 69 67 62 
3 85 100 80 81 
k 62 67 60 64 
5 52 58 50 61 
6«7 k2 50 67 42 
8-9 6k 56 75 64 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Table 59. Percent distribution of leases by month beginning 
State Jan. Mar. May July Sept. Nov, None 
and Feb. Apr. Jme Aug. Oct. Dec. named 
area 
Ind. 2b 16 68 0 2 3 3 8 
6 20 56 0 9 4 2 9 
la. la 9 87 0 1 - - 2 
lb 9 85 - 2 1 1 2 
2a 6 84 1 S 3 1 3 
2b 8 83 1 2 2 2 2 
3a 9 86 0 0 0 - 5 
3b 10 84 0 1 2 1 2 
h 11 82 - 1 2 2 1 
5 10 83 0 1 2 2 2 
6 11 81 0 1 - 2 4 
Kan. 1 3 4o , 1 47 2 0 7 
2a 9 18 0 53 8 1 11 
2b 6 3^ 2 55 1 0 3 
3 a 6 24 0 61 2 0 7 
3b 9 44 3 32 1 1 10 
6 74 1 l4 1 0 .4 
5 9 67 1 18 2 0 3 
6 13 73 2 8 2 0 2 
Ta 9 80 4 i 0 2 4 
7b 9 63 2 20 3 0 3 
Minn. 1-4 l6 4l 3 1 21 13 5 
6 l8 39 3 57 32 7 1 
7~Q 9 70 1 3 7 6 ,4 
Neb. 1 9 75 10 - 2 1 2 
2 9 75 2 1 4 2 7 
3a 5 86 0 2 3 - 3 
3b 5 88 - 1 2 - 3 
4 6 82 1 4 3 - 4 
5 4 75 1 ID 4 0 6 
6 6 90 1 - 2 - 1 
T 10 77 4 4 1 0 4 
S.D. 1 18 68 1 1 5 7 0 
2a l4 52 2 1 25 6 0 
2b 9 42 0 3 kk 2 0 
3a 8 88 1 1 2 0 0 
3b 11 81 - 2 4 0 1 
ii-a 7 46 1 2. 42 2 0 
4b 10 83 1 1 1 1 3 
Wis. 1 24 43 i4 5 8 6 0 
2ab 13 63 2 I 11 8 2 
3 14 82 - 0 1 2 1 
k 15 63 8 1 5 5 3 
5 21 57 6 1 8 5 2 
6-7 21 42 5 1 22 7 2 
8-9 12 63 2 1 15 5 2 
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Table 60. Percent male landlords by length of lease 
State Wot in 1 2-3 if-5 Indefinite other 
and lease year years years 
area 
Ind. 2b 70 i+0 75 68 65 
6 100 78 75 75 59 50 
la. la - 75 kl 72 50 80 
lb - 73 53 50 33 7i+ 
2a -- 78 63 67 72 77 
2b 100 68 83 55 71 65 
3a 73 100 67 82 •Jk 
3b 71 69 - 100 83 
J+ - 7k 87 67 57 65 
5 - 65 6k 88 69 80 
6 • - 72 60 75 6k 82 
Kan. 1 - 70 H5 90 78 77 
2a - 83 75 50 76 81 
2b - 81+ 20 67 77 71 
3a 100 63 67 80 77 56 
3b 92 6k 100 78 71 79 
k 89 Ik 63 71 71 78 
5 100 75 50 - 90 77 
6 57 77 71 82 61+ 79 
7a 4o 79 100 _ 60 73 
7b - 83 63 9IJ. 76 86 
Minn. 1-k 75 77 76 55 78 67 
6 67 75 69 .88 80 73 
7-8 80 80 87 68 72 71 
Neb. 1 50 77 83 71 100 60 
2 89 82 59 59 8i+ 77 
3a - 77 100 87 57 85 
3b 50 72 83 86 100 86 
k 80 69 73 75 88 81 
5 100 77 62 71 93 68 
6 100 72 71 71 100 91 
7 50 72 67 89 36 70 
S.D. 1 - Qk 79 86 69 65 
2a - 79 78 100 67 6i+ 
2b - 78 71 67 85 92 
3a - 81 6k 50 65 75 
3b - 83 50 67 95 71 
Ua - 79 86 90 95 73 
1+b 
- 75 82 67 82 60 
Wis. 1 - 71 79 57 78 75 
2ab 100 82 100 77 78 73 
3 67 80 78 90 89 78 
k 67 70 7i^ 88 91 75 
5 67 76 73 75 73 76 
6-7 - 66 71 79 81 88 
8-9 100 -Jk 79 81 75 76 
Table 6l. Percent distribution of leases by number of years rented this 
land 
State One 2-J+ 5-9 lO years 
and year years years +• 
area 
Ind. 2b 9 28 29 31^ 
6 9 31 29 31 
la. la 9 33 3^ 2I+ 
lb l4 32 33 21 
2a 10 29 38 23 
2b 9 31 32 28 
3:a li^ 35 28 23 
3b 13 37 30 20 
12 37 30 21 
5 8 30 3^ 28 
6 10 27 1+0 23 
Kan. 1 1 28 35 36 
2a 2k 37 39 
2b 30 36 31+ 
3 a 33 33 33 
3b 1 27 33 39 
k 1+0 3^ 26 
5 39 36 25 
6 2 37 3^ 27 
7a 3 3^ 39 21+ 
Tb 1 hi 3i^ 21+ 
Minn. 1-it- 13 36 29 22 
6 11 38 29 22 
7-8 10 28 1+0 22 
Neb. 1 8 30 33 29 
2 6 22 35 37 
3 a 12 31^ 32 22 
3b 13 36 32 19 
6 3i+ 3^^ 26 
5 5 25 37 33 
6 13 36 30 21 
7 6 31 35 28 
S.D. 1 7 ho 29 21+ 
2a 9 35 35 21 
2b 7 3h 35 2k 
3a 9 38 30 23 
3b 12 k2 31 15 
ka 9 39 31 21 
kh 10 32 31^ 21+ 
Wis. 1 20 1+2 26 12 
2ab 15 1+1 28 16 
3 11 1+0 31 18 
13 39 31^ II+ 
5 i6 36 27 21 
6-7 9 35 3it 22 
8-9 13 32 32 23 
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Table 62. Percent of crop-share and crop-share-cash leases with one-half 
share fertilizer costs and percent with one-half share corn by niMber 
years rented 
State Fertilizer Corn 
and Rented this land Rented this land 
area 1 2-I4. 5-9 10+ 1 2-4 5-9 10 f 
year years years years year years years years 
Ind. 2b 85 96 97 97 89 100 98 95 
6 14,1). 43 52 30 50 38 40 29 
la. la 9h 80 80 • 72 100 89 92 89 
lb 85 76 65 78 100 100 100 86 
2a 89 85 84 75 100 92 93 88 
2b 96 87 84 80 100 100 100 98 
3a 69 71 74 59 100 100 100 95 
3b 38 72 53 50 100 100 100 100 
65 85 80 88 83 96 92 94 
5 83 65 65 63 100 100 98 100 
6 78 62 60 56 100 93 94 94 
Kan. 1 0 9 6 22 0 0 0 0 
2a •X- 0 11 45 11 0 0 0 0 
2b 0 0 6 l4 0 0 0 10 
3a * 0 64 35 23 0 0 0 0 
313 0 27 22 16 0 17 6 7 
i+ 0 20 28 39 0 7 23 7 
5 0 31 31 24 0 26 36 32 
6 0 56 52 60 100 69 58 61 
Ta 0 31 26 27 0 10 2 9 
7b * 0 70 65 48 0 0 0 0 
Minn. l-i+ 6 ki 35 32 25 26 5 13 
6 0 63 45 58 60 45 42 33 
7-8 10 45 45 45 38 42 22 30 
Neb. 1 0 19 12 15 0 11 2 4 
2 0 26 26 25 10 6 0 0 
3a 0 30 11 7 4 6 0 0 
3b 1+ 18 18 36 8 3 7 4 
1+ 0 12 13 10 0 3 1 1 
5 * 0 10 26 8 0 0 0 0 
6 * 13 37 34 9 18 13 13 17 
7 0 1+0 29 36 42 30 19 33 
S.D. 1 33 29 18 29 100 0 8 0 
2a 0 i+0 0 0 0 3 3 0 
2b 0 33 10 20 0 6 0 0 
3a 25 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 
3b 0 19 21 0 4 1 0 0 
i+a 0 23 21 27 7 13 l4 9 
4b 22 2k 4o 13 21 12 10 5 
Wis. 1 * 15 33 64 0 0 0 0 0 
2ab * i+ 56 62 76 1(56 66 ^ 0 •' 0 
3 * 3 72 82 72 50 100 100 100 
4 * 5 65 72 76 75 0 0 0 
5 * 10 53 61 71 67 53 17 60 
6-7 0 80 69 65 0 100 100 100 
8-9 * 78 78 89 0 100 100 100 
mz-wo a •? rm-?-Pt r» Q-n-l- n-P-Por*«=krv t-n •nr»/^"r»n"I r^rv G 'h<a*i-.T.T/=v#=k'n "Prvr» 
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Table 63. Percent male landlords by size of tract 
State Size of tract, acres 
and 0- 30- 50- 100- lao- 260- 500- 1000+ 
area 29 49 99  ^ 179 259 499 999 
Ind. 2b 40 71 65 59 76 62 100 
6 60 79 60 71 84 80 100 
la. la 83 68 76 78 72 
lb 100 76 66 81 69 100 100 
2 a 75 71 75 79 76 100 
2b 100 67 65 63 63 84 100 100 
3a 67 33 68 71 78 82 86 
3b 100 67 57 67 74 97 
50 60 58 76 78 67 100 
5 100 100 57 65 74 82 100 
6 67 78 59 74 71 83 
Kan. 1 76 75 80 69 69 
2a * 46 77 89 80 80 71 
2b 100 70 69 88 73 67 100 
3a 100 71 47 62 64 76 86 
3b 100 72 82 71 71 69 82 
k 50 40 74 70 50 74 91 100 
5 100 58 4o 76 85 75 92 88 
6 * 93 63 82 35 94 86 67 
7a 87 78 .89 65 57 76 33 
7b * 95 93 78 82 84 50 100 
Minn. 1-4 75 100 74 77 65 78 67 100 
6 89 100 68 77 75 72 50 
7-8 33 33 75 81 84 74 75 
84 100 Neb. 1 100 79 73 84 79 69 
2 100 100 86 73 78 76 72 85 
3a 100 100 67 75 81 80 88 86 
3b 86 75 57 77 81 70 100 100 
k 100 62 80 71 72 48 86 
5 100 50 70 74 78 85 100 
6 67 69 86 71 71 62 100 
7 88 71 67 64 71 83 100 
S.D. 1 67 100 67 82 75 79 63 92 50 
2a 100 80 72 69 76 86 100 
2b 33 67 72 73 84 100 100 
3a 100 100 ' 69 87 74 92 86 
3b 50 57 94 78 85 85 100 100 
ij-a 100 75 50 81 83 85 83 
kh 100 71 78 66 75 100 100 
Wis. 1 79 63 71 76 100 67 
2ab 58 4o 81 85^  83 90 100 100 
3 100 67 67 78 82 87 75 100 
h 71 74 60 83 74 100 100 
5 76 75 67 76 78 82 100 
6,7 79 45 67 76 88 100 
8-9 64 70 81 74 69 84 
*One significant difference in proportions between size groups. 
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Table 6k. Percent distribution of nxaniber of yea,rB rented this land by size 
of tract rented 
State Under 29 acres 30-% 1 acres 50-! 5*9 acres 
and 1 2*k 5-9 lOf 1 2-k 5^9" lOf 1 2«4 5-9 10-t-
area jrr, . yrs . yrs. yrs. yr. yrs. yrs. yrs. yr, yrs. yrs* yrs 
Ind. 2b 20 20 60 7 22 57 11+ 11 22 1+1 25^ 
6 27 20 7 k6 4 33 33 29 6 34 28 32 
lat la 50 17 33 8 i+i+ 33 li+ 
lb 50 50 50 50 26 ,1+2 16 16 
2a 25 75 11 32 37 21 
2b 100 17 50 33 8 1+0 3^ 19 
3a 100 33 67 15 26 35 2i+ 
3b 50 50 
66 
33 67 1+2 37 21 
k 25 50 25 17 17 15 22 26 37 
5 100 20 i+o 20 20 k 32 39 25 
6 17 50 17 17 22 33 13 18 36 33 
Kan. 1 
2 a i+ 29 25 1+2 
2b 100 1+1 22 37 
3a 50 50 
4 
38 62 27 30 k3 
3b 75 
50 
25 13 61 ,22' 32 20 ,1+8 
k 50 •1+0 60 50 17 33 
5 75 
36 
25 1+2 1+2 16 37 1+6 17 
6 6h k 17 1+6 33 2 39 2I+ 35 
7a 26 26 26 37 33 1+ 29 i+5 22 
fb * it- 78 Ik :k 28 69 3 1+2 18 39 
Minn. 1-^4- 25 50 6 19 ' 22 1+1+ 22 11 II+ 26 38 22 
6 67 22 11 75 25- 13 31 33 23 
7-8 33 67 33 33 33 li+ 39 33 Ik 
Heb. 1 67 33 5 50 1+0 5 
2 67 33 100 11 33 33 22 
3a IT 66 17 25 50 25 5 3^ 32 29 
3b 57 k3 50 25 25 12 31^ 27 27 
h *100 50 50 6 1+7 19 28 
5 100 75 25 1 25 31+ 1+0 
6 * 25 50 25 k X5 23 58 28 ,1+2 26 1+ 
T 43, li^ Ik 29 25 25 50 k 1+1 38 17 
S,D. 1 67 33 50 50 10 30 30 30 
2a 100 li+ 11+ Ik 57 
2b 67 33 9 45 27 18 
3a 100 75 25 17 50 33 
3b 50 50 29 k3 28 21+ 1+1 21+ 12 
!+a 100 75 25 8 33 25 33 
Ub 100 1+3 29 29 12 41+ 30 Ik 
Wis. 1 15 52 33 16 1+7 25 12 22 33 22 22 
2ab* 1+2 58 ID 50 30 10 1+ 50 2i+ 22 
3 100 33 33 33 21 1+2 21 16 
k 15 55 15 X5 7 38 38 17 16 38 33 13 
5 38 31 19 12 6 75 13 6 17 37 25 21 
6-7 k kl 26 30 3 31 55 10 9 32 38 21 
8*9 36 36 7 21 56 27 18 18 26 37 19 
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Table 6k (Continued) 
State 10Q-1T9 acres 180-259 acres 
and 1 2-h 5-9 10+ 1 2-4 5-9 10 1 , 2*^4 5-9 10+ 
area yr. yrs. yrs, yrs. yr. yrs. yrs. yrs. yr* yrs. yrs. yrs 
Ind. 2b 13 27 27 32 2 3  ^ 29 12 31 14 ^3 
6 7 37 35 20 5 16 26 53 l4 29 29 29 
la • la 8 32 32 28 12 26 40 22 6 33 35 25 
lb 14 28 32 26 10 1+0 38 12 10 25 4o 25 
2a 10 31 36 23 10 18 48 24 9 37 32 22 
2b 12 30 29 29 8 21 4l 30 6 37 27 31 
3a 19 33 25 22 9 36 33 22 11 50 l4 25 
3b 15 ^3 25 18 21 26 3  ^ 18 6 4l 31 22 
4 8 i+0 26 25 12 37 4l 10 19 33 37 11 
5 3 31 33 32 IT 25 36 22 13 35 35 16 
6 8 25 1+1+ 21+ 11 35 40 14 17 21 42 21 
Kan. 1 Zk 26 50 63 37 32 4l 26 
2a 17 33 50 11 72 17 32 29 39 
2b 1+0 29 31 2I+ 35 4l 15 56 29 
3a 38 28 3lt 57 24 19 2 27 45 26 
3b 26 31+ 1+0 27 29 44 23 4o 37 
k i+3 30 27 37 43 20 32 49 19 
5 37 1+1 22 32 32 36 2 38 30 30 
6 1 k-j 28 21+ 30 42 28 4 42 35 19 
Ta 2 39 33 25 5" 23 49 23 36 36 27 
7b * 3 il-0 38 18 ,1+1+ 44 12 13 35 52 
Minn. l-.i4- 10 ^7 25 18 11 1+1 22 26 14 30 32 23 
6 12 it-0 31 18 11 43 16 30 10 30 25 35 
7-8 12 26 1+2 20 T 24 31+ 35 5 30 46 19 
Neb. 1 11 11 k3 3^ 19 29 38 l4 7 26 33 33 
2 7 22 33 38 1+ 38 27 31 4 19 36 4l 
3a 17 27 30 27 12 44 25 19 16 33 39 12 
3b 11 37 33 19 13 35 33 18 22 35 35 8 
4 * 6 36 38 19 2 42 37 19 6 22 39 33 
5 5 27 38 30 9 16 29 46 6 28 48 19 
6 * 10 39 28 22 13 42 35 10 10 33 31 26 
7 7 29 35 29 1+ 31^ 34 28 7 26 44 22 
S.D. 1 6 35 22 37 10 70 20 6 4l 3^ 19 
2 a 6 26 1+0 29 ,8 69 8 15 8 4l 42 9 
2b 5 i+l 25 30 6 29 29 35 7 29 48 17 
3a 9 30 30 31 6 31 44 19 5 i+3 36 16 
3b 11 39 31 19 15 48 33 4 9 48 33 -9 
^a 7 38 28 27 13 .33 4o 13 ,11 37 37 15 
i+b 12 29 33 26 6 28 36 30 12 31 35 22 
Wis. 1 2k 1+2 21+ 9 33 17 50 33 33 33 
2ab* 15 ^3 26 15 22 36 30 12 9 25 44 22 
3 10 38 31 21 11 4o 33 16 9 40 32 19 
k l6 36 35 13 6 31+ 46 l4 50 25 25 
5 l8 32 29 21 10 38 26 26 17 17 33 33 
6-7 10 38 26 25 20 30 30 20 20 20 60 
8-9 15 27 30 28 1+ 4l 39 15 5 42 32 21 
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Table 6k (Continued) 
State 500-999 acres lOOO-il-999 acres Over 5000 acres" 
and 1 2-k 5-9 lOf 1 21-4 5-9 10+ 1 2-k 5-9 10+ 
area yr. yrs. yrs. yrs. yr. yrs. yrs. yrs. yr. yrs, yrs. yrs. 
Ind. 2b 100 
6 33 33 33 
la. la 
lb 100 100 
2a 100 
2b 100 100 
3a lil- li+ 72 
3b 100 
1+ 100 
5 50 50 
6 
Kan, 1 3 27 35 35 20 4o Ho 
2a lit- 72 11+ 36 57 7 
2b 7 50 h3 25 12 63 
3a 33 kk 22 
3b 33 i+2 25 
4 65 17 17 100 
5 33 27 4o 63 25 12 
6 33 33 33 
7a 50 25 25 
7b * 100 
Minn.l-i+ 18 ,27 27 27 50 50 
6 75 25 
7-8 20 i^0 ho 
Neb. 1 11 37 23 29 5 28 4l 26 75 25 
2 21 38 38 .7 h3 50 
3a 22 22 56 10 ko 20 30 
3b 22 33 22 22 100 
k * 11 26 26 37 57 29 Ik 
5 75 25 
6 * 100 
7' 33 67 
S.D. 1 4 56 20 20 10 33 ^3 .13 25 25 50 
2a 23 31 29 17 20 80 
2b 18 18 53 12 50 50 
3 a 29 36 36 57 i4 29 100 
3b 17 17 50 17 100 
i+a 50 33 17 
4b 33 67 100 
Wis. 1 
2ab* 100 50 50 





*One or more significant difference in proportions between size groups. 
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Table 65. Distribution of types of landlord by age of renter 
State Percent renters xmder 25 Percent,renters 25-3^  
and renting fromo- renting frpmS' 
area 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ind. 2b 9 27 18 27 9 9 9 29 30 9 11 12 
6 * 33 42 17 8 15 15 39 15 4 12 
la, la * ij-0 20 10 20 10 12 50 17 11 3 7 
lb * 33 33 17 6 6 6 16 35 23 12 1 13 
2a ko 4o 10 10 15 4o 24 13 2 6 
2b * 17 25 17 4l 10 48 24 13 2 3 
3a * 60 10 10 10 10 17 33 27 8 4 11 
3b * 25 25 25 17 8 17 31 15 9 11 17 
U 19 57 10 iO 4 17 4i 19 11 3 9 
5 50 25 25 13 51 8 20 5 3 
6 17 32 17 17 17 13 42 15 13 6 11 
Kan. 1 * 7 51 21 21 17 28 28 1 13 13 
2a 66 17 17 16 35 21 15 1 12 
2b * 13 33 27 20 7 11 45 16 7 3 18 
3a * 13 80 7 19 37 12 4 12 16 
3b * 33 U5 22 15 35 15 15 6 15 
1). * 26 30 22 22 28 18 26 9 1 18 
5 * 17 50 n 17 10 45 12 18 6 9 
6 * 10 35 20 10 25 22 30 18 15 3 12 
7a 33 67 4 15 32 34 4 11 
7b 51+ 31 15 11 38 22 8 10 11 
Minn»1-4 6 kl 12 17 6 18 17 32 14 13 2 22 
6 36 46 8 15 4l 13 11 5 15 
7-8 20 47 20 13 15 47 14 13 2 9 
Neb, 1 * 50 33 17 29 39 13 2 3 l4 
2 * 11 45 22 11 11 16 36 23 13 5 7 
3a * 20 30 30 10 10 21 38 25 9 5 2 
3b * l4 23 36 14 4 9 26 33 12 16 2 11 
k * 4 31 17 13 35 28 29 18 9 6 10 
5 * 10 65 20 5 20 39 16 6 3 16 
6 * 33 38 4 13 4 8 18 34 16 8 9 15 
7 50 17 8 25 l4 4i 16 14 4 11 
S.D. 1 29 57 14 24 34 24 7 3 8 
2a * 20 34 20 13 13 17 33 18 12 8 12 
2b 32 22 17 17 6 6 15 38 15 6 9 17 
3a 12 38 25 25 18 44 18 10 6 5 
3b 16 31 37 5 11 21 37 19 6 6 11 
Ua ll4- 14 36 7 7 22 26 38 l4 9 9 4 
Ub 8 50 8 8 25 19 36 23 11 4 7 
Wis. 1 37 27 9 27 9 22 27 9 6 27 
2ab 13 hi 20 7 13 l4 48 18 10 3 7 
3 25 12 12 6 12 46 15 11 1 15 
k * 20 40 15 15 10 7 53 13 14 4 9 
5 Ik l4 36 14 7 14 15 30 23 11 4 17 
6-7 42 29 29 15 35 17 21 1 11 
8-9* 18 27 9 18 27 11 52 19 7 11 
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Table 65 (Continued) 
State Percent renters 35-^^ Percent renters ^5-5^ 
and 
area 
renting froma renting from®' 
1 2 3 1+ 5 6 1 2 3 1+ 5 6 
Ind. 2b 6 21 28 25 10 10 6 3^  19 23 9 9 
6 * 8 32 22 II+ 10 1I+ 10 20 38 17 5 10 
la. la * 12 kl 17 9 11 10 8 23 30 12 12 15 
lb * 21 32 17 7 8 15 12 12 26 16 9 26 
2a 7 35 35 12 6 5 11 22 35 12 13 7 
2b * 11 33 23 11 10 12 5 17 2i+ 28 9 17 
3a * 6 31 31 15 6 11 3 27 33 17 10 10 
3b * 19 31 20 15 9 6 7 23 1+1+ 10 3 13 
12 23 21+ 20 6 15 21 21 17 12 29 
5 9 ko 17 11 8 15 1+ 37 19 17 8 15 
6 1 h3 26 15 5 10 7 30 22 17 7 17 
Kan. 1 * 5 35 25 10 12 13 12 26 30 12 10 10 
2a li+ 39 16 16 1+ 11 17 28 15 13 6 21 
2b * 18 51 12 6 3 10 7 32 15 21+ 22 
3a * 16 32 16 18 12 6 8 10 13 21 32 16 
3b * if 1+5 15 15 8 13 8 20 38 10 10 II+ 
k * 9 33 12 18 8 20 16 1+1 10 11 16 6 
5 * 13 18 18 18 9 2k 9 28 26 18 2 17 
6 •x- 8 30 21 21+ 3 11+ 6 23 32 11 10 18 
7a 13 23 31 7 3  ^ 23 7 28 32 17 10 6 
7b 11 26 20 1I+ 2 27 6 22 36 13 3 20 
Minn. 1-1+ 13 23 16 12 10 26 8 31 17 8 5 31 
6 6 hk 9 19 7 15 3 26 11 31 29 
7-8 9 k9 12 7 5 18 13 27 18 1I+ 10 18 
Neb. 1 * 23 19 8 27 8 15 17 32 19 13 1+ 15 
.2 * 10 21 3U 11 9 15 11 28 23 13 6 19 
3a * Ik ,25 1+0 9 6 6 18 28 12 21+ 1+ 1I+ 
3b * 11 3^  17 19 6 13 19 19 26 Ik 5 17 
!+ * 10 35 16 20 9 10 16 30 26 8 8 12 
5 * 10 l+O 25 9 8 8 6 26 21+ 10 13 21 
6 * 16 36 20 11 3 1I+ 9 33 18 18 1+ 18 
7 ih 33 25 11 5 12 1I+ 29 18, 12 11 16 
S.D. 1 12 23 31 9 2 23 1I+ 1I+ 27 8 11+ 23 
2a * 23 31 25 2 12 7 3 20 1+6 18 13 
2b 12 3^  ^ 3^  2 9 9 15 30 33 11 11 
3a 19 29 21+ 7 7 11+ 15 23 31 8 1+ 19 
3b 12 32 33 12 6 5 12 37 21+ 3 15 9 
l+a li+ 32 26 8 6 1I+ 20 25 33 2 5 15 
1+b 13 30 27 8 9 13 8 35 31 10 16 
Wis. 1 9 26 25 15 2 23 7 26 26 15 26 
2ab 9 1+1+ 19 li+ 1I+ 9 29 26 21 15 
3 9 52 13 11 7 8 9 1+2 30 15 2 2 
U * 11 31 1I+ 18 11 15 8 32 27 II+ , 5 1I+ 
5 12^  22 25 22 2 IT 10 32 15 23 5 15 
6-7 lo'' 1+5 12 13 3 17 9 25 6 22 9 29 
8-9* 9 1+1 23 20 1 6 13 23 23 25 9 7 
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Table 65 (Continued) 
State Percent renters 55-^  Percent renters 65 
and renting fromO' renting from^  
area 1 2 3 k 5 6 1 2 3 k 5 6 
Ind. 2b 32 25 k 11 25 20 20 1+0 20 
6 * 5 23 5^^ 9 9 11 1+5 11 11 22 
la. la * 20 30 20 15 15 25 50 25 
lb * 6 19 25 25 19 6 ^3 1+3 II+ 
2a 5 15 50 10 10 10 50 50 
2b * 12 25 18 9 15 21 1+0 ^0 20 
3:a * 12 12 38 38 100 
3b * 7 8 5^ 8 23 100 
k IT 1+1 8 IT IT 100 
5 29 18 12 23 18 50 25 25 
6 9 18 28 18 9 18 50 50 
Kan. 1 * 3 1+0 20 3T 100 
2a 12 30 19 8 31 25 T5 
2b * 8 3a 16 1+ 20 20 50 33 IT 
3a * 2k 2k 21 3 28 8 30 8 8 1+6 
3b * 7 23 11 18 5 36 1+6 1 23 30 
I4. * 11 19 19 2T 3 21 50 33 17 
5 * 17 23 IT T T 29 8 31+ 25 8 25 
6 * 18 26 1+1 1+ 11 1+0 1+0 10 10 
7a 19 1+3 1+ 15 19 58 li+ 11+ 11+ 
7b 20 30 10 13 27 6T 11 11 11 
Minn.l-B^  28 33 39 25 38 25 12 
6 35 20 5 10 30 33 33 33 
7-8 9 22 30 1+ 1+ 31 33 33 33 
Neb. 1 * 7 19 1+2 10 3 19 25 12 12 50 
2 * 10 16 1+6 6 3 19 11 22 .22 22 11 11 
3a * 2k 10 1+2 T 17 100 
3b * 11 26 i+0 5 5 13 IT 50 33 
it * 9 16 28 22 16 9 12 25 38 25 
5 * 23 1+1 18 .1+ Ik 25 25 50 
6 * 10 15 23 12 5 35 11+ Ik 58 
7 32 18 9 23 18 11 56 11 22 
S.D. 1 18 18 12 12 1+1 i+0 20 ,1+0 
2a * 19 22 kk 15 50 50 
2b 8 12 1+2 15 8 15 25 50 25 
3a 12 19 38 19 12 25 12 38 25 
3b 20 10 50 10 10 50 25 25 
ka. Ik 29 1+3 T T 100 
i+b 17 28 21+ T T 17 10. 20 1+0 20 10 
Wis. 1 37 18 2T 9 9 60 20 20 
2ab k3 II+ 1I+ 29 20 20 1+0 20 
3 11 39 22 11 IT 100 
1+ * 38 6 6 50 20 1+0 20 20 
5 10 30 10 20 10 20 12 50 12 12 12 
6-7 IT l^T 12 12 12 33 IT IT 33 
8-9* 13 22 26 13 1+ 22 6T 33 
*One or Diore significant difference in profortions when tested against 
proportion for all leases, 
a  ^ » 
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Table 67. Percent distribution of size of tra-ct rented froir; this landlord 
by type of Imdlord 
State Active farmer Retired farmer 
and  ^tracts with acres ji tracts -with acres 
area 0- 100- 180- 260- 500 + 0- 100- 180- 260- 500 f 
99 179 259 i^ 99 99 179 259 1+99 
Ind. 2b 26 k2 21 11 22 32 19 2k 3 
6 33 kk 17 6 56 2k 10 10 
la. la 2h 59 5 11 9 55 20 16 
lb 25 in 20 11 2 15 9^ 26 10 
2a * 18 56 21 5 12 51 20 17 
2b 18 52 12 15 3 2% i^ O 18 18 
3a * 20 28 28 20 k 16 1+5 23 16 
3b 19 35 19 27 19 i+0 19 23 
i)- 11 i^ 8 26 15 10 51+ 26 10 
5 llf 36 23 27 19 k2 28 10 1 
6 16 k2 26 16 17 k6 26 11 
Kan. 1 2k 52 2k k3 38 19 
2a * 5 kk 16 28 7 3 26 8 1+1 22 
2b * 16 53 6 19 6 12 22 30 26 10 
3a * 31 Hit 3 23 19 k2 X7 18 5 
3b * 17 i+7 13 17 7 27 39 17 13 5 
k * 35 23 7 19 16 li^  51 8 16 11 
5 18 k6 21 Ik 9 27 23 33 8 
6 35 38 8 16 3 21 33 26 20 1 
Ta * 7^ 7 7 k5 lit 18 2I+ 
Tb 50 15 27 7 37 k6 7 9 
Minn.l~H 33 26 8 28 5 29 i+1 8 20 2 
6 39 it6 8 4 26 50 17 7 
7-8 19 56 15 • 8 2 17 1+8 25 9 1 
Neb. 1 9 10 7 2i^  50 16 li+ 7 27 36 
2 16 30 7 19 28 16 29 8 20 27 
3a 21 27 15 29 8 16 4l 1I+ 22 7 
3t 9 28 11 9 Ik 52 23 7 3 
k 9 h5 11 31 k 15 32 18 27 8 
5 28 ko 18 15 18 i+l 17 22 2 
6 38 36 18 9 23 k9 16 9 3 
7 35 27 22 Ik 3 19 kk 21 1I+ 1 
S.D. 1 17 28 3 28 Zk 5 20 5 18 52 
2a * 3 i^ 3 11 23 20 3 20 5 39 33 
2b 7 31 10 31 21 2 37 8 1+2 12 
3a li^  36 Ik 25 11 6 32 13 3i+ 15 
3b 12 53 15 21 7 37 11 38 7 
ka 5 53 8 3i+ 7 36 2l+ 29 3 
l^ b * hi 37 12 7 2 10 51 19 19 1 
Wis. 1 50 36 Ik 68 30 2 
2ab 26 37 22 15 2k 1+1 20 13 2 
3 6 i+3 20 29 3 12 1^ 3 31 12 2 
* 30 kQ 17 k kk 3h 16 6 
5 kk 32 20 1+ 33 33 2I+ 6 3 
6-7 57 39 U i^ l k6 12 1 
8-9 47 ^3 3 7 33 1+1+ 16 6 
Table 67 (Continued) 
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State Business or professional Farm widow 
and jo tracts with acres  ^tracts with acres 
area 0- 100- 180- 260- 500+ 0- 100- 180- 260- 5004 
99 179 259 9^9 99 m 259 1+99 
Ind. 2b 2^  24 32 15 30 1+0 19 11 
6 1+0 28 12 16 3 1+8 36 1+ 12 
Xa* la 16 45 18 21 13 55 16 16 
lb 12 36 28 22 2 6 61+ 21 9 
2a * 7 1+0 22 30 1 12 63 12 12 
2b 12 1+1 23 23 1 23 53 19 6 
3a * 21 21 29 19 10 29 33 25 12 
3b 12 29 37 22 33 50 17 
13 38 29 18 2 22 38 22 19 
5 25 38 22 16 19 1+6 21+ 11 
6 26 .1+8 16 10 31 36 25 8 
Kan. 1 1+1 7 26 27 58 1+2 
2a * 10 22 5 1+6 17 28 10 1+0 23 
2b * 9 1^ 3 9 29 9 8 1+9 1I+ 27 3 
3a * 33 1I+ 21+ 5 21+ i^ 5 19 12 
3b * 32 1+2 18 5 3 15 i^ 5 26 11 1+ 
k * 15 1+0 1+ 27 15 11 1+2 22 20 1+ 
5 15 25 21 21 19 2l+ 33 3 36 3 
6 35 21+ 21+ 17 31+ 59 2 2 2 
Ta * 61+ 20 12 4 7 1+0 1+3 7 3 
7b 51 31 7 5 6 29 28 8 36 
Minn.l-i+ 35 31 10 20 1+ 21+ 1+1 18 15 3 
6 30 33 ,21+ 12 31 50 12 7 
7-8 15 1+0 21+ 22 31 1+2 II+ Ik 
Neb. 1 5 29 12 11+ 1+0 11 21 7 11 50 
2 11 26 6 1+6 10 8 33 6 28 25 
3a 21 39 15 18 6 29 1+3 7 21 
3b 30 1+3 12 15 36 3^ .15 6 
k 12 1+7 9 21+ 8 23 23 ,15 21 17 
5 21 1+0 19 18 1 15 56 19 11 
6 31 1+2 12 15 26 32 21+ 18 
7 29 1+1 22 6 2 16 52 29 3 
S.D. 1 7 7 12 31 23 8 8 31 31 
2a * 3 57 5 21 13 25 8 50 17 
2b 6 51^  6 21+ 11 13 53 20 13 
3a 5 32 5 hZ 16 29 11+ 57 
3b 19 i+8 13 17 1+ 6 59 12 21+ 
ha. 6 1+1+ 15 29 6 15 38 23 .15 8 
i^ b * 21 l+i+ 1I+ 21 1 12 1+6 31 12 
Wis. 1 65 28 5 2 fk 22 1+ 
2ab 31 29 23 17 1+1+ 38 19 
. 3 11 39 2I+ 22 k 28 1+0 25 5 2 
k * 37 1+2 16 5 68 18 13 
5 38 1+1+ 10 8 3^ i+l 11 5 
6-7 38 1+1 15 6 58 37 5 
8-9 30 1+0 18 12 21+ 58 13 1+ 
U4 
Table 67 (Continued) 
State Non-fam widow Other 
and jo tracts with acres jo tracts with acres 
area 0- 1001- 180- 260- 500+ 0- 100- lao- 260- 500f 
99 179 259 1^99 99 179 259 499 
Ind. 2b 18 43 14 25 4l 34 3 22 
6 5^ 23 15 8 57 33 5 5 
la. la 26 48 17 9 17 45 17 21 
lb 20 47 7 27 18 39 18 24 
2a * 24 24 33 19 22 39 13 26 
2b IT 42 33 8 9 47 35 9 
3a * 22 44 11 11 11 24 52 19 5 
313 8 38 38 8 8 19 43 i4 24 
h 33 50 8 8 35 42 12 8 .4 
5 29 62 10 25 29 29 l4 4 
6 21 43 .29 7 27 43 23 7 
Kan. 1 37 7 26 30 33 30 38 
2a * 64 18 9 9 10 31 4 24 31 
2b * 43 i4 ^3 18 37 16 24 4 
3a * 33 47 14 6 23 42 l4 14 7 
3b * 50 20 10 20 28 4i 31 
I4. * 50 30 20 23 i+3 20 14 
5 35 29 24 6 6 18 29 22 24 6 
6 8 75 17 28 37 15 20 
7a * 56 25 13 6 46 l4 21 l4 4 
7b 39 44 6 11 58 37 2 3 
Minn, 1-1+ 28 22 11 28 11 49 29 5 12 5 
6 29 43 l4 l4 44 27 19 4 6 
7-8 28 44 6 22 12 44 28 12 4 
Web. 1 20 50 30 15 24 9 21 32 
2 8 29 4 46 13 10 35 12 23 20 
3a 23 46 8 15 6 32 23 l4 9 23 
3b 15 46 8 31 20 39 17 17 7 
1+ 12 12 16 48 12 26 50 7 l4 2 
5 18 64 9 9 44 26 19 12 
6 69 19 12 32 33 19 16 
T 29 47 18 6 42 48 3 6 
S.D. 1 12 63 25 3 26 10 26 35 
2a * 60 30 10 12 50 8 23 8 
2b 14 57 7 21 12 52 8 28 
3a 67 33 11 63 5 5 16 
3b 13 60 13 13 12 41 18 29 
Ua 8 46 8 38 26 47 11 16 
4b * 13 20 33 33 31 44 8 17 
Wis. 1 86 l4 75 25 
2ab 75 25 i^3 25 11 18 4 
3 11 56 22 11 13 33 38 8 8 
1+ * 4o 47 13 66 32 2 
5 50 40 10 46 26 29 
6-7 78 22 52 42 3 3 
8-9 57 43 44 20 32 4 
*One or more significant difference in proportions when tested against 
percent distribution all tracts by size. 
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Table 68, Percent dlstrib-ution of ftjll tenants and part-owiers by type of 
landlord 
State Active fajpaer Retired farmer 
and Fiill tenant iPart-owner Pull tenant Part' -owner 
area 1 2 br '4. 1 2 or + 1 2 or "•» 1 2 or •+ 
land­ lsndf» Isold- land­ land­ land­ land­ land» 
lord lords lord lords lord lords lord lords 
Ind. 2b k2 37 5 16 i^ l 27 17 15 
6 17 22 33 28 17 29 24 29 
la. la 65 2k 11 0 67 20 9 4 
lb 6i 22 7 11 51 27 18 4 
2 a. 70 12 12 5 73 12 10 5 
2b 59 32 6 3 56 25 11 8 
3a 6k 12 16 8 66 12 12 9 
313 50 18 ik 18 52 18 23 7 
4 67 22 11 0 82 11 4 3 
5 58 21 8 12 62 19 9 9 
6 60 10 25 5 70 18 11 1 
Kan. 1 15 19 11 56 16 34 4 47 
2a * 8 27 13 52 ll^  k6 11 29 
2b * 6 28 19 1^ 7 6 k2 7 45 
3a 13 38 8 kl 17 k3 12 28 
3b * 17 I47 20 17 17 k2 13 28 
k 12 kQ 8 31 9 37 10 43 
5 13 23 20 J+3 18 37 9 36 
6  ^ 20 2k 12 I4.4 20 45 18 18 
Ta 13 33 27 27 20 2h 27 29 
Tb 19 18 25 39 12 33 10 45 
Minn. 1 A* 33 10 30 27 27 23 25 26 
6 33 15 7 55 20 17 8 
7-8* 62 20 16 2 65 17 13 6 
Neb, 1 * 514. 33 10 3 62 17 i4 7 
2 * 37 2k 22 17 ko 27 16 17 
3a * 53 Ik Ik 18 29 33 19 19 
3b 5k 22 15 9 44 26 20 9 
* 25 51 7 18 30 32 15 23 
5 15 68 5 12 39 31 20 10 
6 * 39 37 6 18 k3 35 16 5 
7 * 5)4 2k 11 11 37 31 16 16 
S.D. 1 * 28 12 22 38 33 22 $4 20 
2a 29 20 17 3^  32 18 26 24 
2b 30 27 30 13 27 23 18 32 
3a * 32 19 26 •23 2k 33 14 29 
3t> * 27 32 19 22 k3 33 17 7 
ifa 50 22 22 5 51 17 22 10 
kh 32 17 7 56 26 9 8 
Wis. 1 50 0 36 Ik 20 7 4l 33 
2ab 67 11 11 11 71 9 16 4 
3 83 l4 3 0 86 7 6 1 
56 0 35 9 54 10 28 8 
5 60 12 12 16 k2 12 33 12 
6-7 67 12 21 0 6k 8 17 12 
8-9 60 13 17 10 69 14 11 6 
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Table 68 (Continued) 
State Business or professional Farm widow 
and Full tenant Part' -owner Full tenant Part' -owner 
area 1 2 or i- 1 2 or + 1 2 or - 1 2 or 4-
land­ land­ land­ land­ land­ land­ land­ land­
lord lords lord lords lord lords lord lords 
Ind. 2b i^ 3 32 12 12 28 30 25 17 
6 27 21 16 36 20 36 16 28 
la. la 6k 25 9 2 55 32 10 3 
lb 55 19 1!+ 12 50 26 18 6 
2a 70 18 9 k9 27 17 7 
2b 59 IT lU 9 52 33 9 6 
3a 65 21 13 0 58 21 4 17 
313 60 12 21 7 17 kk 33 6 
61^  16 16 k 66 16 19 0 
5 56 16 12 16 50 26 11 13 
6 68 10 10 12 58 Ik 25 3 
Kan. 1 11 23 8 58 11 37 5 it-7 
2a * 13 30 5^  7 33 5 55 
2b * 9 3^ 15 33 16 39 16 29 
3a l6 28 30 26 k 38 18 ko 
3b * 12 19 17 52 18 3^ 8 31 
1+ 13 35 15 37 26 38 11 26 
5 2.k 26 16 3^  li+ 3^  11 kl 
6 * 23 kk 17 17 10 37 12 in 
Ta 15 23 17 45 30 12 9 1+8 
7b 8 28 15 k8 1^ 4- 28 19 39 
Mlnn.lf-i|- * 19 7 52 22 1^ 7 8 19 25 
6 i+l 21 21 18 35 30 28 7 
7-8 * 57 20 20 1+ 33 k2 19 6 
Neb. 1 * 23 28 21 28 23 29 26 23 
2 * 28 28 6 39 32 3^  17 17 
3a * 29 27 Ik 30 18 18 32 32 
3b 33 30 22 15 k5 3^  15 6 
k * 28 l+lj. 13 15 35 25 18 22 
5 36 i^ 3 7 15 30 37 22 11 
6 * 38 21 21 21 1+1 32 18 9 
7 * kk 17 13 25 36 36 12 15 
S.D. 1 * 2k 19 ko 17 23 15 38 23 
2a 19 1^  23 kk 33 k2 8 17 
2b 26 22 15 37 4o 20 20 20 
3a * 39 20 18 23 i^ 3 29 21 7 
3b * 25 32 25 17 53 29 18 0 
ii-a k2 23 23 12 38 31 8 23 
to 53 22 15 11 50 27 19 
Wis. 1 35 9 35' 21 39 k 39 17 
2ab 69 k 20 6 47 16 25 12 
3 81 11 4 k 78 7 15 0 
h * 66 5 26 3 55 3 26 16 
5 kk li^  2k 18 51 8 35 5 
6-7 56 9 20 15 3k 15 18 13 
8-9 63 18 12 7 59 17 9 15 
Table 68 (Continued) 
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State Non-farm widow Other 
and , Full tenant Part' -owner Full tenant Part--owner 
area 1 2 or f 1 2 or f 1 2 or + 1 2 or +. 
land­ land- land land- land­ land­ land­ land­
lord lords lord lords lord lords lord lords 
Ind. 2b 32 36 18 l4 28 34 13 25 
6 0 23 23 54 9 24 29 38 
la. la 67 12 17 4 72 17 0 10 
lb 47 24 12 18 49 26 18 8 
2a 43 33 19 5 70 4 22 4 
2b 54 21 12 12 60 23 l4 3 
3a 33 22 22 22 38 33 24 5 
3b 62 8 31 0 55 14 23 9 
42 25 8 25 46 25 21 7 
5 43 33 19 5 57 11 29 3 
6 64 36 0 0 60 3 23 13 
Kan. 1 19 19 63 0 17 17 7 60 
2a •X- 27 0 27 45 17 33 13 37 
2b * 20 0 20 60 8 45 24 22 
3a 11 19 8 61 12 26 26 37 
3b * l4 23 5 59 18 20 l4 48 
h 20 15 10 55 9 30 17 44 
5 12 24 18 47 16 30 22 32 
6 * 42 25 17 17 31 35 14 20 
7a 25 0 19 56 17 30 30 23 
7b 22 33 6 39 7 42 14 37 
Minn,1-4 * 39 11 33 17 19 12 38 31 
6 60 7 20 13 45 18 24 12 
7-8 * 39 17 28 17 48 l4 26 12 
Neb. 1 * 46 8 31 15 19 12 37 33 
2 * 27 l4 27 32 33 7 22 38 
3a * 36 21 36 7 33 38 24 5 
3 38 31 31 0 34 34 12 20 
U 26 22 26 26 26 31 26 17 
5 18 50 i4 18 28 42 16 14 
6 * 53 35 6 6 34 21 16 29 
7 * 28 11 33 28 36 21 15 27 
S.D. 1 * 38 12 50 13 10 39 39 
2a 20 20 10 50 8 27 38 27 
2b 29 l4 29 29 20 24 28 28 
3a * 17 17 17 50 15 5 45 35 
3b * 20 33 27 20 29 35 18 18 
4a 46 15 31 8 26 11 42 21 
4b 63 19 12 6 44 31 19 6 
Wis. 1 25 0 63 12 29 2 54 15 
2ab 100 0 0 0 68 4 18 11 
3 100 0 0 0 84 4 12 0 
4 * 4o 13 40 7 39 2 51 7 
5 80 10 0 10 36 11 36 17 
6-7 33 11 33 22 45 3 27 24 
8-9 29 14 57 0 60 12 24 4 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Ind. 2b * 18 33 48 22 60 25 
6 55 50 51 47 20 40 
la. la 29 28 31 24 29 20 
lb 38 33 42 48 55 28 
2a 32 20 28 35 21 27 
2b * 32 25 31 17 61 26 
3a 53 44 62 31 29 47 
3b 35 59 53 53 60 60 
1+ 22 33 29 27 22 43 
5 53 4i 27 33 4o 53 
6 57 30 25 45 58 27 
Kan. 1 * 40 ,4o 65 64 54 35 
2a * 23 26 53 43 57 63 
2b * 38 26 61 17 25 29 
3 a 59 52 42 68 35 62 
3b * 53 14 48 18 29 56 
il- 36 47 68 23 33 50 
5 * 19 39 44 38 77 4o 
6 ,* 16 26 44 42 50 4o 
7a 55 26 25 4l 29 53 
7b * 6 30 4l 45 30 54 
Minn. 1-it 30 32 31 33 38 28 
6 * 4o 47 50 11 56 48 
7-8 11 23 22 4 8 23 
Neb. 1 16 8 15 25 9 12 
2 * 23 19 29 7 27 18 
3a 6 l4 9 26 23 6 
3b 16 i4 19 8 29 11 
4 16 7 7 23 0 l4 
5 11 18 11 11 13 15 
6 15 13 25 11 45 11 
7 * Ik 8 6 18 50 29 
S.D. 1 33 42 39 29 0 33 
2a 33 27 46 29 55 42 
2b 1+6 35 45 43 50 27 
3a 50 47 55 50 17 25 
3b 38 4l 52 33 20 55 
ij-a 55 27 46 0 44 33 
i^b 11 32 26 25 25 44 
Wis. 1 50 29 38 43 25 30 
2ab 52 49 57 50 67 54 
3 29 42 4l 52 l4 29 
4 69 52 73 48 50 50 
5 71 50 50 43 33 43 
6-7 38 46 56 59 29 36 
8-9 50 48 45 45 50 40 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Table 70. Percent of tenants dealing with agent of landlord in making 
arrangement by type of landlord 
State All Active Retired Business or Farm Non- Othi 
and land­ fanner farmer professional widow farm 
area lords widow 
Ind. 2b * 8 1 12 2 11 22 
6 3 2 3 1+ 10 
la. la * 8 3 2 9 23 21 10 
lb * ik 1 19 2k 4l 33 
2a * lii- 3 28 7 29 35 
2b * 11 2 18 11 33 23 
3a * 10 11 25 22 10 
3b * 13 i4 18 k6 24 
* 1I4- k 13 16 50 33 
5 9 h 2 13 11 2k 25 
6 * 11 1 12 22 ^3 20 
Kan. 1 * 11 5 22 60 
2a * 13 6 k 9 55 
2b * 11 2 8 3 30 47 
3a * lit 13 9 16 Ik 51 
3b * Ih 1 3 10 li<- 59 
4 * 11 17 k 49 
5 * 16 1 2 29 62 
6 * 11 5 6 33 45 
7a * 8 13 2 1 3 6 4o 
7b 10 h 6 28 27 
Minn. 1-14. * 13 3 3 6 3 6 39 
6 * 9 1 6 46 
7-8 * 11 2 2 9 8 11 53 
Neb. 1 * 10 3 3 6 3 36 
2 * 13 2 1 11 3 17 64 
3a 11 6 11 18 li+ 4i 
3b * 10 2 2 13 15 23 28 
* 13 2 5 lU 10 2k 4l 
5 * 13 2 3 15 7 32 42 
6 * 15 3 15 15 25 46 
7 * 17 3 1+ 2k 12 22 47 
S.D. 1 * ih Ik 25 53 
2a * 16 3 3 21 8 50 32 
2b * 18 3 2 19 20 50 56 
3a * 12 3 5 12 Ik 17 37 
3b 6 3 8 2k 7 18 
ka * 12 3 3 23 17 23 22 
i+b * 9 3 2 15 12 14 17 
Wis. 1 U 2 k 13 
2ab 2 1 14 
3 * 6 3 2 2 3 3  ^
1+ * 7 5 1 16 5 19 
5 5 k 5 24 
6-7 9 9 5 22 29 
8-9 7 3 1 7 9 32 
*One or* more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Tafcle 71. Percent of leases in which landlord shares ownership of livestockj 




Active farmer Retired farmer Business or prof, man 
Li ve­ Cash Machin­ Live­ Cash Machin­ Live­ Cash Machin--
stock expense ery stock expense ery stock expense ery 
st * 58 100 * 47 56 100 51 65 100 4o 
6 22 9h 22 15 98 7 25 96 20 
la 24 * 89 * 50 35 87 34 23 95 26 
lb * 35 96 * 43 45 96 29 29 96 33 
2a * 15 93 * 3  ^ 27 94 3  ^ l4 95 23 
2b * 29 9h * 47 28 98 4i 20 100 28 
3a 36 100 46 38 96 43 38 96 45 
3b 29 93 44 39 95 49 43 90 50 
l^ • * 52 96 * 70 68 89 63 4o 93 45 
5 * i+2 92 54 44 88 4l 31 97 32 
6 * 35 89 * 42 36 85 37 38 90 42 
1 8 * 68 12 4 54 8 6 39 8 
2a 6 * 35 * 6 7 57 13 10 49 16 
2b 3 * 3h 7 10 51 10 83 3 
3a 85 8 7 78 16 5 78 16 
3b 7 76 * 38 15 76 24 7 70 9 
4 * 31 * 95 * 45 13 74 13 4 83 12 
5 * 8 *100 .* 47 15 93 24 23 88 28 
6 2k 93 * 53 19 93 4l 22 89 21 
7a * 14 67 17 l4 88 22 32 90 13 
7b * k 89 * 38 5 90 5 9 94 11 
,1-1+ 10 * 80 28 19 71 21 6 62 12 
6 * 52 * 69 * 42 38 75 34 26 62 9 
7-8 18 84 24 26 78 24 14 85 17 
1 * 16 59 * 27 26 58 24 6 49 3 
2 * 66 * 12 i4 69 23 6 59 4 
3a 12 * 84 43 11 84 26 10 68 19 
3b 11 88 * 32 13 83 22 3 80 11 
5 * 57 18 17 58 23 10 67 18 
5 5 77 * 23 13 77 28 7 79 20 
6 8 * 96 * 24 16 69 16 6 91 7 
7 22 70 * 43 17 67 26 10 79 12 
1 * 16 * 48 * 19 ^3 56 35 20 36 13 
2a 9 29 * 37 15 24 16 7 11 4 
2b 17 38 25 9 33 16 12 33 15 
3a 6 10 10 11 15 10 7 8 3 
3b 3 6 25 15 14 23 4 8 13 
ll-a 
.3 4l * 29 11 48 9 16 32 11 
1+b 16 33 21 12 22 18 5 17 11 
1 36 50 36 23 44 25 10 32 17 
2ab 69 * 89 * 46 68 83 42 52 69 34 
3 89 97 64 89 95 49 85 98 46 
39 * 73 * 50 48 57 45 49 53 26 
5 52 * 80 28 53 80 39 48 66 30 
6-7 * 67 71 •X- 48 47 63 45 47 61 42 








Table 'Jl (Continued) 
State Farm widow Non-farm widow Other 
and Live^  Cash Machin­ Live­ Cash Machin- Live­ Cash Machin­
area stock expense ery stock expense ery stock expense ery 
Ind. 2b * 47 100 * 23 100 7 31 100 16 
6 36 96 2.k 8 92 0 5 81 5 
la. la 19 * 76 * 23 13 79 8 10 85 4 
lb * 12 9k * zk 100 6 26 92 28 
2a * 20 95 * 33 ICQ 9 87 22 
2b * 9 92 * 21 100 19 6 91 •l4 
3a 25 96 50 22 100 22 24 95 35 
3b 28 100 15 85 46 18 95 27 
U * 59 81 * kl 42 91 36 25 86 29 
5 * 26 * 82 32 5 83 .14 92 27 
6 * 25 80 * k3 T 69 15 13 77 11 
Kan. 1 25 * 57 7 74 9 37 
2a 12 * 95 * 9 11 10 9 45 2 
2b 3 * 53 3 10 67 48 5 
3a 70 8 3 84 63 
3b 1+ Qk * 9 5 84 31 2 69 9 
k * 27 * 90 28 93 5 76 9 
5 * 2 * 90 * 7 65 8 84 15 
6 10 100 * 11 91 9 16 92 17 
Ta * 13 88 26 69 85 
7b * 11 91 * 25 11 81 3 92 6 
Minn.l-^  22 * 74 26 6 65 2 48 6 
6 * 23 * 56 * 14 47 64 20 26 67 23 
7-8 19 Ik 9 17 72 12 18 84 13 
Neb« 1 * 23 52 * 5 15 33 23 7 38 8 
2 12 * 71 * 21 63 5 48 6 
3a 11 * 6k 8 90 17 59 13 
3b ^k * 8 77 62 15 
4 10 * 63 16 44 9 3 42 8 
5 U 65 * 23 5 60 25 84 5 
6 6 * ^k * 12 6 92 8 9 61 13 
7 6 73 * 19 6 78 IT 3 72 9 
S.D. 1 * 8 * Gk * 10 l4 13 14 7 
2a 25 33 * 27 17 18 6 4 25 4 
2b 17 * 36 T 15 4 14 
3a 15 8 8 10 11 5 5 
3b 6 13 Ik 8 17 12 
i4-a 33 * 8 33 8 17 4l 7 
kh 8 16 12 6 8 8 6 l4 9 
Wis. 1 9 22 9 29 14 14 8 4l 10 
2ab 3h * 65 * 16 75 75 25 43 63 31 
3 73 90 89 89 56 75 96 38 
U 39 * 50 * 34 47 47 27 29 34 22 
5 3^ * 62 27 50 44 20 36 60 23 
6-7 * 39 5k * 24 22 33 22 39 58 48 
8-9 65 78 43 43 43 l4 48 68 44 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types of landlord* 
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Table 'J2. Percent distribution of types of lease by age of landlord 
State Landlords 35-^^ Landlords ^4-5-5^ Landlords 
and Cash Crop- Crop- Live­ Cash Crop- Crop- Live­ Cash Crop~ Crop* Live­
area share share- stock' share share- stock- share share- stock' 
cash share cash share cash share 
Ind. 2b* 25 h2 33 21 14 65 17 23 60 
6 * 88 12 15 36 12 36 8 67 8 16 
la. la* 23 15 i^6 15 10 10 56 23 12 4 54 29 
lb J+0 1^7 13 2 Ik 37 43 2 17 48 30 
2a 21 63 16 3 8 68 17 5 6 61 27 
2b 100 5 9 57 29 4 12 62 22 
3a 8 8 50 33 7 18 39 36 6 12 42 4o 
3h* 80 20 6 22 31 38 7 9 56 26 
18 12 2k I17 13 3 29 52 17 7 21 55 
5 18 18 k3 18 20 IT 30 33 l4 5 33 45 
6 * 17 33 33 17 22 15 4l 22 23 13 30 34 
Kan. 1 * 82 14 4 6 82 12 72 23 5 
2a* 33 U5 22 74 22 4 71 19 10 
2b* 87 7 7 63 35 2 51 49 
3a* 33 67 84 16 3 49 42 1 
3b* 18 82 9 52 32 T 3 38 46 13 
k * 100 26 39 34 39 45 16 
5 * 50 50 3 22 50 25 17 13 60 9 
6 * 33 60 7 8 l4 61 18 35 39 26 
7a 17 66 17 11 39 33 11 10 39 48 2 
7b* 65 35 50 46 4 10 67 17 6 
Minn.l-i(- 32 50 18 21 53 16 9 26 49 15 10 
6 17 33 25 25 26 17 17 39 37 8 8 48 
7-8 17 21 k6 IT 20 16 4i 22 20 24 38 18 
Neb. 1 * ^3 29 7 14 7 27 53 9 25 24 34 12 
2 * 83 17 82 12 2 3 65 24 5 
3a* 30 60 10 58 37 5 32 46 22 
3b* 100 2 42 51 6 1 28 62 7 
h 38 .k6 15 53 4o T 4 43 44 9 
5 20 67 13 44 52 4 39 49 T 
6 * 27 55 9 k 33 42 16 13 30 45 8 
T 12 38 38 12 33 53 8 1 31 53 9 
S.D. 1 * 10 50 30 10 8 58 15 15 9 56 9 22 
2a 21 79 33 53 3 3 4a 43 9 
2b 25 63 -12 k 33 52 11 53 34 11 
3a 50 50 32 59 5 29 56 9 
3b 6 35 53 6 36 64 3 23 64 8 
6 i+a* 2 5 67 8 13 83 33 52 
kh 6 2k 59 12 5 19 56 16 4 22 63 11 
Wis. 1 63 5 5 55 7 17 57 4 4 15 
2ab 29 6 59 21 15 6 55 30 4 63 
3 6 6 88 T 2 90 9 2 3 85 
5^  ^ 8 38 35 2 55 45 1 52 
5 27 27 k6 29 25 3 25 26 11 3 51 
6-7 100 4 4 44 36 5 49 
8^* 58 17 25 24 3 ,5 68 22 4 72 
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Table 72 (Continued) 
State Landlords 65-7^  Landlords 7^ -8^  Landlords &3 













Ind. 2b* 31 l6 50 37 1I+ 1+9 35 29 89 
6 * 63 10 27 76 8 16 67 33 
la. la* 25 7 i+i+ 2i+ 28 5 1+2 25 57 li+ li+ 
lb 9 22 i+i 28 7 25 50 18 1I+ ii+ k3 29 
2a 8 11 61+ 17 17 17 57 9 20 80 
2b 6 12 6o 21 5 26 65 5 13 13 60 13 
3a 6 17 it3 3it 11 18 50 21 20 20 60 
3b* , 5 26 32 37 8 19 i+2 31 80 20 
1+ 9 9 13 70 28 8 21+ i+0 50 50 
5 25 11 35 29 26 12 33 29 33 11 33 22 
6 * ^3 9 10 33 i+7 7 18 29 60 20 20 
Kan. 1 * 3 74 17 6 86 Ik 21 72 7 
2a* 37 57 6 61+ 2k 12 35 65 
2b* 3 1+7 37 12 5it 39 7 15 15 69 
3a* 1 61+ 31 1+ 38 62 i+0 60 
3b* 2 35 57 5 5 i+0 1+9 5 67 33 
k * 3 38 i+7 11 27 59 li+ li+ 86 
5 * 10 37 h3 10 22 22 52 1+ 67 33 
6 * 9 33 1+2 l6 6 30 i+8 16 33 67 
Ta 6 53 3h 6 10 31 i+l 17 78 22 
7b* 52 ho 7 22 33 1+1 i+ 33 1+5 22 
Minn. 1-it 22 39 26 li+ 29 i+6 17 9 i+0 1+0 20 
6 it7 12 12 29 1+5 1I+ 11 30 33 33 33 
7-8 19 21 38 22 29 12 1+1+ 15 36 li+ 29 21 
Neb. 1 * 27 27 i8 li+ 29 16 37 5 50 50 
2 * 7i+ 11 13 2 81 12 5 67 33 
3a* 5 i+i i+6 7 17 i+0 33 10 50 25 25 
3b* 5 25 63 7 9 3h i+7 6 50 50 
k i+i+ 39 17 3h 61 5 36 6i+ 
5 28 59 9 3h 6i+ 2 61+ 27 9 
6 * 6 1+1 l+i+ 8 19 22 51 8 25 12 50 12 
7 1 29 5i+ 9 12 15 67 6 9 18 73 
S.D. 1 * 21 29 17 17 13 1+7 20 13 100 
2a i+0 1+6 8 27 it5 9 60 1+0 
2b 2 52 33 8 1+ 39 52 1+ 29 71 
3a 2 1+0 53 1+ 11 16 58 5 67 33 
3b 19 7i+ 7 29 67 1+ 100 
l+a* 23 70 5 27 73 li+ 72 li+ 
1+b 1 l6 7i+ 6 6 15 76 33 67 
Wis. 1 70 8 19 69 8 15 83 
2ab 31 7 7 51 32 61 63 37 
3 13 1 81+ 23 2 75 18 82 
it 51 1+ 3 38 i+7 3 6 35 50 50 
5 19 27 50 19 31 3 i+i+ 29 li+ 57 
6-7 k6 2 i+7 61+ 1+ 1+ 28 33 67 
8-9*2i+ 1+ 70 36 3 3 56 25 25 50 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between age groups. 
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Table 73' Percent distribution of age of renters by age of landlord 
Landlords 35-^  ^ Landlords 45-5^  State 
and "/o of renters f ) of renters 
area '25 25- 35- 1+5- 55- 65- -25 25- 35-• 45- 55- 65-
4  ^ 5k 6i+ fk 3  ^ 44 54 61+ 7^+ 
Ind. 2b * 25 33 25 17 7 k2 42 2 5 2 
6 25 12 38 25 6 39 21 15 12 6 
la. la. 8 77 15 13 k5 26 11 5 
lb 36 50 i4 15 k5 26 11 4 
2a 58 21 21 10 1+1 24 14 12 
2b 25 38 38 5 ^3 36 13 4 
3a * 17 33 42 8 4 57 25 11 4 
3b ivo 40 20 19 3^+ 28 16 3 
k * 2k 18 47 12 16 .42 19 10 13 
5 10 10 50 30 52 24 10 10 3 
6 33 33 17 17 11 48 19 22 
Kan. 1 * 9 50 36 4 9 15 30 36 6 3 
2a 78 22 4 50 27 12 8 
2b 7 53 27 13 13 28 10 40 7 2 
3a 33 67 3 ,23 47 7 20 
3b 82 18 2 25 30 23 7 
k * 12 75 12 26 21 21 29 3 
5 * 100 13 13 42 19 10 3 
6 7 33 20 1+0 6 55 19 13 2 k 
7a * IT 83 11 22 17 50 
7b 15 27 35 19 4 6 33 6 8 
Minn. 1-4 8 36 2k 20 8 12 27 39 17 2 2 
6 ko 10 40 10 40 4o 5 5 
7-8 12 50 12 19 6 9 42 20 22 7 
Neb. 1 7 57 7 21 7 8 4l 22 19 5 5 
2 1+4 33 17 6 3 
8 
26 1+6 16 7 2 
3a 20 60 20 25 45 13 8 2 
3b * 7 13 47 13 20 13 47 17 6 15 2 
k 15 62 15 8 2 51 21 19 5 2 
5 4o 20 20 13 .7 4l 30 11 7 4 
6 * 73 9 18 20 20 31 18 9 2 
7 25 38 25 12 11 42 33 3 8 3 
S.D. 1 10 50 20 10 10 4 38 31 27 
2a 5 37 21 26 11 8 44 31 8 8 
2b 12 12 38 25 12 7 37 26 15 7 7 
3a 25 25 25 25 5 32 i+1 18 5 
3b 29 4i 18 6 6 7 ^3 25 18 4 4 
4a 42 33 25 16 35 32 13 3 
4b 6 35 29 12 12 6 7 40 26 12 10 5 
Wis. 1 * 6 12 kl 29 6 7 46 21 11 11 4 
2ab 5 35 4l 18 9 48 21 12 3 6 
3 6 61 22 6 6 7 55 15 20 2 
k 8 33 25 17 9 8 29 29 31 6 6 
5 18 ^5 18 9 9 16 31 28 12 9 3 
6-7 100 8 1+4 16 8 12 12 
8-9 33 50 17 18 32 26 16 8 
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Table 73 (Continued) 
Landlords State Landlords 6^ -74 
and i of renters i of renters 
area -25 25- 35- 1+5- 55- 65- -25 25- 35- 1+5- 55- 65-
3  ^ 1+1+ 51+ 61+ 7I+ 3I1- 1+1+ 51+ 61+ 71+ 
Ind. 2b k 39 31 17 7 1 3 31 1+2 18 7 
6 2 37 33 16 12 7 25 25 25 10 8 
la. la 5 ^3 32 15 1+ 1 37 1+1 1I+ 8 
lb 6 1+7 22 ii+ 6 5 1+ 1+1 30 18 7 
2a 2 56 27 12 2 1 31  ^ 32 28 1+ 
2b 6 38 32 11 12 1 2 33 1+1+ 17 2 2 
3a * 10 1+9 27 10 2 2 61 21+ 15 
3b 2 29 15 7 2 8 26 39 18 8 
iv * 6 59 23 7 U 1 9 39 1+6 7 
5 2 57 31 9 2 1 3  ^ 1+2 1I+ 8 1 
6 1 57 30 8 ,1+ 2 1+0 38 16 5 
Kan. 1 * 37 33 6 21+ 2 35 3  ^ 23 6 
2a 1 35 1+0 10 11+ 3 32 27 29 8 1 
2b 8 1+1 21 23 7 1 33 35 23 1+ 1+ 
3a 12 30 39 7 10 1 5 21 1+2 23 7 3 
3b 3 1+0 21 21+ 13 6 29 35 20 9 1 
* 7 kh 28 15 6 1+ 9 1+2 27 15 2 
5 * 3 35 31 18 9 1+ 33 25 26 10 6 
6 8 32 35 13 6 1+ 5 21 38 21 ii+ 1 
7a * 35 27 21+ 10 3 5 8 31 39 11 6 
7b 8 32 27 27 6 2 22 1+6 11 9 10 
Minn. l-ii- 5 ^5 26 II+ 8 3 5 32 30 23 8 3 
6 12 57 19 9 3 .1 38 38 12 9 1 
7-8 5 52 23 1I+ 6 1+ 26 1+0 20 7 1 
Neb. 1 2 39 32 12 15 17 53 20 11 
2 k 28 1+5 11 12 1 1+1+ 3i  ^ 13 7 2 
3a 3 1+0 32 15 10 33 32 32 3 
3b * i+ 1+7 32 11 1+ 1 1+ 33 36 17 7 3 
13 39 25 13 9 1 7 26 37 17 11 
5 6 1+1 32 18 1+ 2 26 1+1 2I+ 7 
6 * 5 1+7 19 8 18 3 9 28 38 19 7 
7 1+ 27 33 21 9 6 3 36 35 17 6 3 
S.D. 1 6 39 21+ 21 9 2 38. 25 20 10 5 
2a 6 i+2 20 II+ 16 2 6 3i+ 30 22 6 2 
2b 9 31  ^ 28 9 21 13 32 36 15 2 2 
3a 2 50 30 9 7 2 9 31 31 13 13 1+ 
3b 8 1+7 26 15 3 2 6 32 1+0 17 6 
ka 8 1+0 21 17 12 2 2 1+2 35 12 7 2 
i+b 5 50 20 12 11 2 32 1+1+ 17 6 1 
Wis. 1 * 7 38 33 1I+ 2 5 6 1+1+ 29 15 3 3 
2ab 11 50 23 12 i+ 3 1+0 10 3 
3 7 1+6 31 12 1+ 1+ 1+1 1+0 11 5 
k 8 58 18 9 5 6 31 38 21 3 1 
5 9 50 21 9 5 5 1+ 36 32 15 11 2 
6-7 6 1+2 25 1I+ 13 38 53 6 2 2 
8-9 1 1+6 3  ^ 8 11 32 1+1+ 18 6 
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Table 73 (Continued) 
State Landlords 75-Bh Lwidlords 8g -f 
and of renters of renters 
area -25 25- 35- k5- 55- 65- -25 25-• 35- it5- 55- 65-
3  ^ 1^4 6k jk 3  ^ kk 5  ^ 6it 7it 
Ind. 2b * 7 5 28 ko 19 2 29 18 29 2it 
6 1+ 2h 28 32 12 33 50 17 
la. la 30 35 25 5 5 ik 29 it3 lit 
lb 4 21 ^3 Ik ii+ k lit lit 29 lit 29 
2a 21 3  ^ 36 9 ko ,itO 20 
2b 33 26 19 21 2 13 27 33 20 7 
3a •x- k 19 26 7 3G 30 30 10 
3b k 23 35 27 12 20 ko 20 20 
* 13 35 30 13 9 25 50 25 
5 2 27 27 39 2 2 22 22 itit 11 
6 2 2k if-0 29 4 60 20 20 
Kant 1 * 8 6 50 22 li+ 6k lit 7 lit 
2a 26 32 39 3 12 76 6 6 
2b 11 27 11 3k 11 k6 8 23 15 8 
3a 2k 50 3 21 3 67 22 11 
3b 29 to 21 7 3 67 
k * Ik li+ Ik 36 17 5 lit 29 57 
5 * i^6 39 15 78 11 11 
6 k 30 32 16 12 6 33 17 50 
Ta * 21 21 k5 10 3 22 kk 33 
Tb 20 37 33 7 it 11 67 22 
Minn, l-i  ^ 3 31 31 31 3 75 25 
6 2 21 16 9 5 50 50 
7-8 3 27 37 33 i^3 14 21 lit 7 
Neb. 1 3k 29 18 5 13 100 
2 5 Ik 19 12 7 17 17 50 17 
3a 3 2k kl 2k 7 50 50 
3b * 3 28 37 12 19 100 
2 10 kj 3k 3 .3 7 21 21 29 21 
5 15 22 29 20 11 k 27 55 18 
6 * 3 2k 2k 32 11 5 50 25 12 12 
7 3 2k 36 27 9 9 9 55 27 
S.D. 1 33 1+0 20 7 100 
2a J+5 27 18 9 60 20 20 
2b 13 30 22 17 13 it 29 it2 29 
3a 5 kj 26 16 5 66 33 
3b 8 k6 29 17 25 25 25 25 
ka 5 ^3 10 33 10 lit 57 lit lit 
ii-b 3 15 26 38 18 33 67 
Wis. 1 * 8 25 50 17 17 17 17 50 
2ab 5 21 37 2k 8 5 25 25 50 
3 29 39 22 10 10 10 50 30 
3 25 31 22 12 6 17 50 33 
5 9 ,47 28 12 3 29 71 
6-7 19 37 37 7 67 33 
8-9 9 18 35 21 9 9 it3 i^3 lit 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between age groups of 
landlords. 
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Table 7^ * Percent male landlords by age of landlord 
State Landlords Landlords Landlords Landlords Landlords Landlords 
and 35-1i4 V5-5I+ 55-6^  65-T^  85 + 
area 
Ind. 2 * S3 72 81 59 49 59 
6 75 78 78 71 60 50 
la. la * 75 8i+ 83 69 58 29 
lb * 86 71 86 68 61 50 
2a * 79 78 86 72 65 50 
2b * 100 75 70 70 ,51 40 
3a * 83 61 81 75 79 4o 
3b 80 78 77 60 88 50 
1+ 82 87 75 73 64 25 
5 * 80 83 71 70 57 98 
6 100 "jk 76 74 64 60 
Kan. 1 82 100 79 73 65 21 
2a 100 77 73 76 76 100 
2b 87 81  ^ 82 72 68 62 
3a * 67 6k 76 ,58 48 90 
3b * 100 62 75 87 55 33 
100 79 76 67 62 43 
5 100 78 85 59 78 78 
6 93 76 81 70 74 67 
7a 100 88 71 72 52 78 
Tb * 100 91 72 83 57 100 
Minn.l^ -ll- 79 70 72 82 69 100 
6 ;* 83 83 83 67 68 67 
7-8 79 86 82 76 76 79 
Neb. 1 79 95 69 70 74 100 
2 71 82 Bk 73 71 67 
3a * 100 87 92 61 77 50 
3b 87 88 79 70 72 
5^  ^ 79 76 76 66 43 
5 79 78 83 78 69 64 
6 80 82 79 67 64 63 
7 88 69 72 77 66 82 
S.D. 1 * 100 92 73 81 57 100 
2a 8k 71 82 7k 73 60 
2b 88 81 72 90 78 57 
3a 100 86 76 84 58 100 
3b 88 79 89 77 83 50 
i+a 92 81 91 73 73 71 
l+b 88 7^ 78 76 71 67 
Wis. 1 79 72 78 65 85 33 
2ab 94 85 81 87 78 62 
3 89 85 82 72 80 91 
85 73 69 78 74 100 
5 a 88 79 71 61 71 
6-7 * 50 81 84 70 59 33 
8-9 92 8i  ^ 8k 65 72 50 
*One or more significant difference in propostioas between age groups. 
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Table 75. Percent of renters dealing directly with landlord in 
making lease arrangement by age of landlord 
State Age of landlord 
and 
area 
35-hk 1+5-5  ^ 55-64 65-7  ^ -Bk ^ 5 4  
Ind. 2b 83 93 9i+ 95 95 88 
6 100 97 100 98 96 83 
la. la 85 97 9k 95 82 86 
lb 100 90 91 87 79 57 
2a 81+ 90 Q2 93 85 60 
2b 78 93 88 95 86 87 
3a 92 100 9k 97 93 60 
3b 100 9h 86 8ii 92 80 
9h 100 87 94 88 25 
5 73 93 97 91 93 67 
6 * 100 93 9k 95 78 80 
Kan. 1 * 100 100 100 100 76 100 
2a 100 100 99 99 97 65 
2b 100 90 100 100 95 92 
3a 33 100 97 97 88 90 
3b 100 95 96 95 95 100 
4 100 100 89 100 95 100 
5 * 50 100 100 95 78 89 
6 100 9]+ 99 95 86 83 
7a 100 89 100 94 100 100 
7b 85 96 100 98 96 56 
Minn. 1-U 89 98 98 97 100 60 
6 91 95 100 98 95 100 
7-8 92 98 9k 91+ 91 93 
Neb. 1 100 100 92 97 97 100 
2 88 93 9k 96 93 100 
3a 100 89 97 93 93 100 
3b 87 96 97 93 88 100 
•X" 5  ^ . 98 99 93 83 86 
5 73 89 93 9k 93 70 
6 91 93 92 95 89 75 
7 75 91 93 91 91 82 
S.D. 1 90 100 9k 100 93 100 
2a 79 9U 89 90 82 60 
2b 75 89 89 96 87 86 
3a 100 95 96 95 89 100 
3b 82 96 97 93 96 100 
J+a 100 87 92 91 95 57 
kh 100 8i+ 96 89 9  ^ 100 
Wis. . 1 100 97 100 100 100 83 
2ab 100 100 100 100 98 100 
3 100 98 97 99 93 100 
83 95 97 99 97 100 
5 91 97 98 100 97 100 
6-7 100 100 99 100 86 100 
8-9 100 92 95 99 97 75 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between age 
groups. 
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Table 76- Percent of renters dealing with landlord and percent dealing 
with agent in making the agreement who deal with same party in operating 
decisions 
State Deal Deal 
and with with 
area landlord agent 
__ __ ^ __ 
6 98 83 
la. la 98 83 
lb 100 88 
2a 100 96 
2b 99 95 
3a 100 9^ + 
3b 99 86 
k 99 93 
5 100 83 
6 99 89 
Kan. 1 100 86 
2a 100 100 
2b 100 9k 
3a 99 98 
3b 99 96 
k 100 100 
5 100 100 
6 100 100 
7a 99 100 
7b 100 95 
Minn» 1-k 100 100 
6 98 100 
7-8 100 95 
Neb. 1 100 82 
2 100 98 
3a 99 100 
3b 99 100 
99 91 
5 98 100 
6 95 96 
7 99 100 
S.D. 1 99 96 
2a 98 97 
2b 97 91 
3a 99 100 
3b 100 79 
li-a 98 87 
Itb 100 96 
Wis. 1 99 100 
2ab 100 100 
3 99 100 
h 99 81 
5 99 100 
6-7 98 95 
8-9 98 $k 
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Age of landlord 
35-^^ i+5-54 55-61+ 65 ,.71+ 75-81+ 85 + 
Ind. 2b k2 19 31 22 16 18 
6 2.5 33 18 18 2I+ 50 
la. la 62 50 5^ 1+0 1+8 1^3 
lb * 27 55 57 37 1+3 57 
2a 63 65 51+ kk 1+0 1+0 
2b 56 52 1+8 kk 1+9 60 
3a 58 39 1+2 1+0 29 70 
Sb 60 53 52 1+7 35 1+0 
4 * 71 52 1+6 1+1 68 50 
5 55 ko 35 1+1+ 1+5 22 
6 50 56 kk 50 1+7 20 
Kan. 1 36 39 15 16 32 71 
2a 22 7 16 8 9 1+7 
2b * 27 5 10 32 15 
3a 16 13 12 15 
3b * 6i^ 11 13 6 
1+ * 12 5 1I+ 21+ 16 29 
5 16 26 15 11 kk 
6 * 13 2 15 15 20 
7a * 11 6 15 21 22 
7b * 8 15 13 13 29 33 
Minn. l-k 36 36 31 26 20 1+0 
6 * 50 30 50 31 23 33 
7-8 * 63 35 1+2 36 50 36 
Neb. 1 36 1+9 1+7 1+1 1+5 
2 hk 39 35 35 26 50 
3a kQ ko 32 28 27 
3b * 57 51 35 36 22 50 
k 38 37 32 22 19 21 
5 I4.7 19 21 31^ 29 1+5 
6 73 53 36 50 38 63 
7 38 1+7 27 32 30 27 
S.D. 1 ko 1+0 39 1+3 1+0 100 
2a 32 33 32 18 1+5 20 
2b 25 30 23 27 35 ii+ 
3a 25 18 ,1+5 ?5 1+2 67 
3b 2k 25 21+ 19 29 25 
ij-a 50 35 ^3 26 18 57 
kh kl 28 30 38 29 33 
Wis. 1 21 38 1+7 36 23 33 
2ab * 63 3U 1+5 1+0 37 12 
3 ,* 78 59 ^3 31^ 38 1+5 
50 1+1 1+2 31+ 35 50 
5 1+5 28 i+5 25 19 
6-7 50 1+1+ 1+1 1+2 h3 33 
8-9 58 1+5 1+9 33 32 12 
*One or more significant difference in proportions between types. 
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Table 78. Percent distribution of leases by size of tract rented from 
this landlord 
State Size of tract , acres 
and Under 30- 50- 100- 180- 260- 500- 1000- 5000 
area 30 ^9 99 179 259 499 999 4999 + 
Ind. 2b 5 20 33 21 iB 1 
6 8 13 26 30 10 11 2 
la. la 2 13 52 17 16 
lb 1 1 Ik k3 23 16 - -
2a 1 11 h8 20 20 -
2b 1 2 16 22 15 -
3a 2 2 18 35 24 15 4 
3b 1 2 15 37 24 20 1 
1+ 2 3 12 1+6 23 13 1 
5 - 2 18 k2 24 13 1 
6 2 1+ 16 44 24 10 
Kan- 1 kl 3 29 20 7 
2a 8 30 7 36 10 9 
2b 3 10 35 19 25 5 3 
3a 1 3 21 k2 13 17 3 
3b 1 7 18 ko 16 i4 4 
k 1 17 ko 11 19 8 _ 
5 2 5 10 32 16 26 6 3 
6 It 8 17 36 18 16 1 
7a 9 12 2k 21+ 18 11 2 
7b 8 9 28 36 7 10 2 
Minn. 1-k 5 3 27 33 9 19 3 1 
6 3 1 27 k3 17 ,8 1 
7-8 1 1 16 k6 22 13 1 
Neb. 1 2 8 18 8 23 24 15 2 
2 1 1 11 29 8 30 16 4 
3a 2 2 18 36 13 21 4 4 
3b 2 1 18 46 19 11 3 -
1 1 lit 37 13 26 6 2 
5 - 1 22 41 18 • 17 1 
6 1 9 17 k2 17 13 1 
7 3 3 21 43 19 10 1 
S.D. 1 2 1 6 29 6 20 15 18 3 
2a - 3 42 6 30 17 2 
2b 2 6 45 8 30 8 1 
3a 1 2 3 39 9 33 8 4 1 
3b 1 3 8 46 13 26 3 
Ua 1 2 6 43 16 29 3 
kh - 3 17 44 17 18 1 -
Wis. 1 16 29 24 26 3 2 
2ab 5 k 21 36 20 13 - 1 
3 1 1 12 4i 29 14 2 -
k 8 12 30 34 13 3 -
5 8 8 25 35 18 5 1 
6-7 12 lit 22 4l 9 2 
8-9 5 1+ 25 42 17 7 
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Table 79- Percent distribution of nmber of acres farmed by full 
tenants and by part-owners 
State Percent of full tenants farming Percent of part owners farming 
and Under 100- 150- 2b0- 500 Under 100- lao- 260- 500 
area 100 17Q 259 1+99 4^ 100 179 259 499 + 
Ind. 2b 6 21+ 3k 33 3 1+ 28 39 14 15 
6 6 39 26 24 5 9 24 27 25 15 
la. la 1+7 22 27 3 13 3^ 3^ 16 
lb 1 37 25 35 2 11 19 59 11 
2a kh 22 29 1 2 17 1I+ 57 10 
2b 3 37 27 33 3 20 21+ 39 Ik 
3a. 7 27 25 36 5 12 35 ^3 10 
3b 3 28 25 1+2 2 2 15 17 58 8 
^4- k^ 28 22 1 6 22 33 33 6 
5 2 38 32 27 1 19 32 35 l4 
6 11 ^3 25 20 1 23 12 51 14 
Kan. 1 it 2 20 71+ 1 8 91 
2a 1 3 10 27 59 3 20 T7 
2b 3 12 1+ 50 31 3 35 62 
3a 1 10 15 1+7 27 9 14 1+1 36 
3"b l^. 16 30 37 13 1 3 12 47 37 
U 3 13 17 ^3 21+ 2 13 28 57 
5 8 18 13 1+9 12 2 1+ l4 1+0 40 
6 5 21 2ii- 1+1 9 2 Ik 19 44 21 
Ta 2 29 2k 31 11+ 9 7 22 46 16 
7b 6 16 22 1+9 7 3 7 16 50 24 
Minn. 1_1^ 9 22 20 37 12 3 11 23 42 21 
6 12 i+1 27 16 1+ 2 25 32 32 9 
7-8 ]+ kl 28 25 2 1 18 20 50 11 
Neb. 1 9 9 5 21 56 9 2 19 70 
2 10 18 10 22 1+0 1 3 4 15 T7 
3a 3 22 23 3^ 18 1 6 11 38 1+i 
3b 2 33 37 2i+ k 1+ 15 21+ 42 15 
U 3 Ik 16 1+2 25 2 1 7 47 1+3 
5 2 27 32 32 7 1 1+ 35 50 10 
6 2 35 33 29 1 1 19 42 32 6 
7 7 36 29 2i+ k 7 8 .28 46 11 
S.D. 1 3 11 k 16 66 1 5 29 65 
2a 1 8 7 37 1+7 3 20 77 
2b 1 13 13 39 3i+ 1 37 62 
3a 9 10 1+8 33 1 2 3 29 65 
3b 16 21 56 7 1 3 .12 56 28 
M-a 2 17 22 51+ 5 3 10 55 32 
li-b 3 36 27 30 1+ 15 30 46 9 
Wis. 1 37 i+8 12 3 18 36 23 17 6 
2ab li+ k2 26 16 2 6 31 31 22 10 
3 10 kl 30 17 2 8 21 46 17 8 
k 25 k6 19 10 1I+ 1+0 27 l4 5 
5 2k 38 27 9 2 9 23 25 37 6 
6-7 2k 58 12 6 23 3^ 25 17 1 
8-9 18 i+8 22 11 1 12 32 30 18 8 
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Table 80. Percent distribution of total number of acres rented by 
full tenants aad by part-owners 
State Percent of full tenets renting Percent of part-owners renting 
and Under 100- 180- 260- 500 Under 100- 180- 260- 500 
area 100 179 259 k99 *• 100 179 259 1+99 + 
Ind. 2b 6 25 3^ 33 2 29 22 2k 25 
6 7 39 26 23 5 3h 28 18 1I+ 6 
la. la U H7 25 2k 29 3H 21 13 3 
lb 1 37 32 28 2 20 38 19 19 1+ 
2a 1+ 2h 27 1 29 33 19 17 2 
2b k 37 33 26 i+1 17 20 16 6 
3a 7 27 3^+ 27 5 37 25 18 18 2 
3T3 29 31 3^ 2 36 1+0 12 10 2 
k 46 32 17 1 55 25 17 3 
5 k 37 35 23 1 32 1+0 II+ 9 5 
6 13 h2 27 16 2 30 31 27 10 2 
Kan. 1 5 2 21 72 3 3 3 16 75 
2a 1 1+ 10 28 57 2 9 1+ 27 58 
2b 3 12 6 k9 30 3 16 18 1+1 22 
3a 1 10 15 k6 28 12 21+ 18 28 18 
313 i6 30 37 13 11 21+ 21 31 13 
k 13 18 1+1 21+ 10 19 13 35 23 
5 6 19 13 1+9 13 16 21+ 12 16 32 
6 5 21 2h i+1 9 23 28 26 16 7 
7a 2 29 2k 31 1I+ 3k 23 19 19 5 
7b 6 l6 22 1+9 7 19 19 27 31 k 
Minn. 1-1+ 9 22 20 37 12 37 31 11 16 5 
6 12 1^2 26 16 1+ 1+7 30 11 8 i+ 
7-8 hi 28 25 2 31 1+2 17 7 3 
Feb. 1 12 10 5 20 53 10 li+ 1I+ 2k 38 
2 10 19 10 21 1+0 6 12 5 26 51 
3a 22 23 3k 17 18 31 13 16 22 
3b 3 3^ 3^^ 25 1+ 36 27 16 15 6 
l6 l4 1+2 2k 13 26 16 27 18 
5 2 27 32 32 7 19 35 23 21 2 
6 2 36 33 28 1 31 28 21 18 2 
7 7 36 30 23 1+ 31 29 17 21 2 
S.D. 1 3 11 16 66 9 19 7 36 29 
2a 1 8 7 37 1+7 5 23 .11 37 21+ 
2b 1 13 13 1+0 33 1+ 29 12 38 17 
3a 9 10 i+8 33 10 27 Ik 28 21 
3b 17 21 55 7 21 38 16 18 7 
ha 2 17 23 53 5 9 57 16 18 
Ub 3 36 27 31 3 29 39 18 11+ 
Wis. 1 39 h6 12 3 70 19 5 1+ 2 
2ab 14 k2 26 16 2 61 23 11 5 
3 10 4i 29 17 3 1+2 29 17 1+ 8 
Iv 25 k6 19 10 68 25 3 3 1 
5 25 38 27 9 1 1+7 33 17 2 1 
6-7 25 57 12 6 7I+ 19 5 1 1 
8-9 17 kd 23 11 1 57 28 7 5 3 
zu 
Table 81. Percent distribution of number of acres rented from this landlord 
by full tenants and by part-owners 
State  ^ Full tenants 













2b 8 92 28 70 2 
6 11 86 3 36 6k 
la 5 95 27 73 
lb 2 97 1 28 72 
2a 5 95 - 19 Si 
2b 5 9h 1 23 77 
3a 8 86 6 33 67 
3b 1 99 21 79 
4 5 9  ^ 1 27 70 3 
5 5 94 1 36 6k 
6 16 81+ 23 77 
1 39 61 82 18 
2a 5 67 28 9 67 2k 
2b 17 58 25 17 79 k 
3a 5 77 18 12 88 
3b 5 90 5 23 73 k 
1+ 9 82 9 12 73 15 
5 2 87 11 5 85 10 
6 6 91 3 25 75 
7a k 92 k 37 63 
Tb 15 85 26 69 5 
1-k 10 82 8 23 75 2 
6 17 82 1 33 65 2 
7-8 5 93 2 32 68 
1 11 !+6 i^3 6 1+6 i+8 
2 15 60 25 16 70 11+ 
3a 7 80 13 27 63 10 
3b h 90 6 23 77 
i4. 9 76 15 12 80 8 
5 7 91 2 25 7i+ 1 
6 5 95 28 69 3 
7 11 87 2 27 73 
1 5 32 63 4 52 kk 
2 a 53 hi ,88 12 
2b 2 74 2k 5 8i+ 11 
3a 72 28 2 81 17 
3b 95 5 6 93 1 
^a 2 93 5 8 87 5 
1+b 5 93 2 29 71 
1 h3 57 50 50 
2ab Ik 85 1 38 52 10 
3 11 87 2 8 88 
k 29 71 1+0 60 
5 2h 75 1 48 52 
6-7 27 73 45 55 
8-9 19 81 50 50 
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Table 8l (Continued) 
State Part-owners 
and 1 landlord 2 or + landlords 
area Under 100 100-500 500 + Under 100 100-500 500 + 
Ind. 213 kB 52 1+8 52 
6 33 U3 2 69 30 1 
la • la 37 63 6k 36 
113 28 69 3 k6 52 
2a 39 61 33 67 
2b 62 38 38 58 1+ 
3a 50 50 ^3 57 
3b k3 53 2 36 6k 
k 63 37 kk 56 
5 39 61 61 35 k 
6 33 67 69 31 
1^. 1 9i^ 6 75 25 
2a U 78 17 9 79 12 
2b 9 79 12 7 86 7 
3a 33 67 ^0 58 2 
3t 33 65 2 35 62 3 
k 37 JO 13 29 71 
5 i+0 55 5 Bk 66 10 
6 39 59 2 3k k6 
7a 51 39 k 67 33 
7b 58 52 62 36 2 
Mina. l-k k€ 50 k 56 1+1+ 
6 59 39 2 k6 5  ^
7-8 37 63 
1+2 
k3 J2 5 
Ntb. 1 6 52 23 57 20 
2 12 63 25 6 78 16 
3a 32 6k k 31 69 
1^7 50 3 1+0 60 
k 26 jk 25 72 3 
5 33 67 53 1+7 
6 55 i^5 63 37 
7 53 1+8 50 2 
S.D. 1 13 6k 23 11 68 21 
2a 12 jk 12+ 3 if 5 2b 9 91 12 86 2 
3a 18 82 7 93 
313 29 67 1+ 37 63 
kB. 11 89 35 65 
kh ^5 55 k3 55 
Wli.  1 79 21 91 9 
2ab 67 33 81 19 
3 i+3 kB 9 61 33 
74 25 1 86 Ik 
5 50 kQ 2 76 21+ 
6-7 82 18 90 10 
8-9 63 37 73 27 
Table 82. Distribution of numbers of renters by number of landlords 
State Number of landlords 
and 1 2 3 k 5 6 7 8 9 
area Numbers 
Ind. 2b I!+5 82 28 15 1+ 1 
6 75 51 32 16 7 2 1 
la. la 222 68 3 
lb iBi^  68 18 1 1 
2a 267 61 8 3 
2b 23^  ^ 81 23 3 1 
3a 139 3i^  1I+ 2 
3b 121 35 6 3 
1+ 176 32 11 2 
5 176 59 13 3 1 
6 197 33 13 1 1 
Kan. 1 58 58 60 36 k5 2k 7 8 18 
2a 79 106 78 52 10 12 7 
2b 67 98 81 32 10 7 8 
3a 89 9^  ^ 81 2k 15 
3b 101+ 120 69 32 15 12 
4 82 106 57 41 10, 18 
5 88 92 60 20 10 6 
6 122 102 75 28 7 9 
7a 92 62 36 16 10 7 
7b 90 88 96 ko 35 12 
Minn. 1-i^  198 98 23 5 2 2 
6 190 56 20 3 1 3 
7-8 262 62 19 5 3 
Neb. 1 172 76 11 18 6 1 
2 178 92 i^ 3 15 9 8 8 9 
3a 138 69 32 16 8 6 
3b 199 90 31 8 
4 16k 135 ki 19 1 
5 157 129 38 4 5 
6 173 97 23 6 6 1 9 
7 153 89 2k 5 
S.D. 1 97 38 18 9 5 4 
2a 104 Ik 26 10 7 1 
2b 98 61 29 8 5 1 1 
3a 93 60 23 5 2 
3b 118 75 16 5 k 1 
ka 132 ii-9 8 2 1 
Ub 195 77 20 4 
Wis. 1 133 26 11 5 2 1 1 
2ab 215 26 8 2 2 1 
3 303 23 k 2 
h 225 36 2 
5 174 4o 13 2 1 
6-7 178 35 10 1 1 2 
8-9 215 h2 9 7 2 2 
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Table 83. Nimber of livestock-share leases with tenant owning land or 
renting tracts from two or more landlords 
State Wo. No. full No. part-owners 
and livestock- tenants or having 2 or 
area share with one more landlords 
leases landlord 
Ind. 2-b 142 77 65 
6 39 20 19 
la. la 72 18 
lb 78 57 21 
2a 58 i^5 13 
2b 64 ^5 19 
3a 63 51 12 
3b 52 35 17 
it 113 92 21 
5 80 60 20 
6 72 57 15 
Kan. 1 ih 5 9 
2a 29 3 26 
2b Ih 2 12 
3a 5 5 0 
3b 23 10 13 
1+ 4l 7 3it 
5 28 11 17 
6 57 23 3i+ 
Ta l4 8 6 
7b 19 if 15 
Minn. 1-h 29 lit- 15 
6 90 61 29 
7-8 67 54 13 
Neb. 1 26 18 8 
2 17 11 6 
3a 29 16 13 
3b 16 7 9 
k 32 18 lit 
5 19 13 6 
6 26 12 lit 
7 17 11 6 
s.p. 1 25 12 13 
2a lit- 7 7 
2b ik 7 7 
3a 8 6 2 
3b 12 it 8 
i^ -a 9 8 1 
J+b 2k 16 8 
Wis. 1 21 16 5 
2ab 137 119 18 
3 27i4- 29 
h 110 91 19 
5 101 71 30 
6-7 99 83 16 
8-9 177 Ikl 36 
2^8 
Table 8i<-. Percent distribution of leases by relation of landlord 
State None Father Mother Father- Mother- Grand­ Brother Son Uncle Other 




Ind. 2b 63 13 8 1 2 1 - 3 k 
6 67 6 5 3 ,2 5 - k 
la. la 52 21 5 9 1 1 1 0 7 2 
lb 62 17 5 5 1 - 2 0 i+ it 
2a 62 18 4 7 2 - 2 0 1+ 1 
2b 60 17 6 5 1 - 1+ 0 5 2 
3a 59 15 U 8 2 3 I4 0 3 2 
3b 69 13 3 3 0 2 2 0 5 3 
57 20 8 )+ 2 - 3 0 k -
5 53 25 6 5 1 2 2 - 3 2 
6 51 26 9 3 2 1 - 0 5 2 
Kan. 1 12 3 1 1 3 0 5 -
2a 3k Ik 8 6 3 1 6 0 6 1 
2b k2 17 6 7 3 4 6 0 8 7 
3a 59 12 7 6 1 - 0 5 5 
3b 58 19 9 3 1 1 1 0 it it 
65 12 7 3 2 - 2 0 J+ 1+ 
5 59 16 5 5 2 1 2 0 ii. 6 
6 61 15 5 k 2 1 1 - 6 
7a 72 
-.7 2 k U 0 3 0 3 5 
7b 80 7 i+ 2 1 0 1 - 2 3 
Minn.l-U 63 15 7 3 2 - - k 1 
6 U7 23 10 3 3 1 0 7 2 
7-8 55 22 6 6 1 - 3 0 3 3 
Neb. 1 60 17 6 7 2 - 3 0 2 3 
2 66 13 5 1+ 2 1 3 0 1+ 2 
3a 66 1I+ 5 2 2 1 3 0 6 1 
3b 59 17 6 6 1 - 2 0 6 2 
4 56 19 9 5 2 2 2 0 1 it 
5 51+ 23 5 3 3 2 2 •0 k it 
6 65 17 5 5 2 1 1 0 3 1 
7 60 16 9 5 2 - 3 0 2 3 
S.D. 1 69 13 3 2 1 2 It 0 it 2 
2a 64 12 2 6 1 - 5 - 6 it 
2b 6U 15 3 U 2 - 0 6 2 
3a 67 12 5 5 2 0 3 0 3 3 
3b 59 19 2 5 1 1 3 0 k 6 
i4-a 71 13 2 3 1 1 3 1 3 2 
hh 63 15 6 2 1 - 3 0 3 6 
Wis. 1 60 15 7 1+ 1 0 5 0 2 6 
2ab 5U 28 5 5 2 0 - 0 it 1 
3 52 27 8 5 1 1 - 0 1 it 
U 1+6 29 10 6 2 - 3 0 2 2 
5 50 26 10 2 2 0 3 \ 0 1 6 
6-7 k6 31 10 : 5 - 0 1 0 1 5 
8-9 55 27 8 if 1 1 1 0 2 1 
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Table 85. Percent of renters living on tract rented from this landlord 
by relation of landlord 
State Non-Relative Parent 
and No.  ^live No. % live 
area eases on land cases on land 
Ind. 2b 170 6k 58 79 
6 122 37 18 1+1+ 
la. la 151 82 78 92 
lb 163 68 57 82 
2a 207 76 73 90 
2b 198 77 76 82 
3a 110 75 35 97 
3b 113 69 26 85 
k 119 77 59 95 
5 12k 69 74 85 
6 118 72 83 89 
Kan. 1 205 21 1+2 1+0 
2a 153 2k 63 60 
2b 112 28 63 ,i+8 
3a 162 27 52 62 
3b 183 37 88 69 
177 3i^  53 70 
5 i4o 1+0 1+7 62 
6 187 37 63 75 
Ta 146 37 20 50 
7b 2J+1+ 38 34 62 
Minn. 1-1^  187 28 65 77 
6 119 60 83 93 
7-8 181 62 9I+ 91 
Neb. 1 158 52 56 73 
2 220 1+3 63 68 
3a 163 50 1+7 62 
3b 181 62 71 89 
k 193 14.4 95 71 
5 173 59 88 81+ 
6 189 52 65 80 
7 15^ 1- 58 65 86 
S.D, 1 110 3lt 25 76 
2a 139 30 31 68 
2b 119 31 33 61+ 
3a 116 i^ 3 29 76 
3b 123 50 i+2 79 
13^  ^ 55 29 62 
kh 183 69 62 85 
Wis. 1 100 23 38 82 
2ab 128 73 79 91+ 
3 161 91 110 95 
U 116 ks 95 86 
5 lOii- 52 73 85 
6-7 95 1+6 81+ 98 
8-9 lii-7 93 .91 98 
2?0 

























































STATE COLLEGE AND OOCPERATIVE EXIENSICN WCMC ^ 
DEPARTMENT OF in 40-5193.1 
:ULTURE, CXX>PERATING AGRICULTURE AND HOME ECONOMICS Approval &ipir« 
STATE OF IOWA 
EXTENSION ^ EmriCB 
REGIONAL FARM RENTAL PRACTICES STUDY A«ES. iowa 
Dear Sir: 
Those who rent farms ask many questions about rental arrangements. Who pays new 
expenses? How can agreements be made to cover changes in farming methods? How can 
farm and home improvements be added? How can livestock be handled? 
You can help answer these questions. By filling out the following questionnaire 
you will be helping yourself and other renters. Please take time to complete and 
send your reply in the enclosed self addressed envelope. It does not take a stamp. 
A copy of the report will be sent to you. Your reply will be appreciated and will 





A. ABOUT YOUR FARM OPERATIONS IN 1951 
3W many acres did you farm in 1951? Acres 
f this, (a) how many did you own? Acres (b) How many did you rent? Acres 
lat is your age? Years 
lat were the three main products sold fron this farm in 1951? (name the specific crop, 
Lvestock or livestock product) (a)__ (b) (c) 
imber of livestock on hand on December IS, 1951 were: (a) Beef cows 
}) Other beef cattle • (c) Dairy cows aid heifers (d) Sows 
i )  Other hogs and pigs___ (f) 9ieep and lambs (g) Hens 
i) Broilers...^ (i) Other poultry 
rom how many landlords did you rent in 1951? Number 
TUflN PAGE FOR QUESTIONS ON THE INStDE 
NPTE; Please answer the remaining questions for only one landlord and for the 
rental agreement with that landlord, i£ you rent from more than one. Answer for 
the one whose name is first in the alphabet. Example: If the names are Smith 
and Jones, answer for Jones. 
B. ABOUT THE LANDLORD 
1. Check s/whether land is owned by: Individual Estate Partner­
ship Corporation Government Other 
2. How many acres did you rent from this landlord in 1951? Acres 
3. Check i/whether landlord is: Active farmer Retired farmer Busi­
ness or professional man Widow of farmer Non-farm widow 
Other 
4. What relation is landlord to you? To your wife? 
5. What is landlord's age? Years 
6. In making the rental agreement for this land, did you deal: (check \/{ (a) Directly 
with the landlord? (b) With his agent or manager? 
7. In discussing the operation of this land, do you deal: (check v/) (a) Directly 
with the landlord? (b) With his agent or manager? 
C. ABOUT THE RENTAL AGREEMENT WITH THIS'LANDLORD 
1. Do you live on this rented land? Yes— No . 
2. Was the rental agreement with this landlord in writing in 1951? Yes No, 
3. How many years have you rented this land? Years 
4. What month of the year does the agreement begin? Month 
5. What period does agreement cover? One Yr. Three yrs. Five yrs. Other 
6.  How much-notice is required to end the agreement? Months. 
7. Did you pay cash for the use of all or any part of this land in 1951? Yes No 
8. If any cash was paid, how much was paid per acre for: Hay land? $ Pasture? $ 
Rjilding lots? $ . How much for: Buildings? $ Other? $ ^Total farm? $— 
9. Crop shares: Indicate below the use of this land in 1951 and the landlord's share of 
the crops, such as: none, 1/3, 2/5, 1/2, or all 




d. Wheat , 
e. Alfalfa 
seed 







u« Legume hay_ 
V. Other hay 
Does your landlord own or receive income from any livestock covered by this rental 
agreement? Yes No. . If yes, indicate below the landlord's share of ownership 
and of sales such as: 0, 1/3, 2/5, 1/2 or all. 
Kind of Landlord's share Landlord'sshare 
livestock of ownership of sales 
Livestock Landlord's share of 
products product sales 
a. Dairy cattle 
b. Dairy calves 
c. Beef cattle 




h. Dairy products 
i- Eggs 
i. Wool 
Expenses. Indicate the shares of each cash expense on this land, for both you and the 
landlord such as: none, 1/3, 2/5, 1/2 or all. 
Item of expense 
.Share paid by 
Renter Landlord Item of expense 




c. Seed, small grain 
d. Seed, corn 
e. Seed, grass 
f. Seed, legume 
g. Seed, soybean 
i. Hired labor 
j. Combining small grain. 
k. Combining soybeans 
1. Hail insurance 
m. Government crop 
insurance 
p. Tractor fuel 
q. Weed spray materials_ 
Machinery and eouipment. Indi 
equipment used on this land. 
cate the sha 

















Weed spraying, hired 







Building repair labor 
Building repair 
materials 
Fence repair labor 
Fence repair material 
Electricity 
Terracing 
ownership of farm machinery and 
2/5, 1/2 or all. 
Kind of 
equipment 









d. Corn picker 
e. Field chopper 
f. Hay baler 
g. Weed sprayer 
h. Manure spreader 
i. Milk cooler 
j. Milking machines 
k. MiIk house 
m. Hay drier 
n. Grain drier 
o. Brooder houses 
p. Movable poultry houses 
q. Movable hog houses 
r. Electric fence 
s. Feed grinder 
V .  Terracing equipment 
w. Fertilizer equipment 
D. ABOUT IMPROVING RENTAL AGREEMENTS. 
1. Are arty changes in rental agreements needed to increase the income received by both 
renters and landlords in your community? Yes No 
Describe: 
2. Are any changes in rental agreements needed to increase soil conserving practices on 
rented farms in your community? Yes No 
Describe: 
3. Are any changes in rental agreements needed to encourage keeping more livestock on 
rented farms in your community? Yes No 
Describe: 
4. Are any changes in rental agreements needed to encourage making improvonents in 
buildings and land on rented farms in your community? Yes No 
Describe: 
5. Are you satisfied with your rental agreement ? Yes No 
Why, or why not? 
Describe: 
